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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Daniel Salazar
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589a98b12c |
feat(kv): share KV prefixes with other users at watch/read/write, and bound what apps can be granted (#4331)
* feat(kv): share key-value prefixes with other users, and bound what apps can be granted - KV share handles move out of Events into KvShareService, served at /kv/shares (the /events/kv-handles routes stay as an alias). - Shares have watch, read and write levels, encoded in the permission root (kv-share, kv-share-read, kv-share-write) with write implying read and watch. - Every puter.kv method takes optConfig.handle; keys are relative to the shared prefix, cursors are sealed, and private entries stay hidden. - New puter.kv.share, unshare, listShared and listSharedByMe; optional label; kv.share.received notice in the app's mailbox only; recipient blocks apply. - puter.kv.set gains onlyIfAbsent. - fs and kv events gain viaWorker, and kv events report self from the writer. - /auth/grant-user-app only accepts canonical permissions from a fixed set of families; the consent dialog, puter.perms and docs follow. - Migrations: kv_share_handles gains revoked_by, label, and grantee and app indexes (mysql_mig_49, postgres_mig_38, sqlite 0095). * fix(kv): never name a private key in a cross-app or handle cursor, and bound flat-permission scans - Listings of another namespace (cross-app or through a handle) resume after the last entry they returned, and their cursors are sealed, bound to the namespace or handle, and padded to one length. Old plain cross-app cursors are still read when they name the target namespace; other namespaces get 400. - PermissionStore scans flat permissions a few roots at a time and skips roots nested under another root in the same call. |
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Daniel Salazar
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45f6e9d8ee |
refactor(drivers-wiring): AppService views and launch gates, batched app lookups, shared driver policy and guards (#4186)
* perf(workers): skip hot-reload lookups for files no worker is bound to
The fs.write.file / fs.remove.node / fs.move.node listeners listed every
workers.puter.* row of the file's owner on every event, for every user.
The event's FSEntry already carries the worker rows bound to it, so a file
with none returns before any I/O; a bound file reads just its own rows,
batched, from the primary.
* perf(apps): read the uid alias only after a direct lookup misses
Every AppDriver uid lookup fired an uncached system-KV GetItem for the
merge alias in parallel with the direct read, even when the direct read
hit. The alias is now read only on a miss.
* refactor(apps): one app view with the launch gates, built by AppService
AppDriver's serializer and its private-app / hosted-backing gates move to
AppService.views, built on a pure toAppView that is the one place
index_url is withheld. AppDriver, the subdomains driver's embedded apps and
the GUI shell view all use it. Visibility of protected apps
(filterReadable) moves with it.
Subdomain embeds (associated_app, app_owner) used to return index_url with
no gate; they now withhold it from a viewer who may not open a private app
or whose hosted backing is gone, and carry privateAccess, godmode and
feedback_enabled like a direct app read.
* refactor(apps): one toAppSummary; batch the recommended and taskbar lookups
SuggestedApps, RecommendedApps, /get-launch-apps and the taskbar each built
their own launch summary; they now share toAppSummary (the extra
feedback_enabled / external flags appear on the lists that lacked them).
getRecommendedApps awaited getByName once per recommended app (29) and
getTaskbarItems did the same per taskbar entry on every whoami; both now
make one batched call per key through the new AppStore.getByNames, which
keeps getByName's case-insensitive and old-name matching. The taskbar's
raw UPDATE of the user row goes through UserStore.update, and
/get-launch-apps checks hosted backings in one batch and reaches the
stores without casts.
* refactor(apps): app routes read through AppService; /delete-site calls the subdomains driver
AppController used the global driversContainers through a getter whose
boot-order comment no longer held; it uses the injected drivers and
AppService. GET /apps/:name looked each name up, read it again through the
driver and resolved private access a second time, emitting
app.privateAccess.resolveLaunch twice per private app; it now batches the
names and resolves once. POST /query/app did a lookup, a driver read and a
raw app_filetype_association SELECT per selector (up to 200, serially); it
now makes one batched lookup per key, one grant check and one filetype read.
The driver's read shape is a pure toAppReadView both use.
HostingController's /delete-site re-implemented the subdomains driver's
delete (protected check, delete, subdomain.delete event); it keeps its
owner-scoped 404 and calls the driver. Hosting and Desktop controllers drop
constructors that discarded the drivers argument, and trivial getters.
* refactor(drivers): one per-method policy validator and resolver; drop @Driver
Four policy blocks (rateLimit, concurrent, requireSubscription,
requireReputation) share the { default, methods } shape but each had its
own validator and resolver. They become validatePerMethod(value, label,
policy) and resolvePerMethod(cfg, method); error messages are unchanged.
The @Driver class decorator and the prototype keys it wrote had no users
outside its own tests; drivers declare their fields, and resolveDriverMeta
reads only those. DriverController takes the driver name from the meta it
already resolved instead of probing the prototype.
resolveDriverMethodRateLimit/Concurrent stay as deprecated aliases for the
email extension.
* refactor(drivers): shared actor guards and crud-q concurrency policy
The apps, subdomains, workers and notifications drivers each carried a
private #requireActor, two carried the same #requireVerified, and apps and
subdomains the same owner/app_owner write predicate. These become
requireContextActor, requireContextUserActor, assertActorEmailVerified and
actorOwnsRow in core/actor.ts; each driver keeps its own error for the
cases that differed (system actors still read apps; notifications still
answer 403 for an actor without a user). The identical crud-q concurrency
block is one CRUD_CONCURRENT constant.
The metering, installedApps and appTelemetry extensions re-checked an actor
their routes already require; those checks and the tests for them go.
* refactor(extensions): store methods instead of raw SQL in OSS extensions
installedApps and appTelemetry queried user_to_app_permissions directly
and metering read apps by name with its own SELECT. PermissionStore gains
listAppsGrantedByUser, listAppAuthenticatedUsers (with the email-share
check folded in) and countAppUsers; metering uses AppStore.getByName.
* refactor(server): one layer builder and one lifecycle hook runner
PuterServer built each of its five layers with its own copy of the same
loop (built-ins, then extension additions, into the layer and its export
container), and ran each lifecycle hook with five near-identical loops per
hook. Both are now one helper each: #instantiateLayer and
#runHook(order, hook). Construction order, the args each layer receives,
and hook order (start and prepare bottom-up, shutdown top-down) are
unchanged.
* fix(workers): tear down a deleted source's worker after its FK nulls root_dir_id
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Juan Fernando CastroandDaniel Salazar
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a46eb15d5e |
Let the account's own API token reach the routes a privileged app needs (#4032)
* feat: let the account's own API token reach the routes it should
A privileged app is launched with the GUI session token today. Running one on a
full-access personal access token instead costs much less when it leaks, but
several routes those apps depend on refuse every access token, so the swap would
break them.
Admitted, each a read or a write the token's own HTTP reach already covers:
- the realtime socket handshake, which refused access tokens outright; FS
live updates and notifications stop without it
- GET /get-dev-profile and POST /profile, both puter.js surface
- GET /auth/list-permissions — a read of what was granted, not a grant
- GET /share/shared-by-me/apps and GET /share/audit, over grants
/share/shared-by-me already lists for the same credential
- POST /rao, which puter.js calls on every setAuthToken
Gated on `isAccountContext`, not the `full_access` claim alone, so a token with
an app anywhere in its chain is still refused and a socket for one never joins
the user room.
Left session-only: mint, session, 2FA, grant, team and billing, plus two the
list named. /share/blocks is a personal safety control whose only caller is the
desktop's Blocked Senders window. /app-feedback is reachable only from our own
GUI pages, and being unsubmittable programmatically on a user's behalf is the
property it was built with.
The new HTTP suite drives a real server with a minted token and fails on all six
admissions without the change; the block routes' existing metadata check already
pins their refusal.
* test: sort the two token shapes at the events handshake
* fix: carry the account-context invariant into the HTTP gate
`requireUserActorGate` admitted on the raw `full_access` claim while the socket
and /rao use `isAccountContext`, so one shape — a token carrying the claim with
an app in its chain, or an actor built without `makeActor` — would have been
refused in two places and admitted in the third. Unreachable today, since the
mint and the auth-time read both drop the claim when `app_uid` is present, but
it is the invariant this change states and it should hold at every enforcement
point.
The payout address goes back behind a plain session: `/get-dev-profile` is open
to the account's own token now, and the rest of what it answers is a developer's
own name and incentive-program status.
Also drops a cross-reference in EventsService to the socket posture this change
relaxed, and rewords the block-routes comment, which read as if access tokens
were admitted there rather than refused.
* fix: drop a revoked token's sockets, and read the dev-profile columns
Two gaps the review found, both reachable only because this branch lets the
account's own token hold a socket and call /get-dev-profile.
`#revokeAccessTokenTail` soft-revoked the session row and told no one, so a
revoked token kept its connection — and the account's `outer.gui.*` fan with it
— until the five-minute reauth sweep. Sockets now join a per-token room and a
new `auth.access-token.revoked` event drops exactly that room, so the account's
other tabs stay up. Session revoke keeps its account-wide eviction.
`/get-dev-profile` read `first_name`, `last_name`, `paypal` and the two
incentive flags off the user row, which carries none of them: the columns have
always been `dev_`-prefixed, so the endpoint answered nulls to everyone and
`puter.apps.getDeveloperProfile()` has never returned anything. Reads the real
columns, keeping the unprefixed name as a fallback for a deployment carrying
both. The payout address stays behind a plain session, so opening the route to
the account's token hands over a name and incentive status and nothing else.
Both fail without the fix: the socket test waits five seconds on a connection
that should already be gone, and the profile test reads back a seeded row.
* fix: close /open_item to tokens, and stop the node runner leaking sockets
`/open_item` carried `allowFullAccessToken`, but it grants an app a permission
on the user's behalf and mints the app token to go with it — a grant and a mint,
which stay session-only. Pre-existing, and missed by the first sweep here, which
only asked whether routes lacking the flag should gain it and never re-read the
ones that already had it. Refused at the top of the handler too, so a credential
that gets past the gate cannot leave an ACL row behind.
The node runner loads each SDK into a vm context and never closed it, so every
test leaked a socket, and every socket holds a per-(user, origin) connection
slot. Admitting the account's own token to the handshake pushed that past the
cap, and the whole events block failed with `events_connection_failed` while the
browser and workerd runners — which do not leak — passed. Closing the FS socket
and the events channel after each test gives the slots back.
* fix: announce only the revokes that can have a socket to drop
Every access-token revoke broadcast an eviction cluster-wide, including the
read-URL tokens `revokeReadUrl` retires constantly. A scoped token is refused at
the handshake, so none of those broadcasts could ever reach a connection.
The announcement now goes out only for a token the handshake would have
admitted: full access, no app in the chain. `revokeOwnAccessToken` refuses
full-access tokens outright, so that whole path is silent; a revoke by raw uuid
says nothing about the token and still announces, which costs a no-op broadcast
rather than leaving a revoked socket up.
Fails without it: the test revokes a scoped token and a full-access one through
the same entry point and counts the announcements.
* test: pin the mint route against the account's own token
`/auth/create-access-token` carries only `requireAuth`, so it never showed up
in the sweep over `requireUserActor` routes — the refusal lives in
`AuthService.createAccessToken`, which turns away any access-token actor
outright. That holds today, and a leaked full-access token minting itself a
sibling that survives revoking the original is exactly what the token swap is
meant to rule out, so it is worth a test rather than a reading.
* fix: let the recommended-apps test follow the list it tests
Two commits on main rewrote `RECOMMENDED_APP_NAMES` without touching the test,
which seeds `editor` and `camera` and asserts the result contains them. Neither
is on the list any more, so the resolved set came back empty and `test (base)`
has failed on every PR since.
The test now seeds the first two names off the list itself and asserts on those,
so the next edit to it cannot strand the test: prepending two unknown apps keeps
all four cases green.
* feat: let an extension waive a plan gate for one route or driver method
A plan gate about to refuse a caller now emits
`subscription.gate.<surface>` through `emitAndWait` first:
`route.<method>.<path>` for a route, `driver.<iface>.<method>` for a driver
method, `share.anyone` for link shares. The payload carries the actor, the
request and the requirement, and a listener that sets `allow` waives the plan
for that call. Callers the plan already covers never reach the hook, and a
listener that throws leaves the refusal in place.
* feat: mint godmode apps their own full-access token
`/auth/get-user-app-token` answers a desktop launch of a godmode app (the
`godmode` column) with a full-access token instead of an app token. Origin
lookups, the sign-in popups for pages outside the desktop, keep getting
ordinary app tokens, and only a web session may mint one.
The token carries the app in `godmode_app_uid`, read into
`accessToken.godmodeApp` for attribution only: `effectiveApp` stays null, so
it keeps the account's reach and passes the same gates as a personal access
token, including the vendor-compatible AI routes. It is refused once the app
is gone or no longer godmode.
Its row is an `access_token` session parented to the web session that asked,
with `app_uid` set, so signing out, revoking that session or revoking all
sessions takes it along, and the sessions list shows it under the app. Each
mint re-signs onto the same row with a 12h `exp` and moves the row's expiry
out, so the desktop keeps an open app alive while a copy taken earlier still
expires on schedule.
A full-access token may now mint scoped tokens (read URLs), parented to its
own row; it still may not mint full access. Revoking a full-access token
cascades to the tokens it minted.
An access token whose session row has a parent now authenticates only while
that parent is live, so a read URL a godmode app minted lapses with the app's
token, and through it with the desktop session.
* feat: launch godmode apps on their own token and renew it
The desktop asks for a godmode app's token at launch and blocks the launch if
it can't get one, as it does for other apps; a godmode app never runs on the
desktop's session token. While the window is open the desktop re-mints the
token once less than 6h of its 12h remain, checking on a timer and when the
tab becomes visible, and answers the app's `reauth_required` with a fresh one,
posted to the app's origin.
puter.js keeps a godmode token in sessionStorage like a session token, never
in localStorage. In app mode a 401 on a godmode token, background requests
included, asks the desktop for a new token and replays, and a `puter.token`
message is only taken from the embedding frame.
The sessions list shows a godmode token row with its app's title and icon.
* fix: keep a godmode token the same across renewals
Apps hand their launch token to code that never sees a replacement (the
terminal's Drive mount, a CLI's API key), so a token re-signed every renewal
broke those copies once the first one expired. The JWT now carries no `exp`
and a renewal moves only its row's expiry, so every copy keeps working while
the desktop keeps the app alive.
What still bounds it:
- only the desktop's web session can extend it; using the token never does,
and signing out or revoking that session revokes it;
- it lapses 12h after the desktop last asked, and a lapsed row is never
revived: the next launch gets a new token;
- however often it is renewed, a token is replaced after 7 days, and the old
one is revoked on the spot along with the tokens it minted and its sockets.
The desktop no longer re-posts a renewal that kept the same token, so the
app's sockets aren't rebuilt every few hours; an app that reports its token
stopped working is always answered.
* fix: reserve the feedback and no-reply mailbox names again
Signup checks names against `util/reservedUsernames`, but `fbl`, `noreply` and
`no-reply` were added to a second copy of the list in AuthController that
nothing reads any more, so they became claimable. Move them into the live list
and drop the copy.
---------
Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>
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Daniel Salazar
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007d5391a1 |
fix(events): carry handler depth onto tokens a handler mints (#4049)
An events handler could mint a fresh token for its own app through /sign or /auth/create-access-token, and writes made with it started a new chain. An app token minted from a handler token now carries its handler_depth and expires with it; an access token carries the depth at the lifetime asked for. |
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Daniel Salazar
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4448103ef0 |
fix: misc events and kv issues found during recipes (#3997)
* fix: misc events and kv issues found during recipes * test: cover handler depth on narrowed actors and created notifications * test: fix stale legacy batch directory upload test and seat user-agent flake * test: wait for the refusal to be recorded before claiming its gap marker |
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Daniel Salazar
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9292771554 | fix: hardening (#3904) | ||
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Daniel Salazar
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194ca7c789 |
fix: list a link share only while the owner's plan covers it (#3891)
* fix: list a link share only while the owner's plan covers it * chore: types + jsdoc cleanup |
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Daniel Salazar
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ed7e0b9cc4 |
fix: sharing, events and worker-credential authorization hardening (#3855)
- PUT-1800: gate `createWorkerSessionToken` on actor type, so an app or an access token can no longer mint an app-less, root-shaped worker session; `WorkerDriver` binds on `effectiveApp` instead of `app`. - PUT-1799: add `isAccountContext` and read it where "no app" was being read as "the account" — handler publish, events-worker listing, kv handle mint/revoke/list. A scoped API token is no longer an account session. - PUT-1802: re-authorize a durable row before its backlog drains, settling it permanently when the grant is gone. Covers an ancestor-level unshare, which the revoke settle deliberately leaves to the delivery re-check. - PUT-1803: mask the owner's absolute path out of deliveries and subscription anchors on a foreign node, the way every FS surface already does. - PUT-1804: let a revoke reach rows already suspended for a resumable reason, re-stamping them so a resume cannot hand over the held backlog. - PUT-1805: apply the subscribe path's audience gate to `/events/fetch` before the query, so a cursor can no longer count and name invisible notifications. - PUT-1807: refuse `mode: 'manage'` from any actor holding an app — inside its own AppData the ACL short-circuit would otherwise supply the reach. - PUT-1808: take the sending peer from the verified signature header rather than the request body. - PUT-1810: re-base a kv share-handle row's stored match filter on the handle, so the owner's absolute key prefix stays hidden. - PUT-1814: escape LIKE wildcards and anchor the issuer-prefix queries on a segment; anchor `manage:` stripping; reject a backslash in a share prefix; assert a resolved actor in `subscribeDurable`. - PUT-1815: bound the char/varchar columns behind `event_subscriptions` and `kv_share_handles` at the store layer. |
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Juan Fernando CastroandDaniel Salazar
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d202be10a9 |
feat: let apps use another app's data with user consent (#3516)
* feat(perms): add cross-app app-data permission vocabulary * feat(perms): sweep app grants by permission prefix * feat(perms): resolve and withdraw cross-app data grants * feat(kv): support an authorized namespace override and per-key privacy * feat(kv): gate cross-app KV access behind app-data grants * feat(fs): allow cross-app AppData access and require a scope to delete * feat(auth): accept permission lists and gate app-data grants * feat(perms): add requestAppData to the puter.js SDK * feat(gui): carry permission lists through the IPC and popup transports * feat(gui): describe cross-app data requests in the consent dialog * docs: document requestAppData and per-entry KV privacy * perf(perms): sweep cross-app grants only for origin-bootstrapped apps * fix(gui): stop double-encoding cross-app consent text * fix(perms): close three gaps in cross-app grant enforcement * fix(kv): meter and batch the per-entry privacy probe * fix(perms): resolve app identifiers and scopes more strictly in the SDK * test(perms): cover the cross-app consent flow end to end * fix: small missing token resolution for app also adds the same exclusion for the batchPut api, small change * fix: make resolved actor optional --------- Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com> |
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Daniel Salazar
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116d6e6663 | tests: big test push for better coverage (#3490) | ||
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Daniel Salazar
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861cf5efb8 | feat: email api wip (#3391) | ||
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Daniel Salazar
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f6408db74e | fix: access tokens with full accesses allowed through with new middleware gate (#3234) | ||
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Daniel Salazar
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101e0bc930 | fix: search leaking metadata (#3150) | ||
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Daniel Salazar
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0276420213 |
fix: treat access tokens as non-auth unless opted in (#3111)
* fix: treat access tokens as non-auth unless opted in * fix: tests |
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Daniel Salazar
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26cff23af4 |
chore: cleanup types for metering (#3074)
* chore: cleanup types for metering * fix: error responses |
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Nariman Jelveh
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267f464232 | Add AGPL license headers to source files (#2877) | ||
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d4d78ac7db |
rework: change backend and backend extensions to use simpler code structure and patterns (#2815)
* fix: dynamodb health checks and client recreation (#2789) * wip: no nanoServices groundwork * feat: data clients in new shape * wip: auth and perms in new system * more wip * middlewaters mainly done * wip: fsv2 in new layout * old fs v2 migration * driver system * driver and old fs fixes * ai drivers wip * stream support * metering in ai chat driver * wip: new auth * rate limit and auth routes * captcha and anti csrf * fix: types * auth store * app logic * wip most other dricvers * fs * mostly kill all legacy stuff * fs finish * fix: redis usage * ai controller * driver cleanup * socket io in v2 * broadcast and crudq stuff * subdomains * notifcations and shares * fix bad syntaxes * auth wip Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * extensions * extension setup * more routes * sql migrations and default services * home router * tier 7 * everything else * everything else * remaining missing bits * server health * logs * cleanup * deps * cleanup 2 * more cleanup 2 * boot * fix launch * config fix * move file * fix: tsconfig things * fix: extension loading * launching * fix: drivers * fix: others * fix: icons * fix: file uploads * fs fixes * fix: fs api * fix: dev-center * config * add back telemetry * lint stuff * husky hooks * fix: fs oss * fix: config migration * config migration * migrate scripts + replicate * runner * fix: merge defafult config * fix: default region * fix: api domain * fix paths in readfile * fix fs entry default s3 * NS: Remove Referral && Entri Service * dep cleanups * fix: static assets * fix: kv and perms * fix: driver registrations * fix: home mapping * fix: rao * adding back 500 alarm * fix: build paths * fix: fs and kv shapes * fix: kv shape * more kv coercing and ai chat matching format as prior * fix: private app gates * private app caches * fix: whole bunch of legacy shape issues * update template jsonc * fix caching partial oidc and fs signed paths * more oidc fixes * fix: wip * fix: private apps * admin route fixes * fix: last few things hopefully * claude uploads * fix security for app only routes * fix kv system namespace * stuff * fix: app and kv and suggested apps * fix:open item * fix: FS operations * fix: default app icons * add back token-read and WSL support * metering fixes * fix: fsEntry * perm scanners and implicators * proper download endpoint * fix: download * fix anti csrft on v2 * fix file extensions, app icons * fold in v1 fixes from origin/main into v2 equivalents Re-applies the v1 fixes that landed on origin/main into their v2 counterparts since the v1 files were deleted on DS/wip during the v2 migration. v1 commits referenced below. - SQLBatcher: flush immediately when queue hits maxBatchSize instead of racing the timer (v1 12f48238). - RedisClient: drop maxRetriesPerRequest from 2 to 1 to shrink failure window (v1 |