Files
backrest/internal/api/syncapi/authmiddleware.go
Gareth 93becf3e32
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fix: multihost sync refinements (#830)
2025-11-01 18:29:35 -07:00

246 lines
7.7 KiB
Go

package syncapi
import (
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"slices"
"time"
"connectrpc.com/connect"
v1 "github.com/garethgeorge/backrest/gen/go/v1"
"github.com/garethgeorge/backrest/gen/go/v1sync"
"github.com/garethgeorge/backrest/internal/config"
"github.com/garethgeorge/backrest/internal/cryptoutil"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
)
var authTokenHeader = "Authorization"
var maxSignatureAge = 5 * time.Minute // Maximum age of a signature before it is considered invalid
type peerContextKey string
const PeerContextKey peerContextKey = "peer"
func ContextWithPeer(ctx context.Context, peer *v1.Multihost_Peer) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, PeerContextKey, peer)
}
func PeerFromContext(ctx context.Context) *v1.Multihost_Peer {
peer, ok := ctx.Value(PeerContextKey).(*v1.Multihost_Peer)
if !ok {
return nil
}
return peer
}
func newAuthHandler(config *config.ConfigManager, next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
config, err := config.Get()
if err != nil {
http.Error(rw, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
authHeaderValue, err := createAuthHeader(config)
if err != nil {
http.Error(rw, fmt.Sprintf("internal error: %v", err), http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
rw.Header().Set(authTokenHeader, authHeaderValue)
peer, err := decodeAndVerifyAuthHeader(r, config.Instance, config.GetMultihost().GetAuthorizedClients())
if err != nil {
http.Error(rw, fmt.Sprintf("unauthorized: %v", err), http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(rw, r.WithContext(context.WithValue(r.Context(), PeerContextKey, peer)))
})
}
func createAuthHeader(config *v1.Config) (string, error) {
if config == nil || config.GetMultihost().GetIdentity() == nil {
return "", errors.New("config missing multihost.identity")
}
privKey, err := cryptoutil.NewPrivateKey(config.GetMultihost().GetIdentity())
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("load private key: %w", err)
}
signedMessage, err := createSignedMessage([]byte(config.Instance), privKey)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("create signed message: %w", err)
}
authToken := &v1sync.AuthorizationToken{
InstanceId: signedMessage,
PublicKey: privKey.PublicKeyProto(),
}
tokenBytes, err := proto.Marshal(authToken)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("marshal auth token: %w", err)
}
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(tokenBytes), nil
}
type authHeaderClient struct {
configManager *config.ConfigManager
delegate connect.HTTPClient
wantPeer *v1.Multihost_Peer
}
func (c *authHeaderClient) Do(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
// create the header
cfg, err := c.configManager.Get()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("get config: %w", err)
}
authHeaderValue, err := createAuthHeader(cfg)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create auth header: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set(authTokenHeader, authHeaderValue)
resp, err := c.delegate.Do(req)
// verify the response header
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("HTTP request failed: %w", err)
}
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return resp, fmt.Errorf("HTTP request failed with status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, resp.Status)
}
peer, err := decodeAndVerifyAuthHeader(req, cfg.Instance, cfg.GetMultihost().GetAuthorizedClients())
if err != nil {
return resp, fmt.Errorf("verify auth header: %w", err)
}
// Check the peer matches the expected one.
if c.wantPeer == nil || c.wantPeer.GetInstanceId() != peer.GetInstanceId() {
return resp, fmt.Errorf("peer instance ID mismatch: expected %s, got %s", c.wantPeer.GetInstanceId(), peer.GetInstanceId())
}
if c.wantPeer.GetKeyid() != peer.GetKeyid() {
return resp, fmt.Errorf("peer key ID mismatch: expected %s, got %s", c.wantPeer.GetKeyid(), peer.GetKeyid())
}
return resp, nil
}
func newHTTPClientWithConfig(cfg *config.ConfigManager, delegate connect.HTTPClient) (connect.HTTPClient, error) {
return &authHeaderClient{
configManager: cfg,
delegate: delegate,
}, nil
}
func decodeAndVerifyAuthHeader(r *http.Request, localInstanceID string, peers []*v1.Multihost_Peer) (*v1.Multihost_Peer, error) {
authHeader := r.Header.Get(authTokenHeader)
if len(authHeader) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("missing authorization header")
}
// Decode the auth token from the header
tokenBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(authHeader)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.New("invalid authorization header format")
}
var token v1sync.AuthorizationToken
if err := proto.Unmarshal(tokenBytes, &token); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal authorization token: %w", err)
}
// Load the public key from the token
publicKey, err := cryptoutil.NewPublicKey(token.GetPublicKey())
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("load public key: %w", err)
}
if publicKey.KeyID() != token.InstanceId.GetKeyid() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("instance ID must be signed with public key in token: expected %s, got %s", token.InstanceId.GetKeyid(), publicKey.KeyID())
}
// Verify the signed message
if err := verifySignedMessage(token.GetInstanceId(), publicKey); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("verify signed message: %w", err)
}
// Now that we've validated that the peer was able to sign the message, we can look it up in the config
peerIdx := slices.IndexFunc(peers, func(peer *v1.Multihost_Peer) bool {
return peer.Keyid == publicKey.KeyID()
})
if peerIdx == -1 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("peer with key ID %s not found in authorized clients", publicKey.KeyID())
}
// Finally check that the instance ID in the token matches the one in the config
peer := peers[peerIdx]
tokenInstanceID := string(token.GetInstanceId().GetPayload())
if peer.InstanceId != tokenInstanceID {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("instance ID mismatch: expected %s, got %s", peer.InstanceId, tokenInstanceID)
}
return peer, nil
}
func createSignedMessage(payload []byte, identity *cryptoutil.PrivateKey) (*v1.SignedMessage, error) {
if len(payload) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("payload must not be empty")
}
timestampMillis := time.Now().UnixMilli()
payloadWithTimestamp := make([]byte, 0, len(payload)+8)
binary.BigEndian.AppendUint64(payloadWithTimestamp, uint64(timestampMillis))
payloadWithTimestamp = append(payloadWithTimestamp, payload...)
signature, err := identity.Sign(payloadWithTimestamp)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("signing payload: %w", err)
}
return &v1.SignedMessage{
Payload: payload,
Signature: signature,
Keyid: identity.KeyID(),
TimestampMillis: timestampMillis,
}, nil
}
func verifySignedMessage(msg *v1.SignedMessage, publicKey *cryptoutil.PublicKey) error {
if msg == nil {
return errors.New("signed message must not be nil")
}
if len(msg.GetPayload()) == 0 {
return errors.New("signed message payload must not be empty")
}
if len(msg.GetSignature()) == 0 {
return errors.New("signed message signature must not be empty")
}
if len(msg.GetKeyid()) == 0 {
return errors.New("signed message key ID must not be empty")
}
if publicKey.KeyID() != msg.GetKeyid() {
return fmt.Errorf("public key ID mismatch: expected %s, got %s", publicKey.KeyID(), msg.GetKeyid())
}
payloadWithTimestamp := make([]byte, 0, len(msg.GetPayload())+8)
binary.BigEndian.AppendUint64(payloadWithTimestamp, uint64(msg.GetTimestampMillis()))
payloadWithTimestamp = append(payloadWithTimestamp, msg.GetPayload()...)
if err := publicKey.Verify(payloadWithTimestamp, msg.GetSignature()); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("verifying signed message: %w", err)
}
if time.Since(time.UnixMilli(msg.GetTimestampMillis())) > maxSignatureAge {
return fmt.Errorf("signature is too old, max age is %s. Is the clock out of sync?", maxSignatureAge)
}
return nil
}