`useCredentialChain: true` in `dynamo.aws`, `providers['aws-polly']` or
`providers['aws-textract']` takes credentials from the default AWS chain
instead of static keys, as `s3.s3Config` already does. One provider is shared
and refreshes temporary credentials itself.
- Providers send upstream calls with a driver-owned `upstreamSignal`
instead of the caller's `abortSignal`. A disconnect detaches the chat
stream: output stops, the provider keeps reading until the upstream
reports usage, and that usage is metered.
- A detached stream gets SDK_TIMEOUT_MS to finish. After that the driver
aborts the upstream, and the stream is metered like any other stream
that ends without usage.
- The disconnect check also runs right before dispatch.
- The OpenAI stream handlers report usage that arrived before an abort.
- Docs: stopping a stream stops the output, and a request that reached
the model is billed in full. Detached streams get 10 more minutes.
Image, video, TTS, speech-to-text and voice-changer driver tests run one
request at factor 1 and again with every `ai.cost.factor.*` hook set to
2, and check that both the credit hold and the recorded cost double.
Chat and OCR already had this coverage. A driver that hands a provider
the raw metering service instead of its factored view now fails its
test.
`withAiCostFactorHook` in integrationTestUtil keeps the hook in place
for a callback, since providers record their usage unawaited.
Infron (a new-api gateway) answers "bad response status code N" with the
upstream's status when the upstream replied without a JSON error, e.g. a
model the upstream no longer serves. That 4xx was classified as the
caller's bad request, so the request skipped fallback, the dead route
stayed in rotation, and the caller got upstream_bad_request. It now counts
as an upstream failure: fallback runs, the route is marked unhealthy, and
an exhausted chain reports upstream_provider_unavailable. A gateway error
that carries the vendor's own message still stays request-level.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(teams): refuse to boot when teams_enabled has nothing registering Teams
Core's seat checks (team 2FA, seat password reset, email and username
changes, self-delete, the signup placeholder claim) read the team store and
skip when it is absent. With `teams_enabled` on and no extension registering
the store and service, the server now fails at boot instead of serving
without those checks.
- whoami no longer string-matches the extension proxy's "missing property"
error: with the flag on, the store is always there.
- Tests that turned the flag on without Teams drop it; the puter.js harness
sets it only under the `teams` capability.
- Drop a stale services/index.ts comment.
* refactor(gui): drop the Teams console styles, which ship with the console now
* feat(metering): let registered plans declare free and no-allowance traits
A policy passed to registerPolicy can now set `free: true`, so
isFreeSubscription and everything that reads it count the plan as free.
It can also set `noAllowance: true`: the plan grants no monthly
allowance, so only purchased credit can be spent, and the cached
credit check refuses an actor that has none. A non-positive allowance
without the trait still means the plan is not metered.
getActorSubscriptionStatus returns the plan along with whether it was
paid for and whether the answer is provisional (a lookup behind it
failed, or the actor lacks a field resolvers key on), so callers can
tell a fallback from a resolved plan. getActorSubscription is unchanged.
* feat(metering): provisional resolver answers, and tighter no-allowance accounting
A subscription resolver can answer { id, provisional: true }. The answer
wins like any id but is cached only for the fallback window.
On a no-allowance plan, the month record now records allowanceUsed = 0,
so spend that purchased credit paid for is not counted again against an
allowance the actor gets later in the month. An actor that never had
budget raises no credit-state event. setMonthAllowance refuses plans
whose allowance an override never applies to.
* fix(metering): keep resolved plans clean when a default fails, and announce moves onto no budget
A failed or provisional default resolver now marks the answer provisional
only when the default is what applied; an explicit plan that won is
cached for the full window. A provisional answer with no id still marks
the result provisional.
A plan or credit change now re-arms an actor's credit alert instead of
forgetting it, so an actor moving onto a plan with no budget hears
'exhausted' once. An actor never seen with budget still hears nothing.
* chore(metering): let a provisional answer carry no id, and fix two resolver docs
* chore: one-line comments
* refactor: let core run without a teams registration
Teams becomes optional: `services.team` and `stores.team` may be absent, and
core stops assuming either is there.
Seventeen call sites across share, signup, account deletion and the homepage
now degrade instead of throwing: a team recipient that cannot be resolved is
"no such recipient" rather than a fault, a group share folds in nothing, and
account deletion stops asking what a seat was charged for. This generalises
the pattern `gates.ts` and `SocketService` already used.
Teams' own files take a private handle to their store and service, so the
feature's code stays free of optionality that only core needs.
No behaviour changes where Teams is registered.
* refactor: put a contract between core and teams
`core/teams.ts` holds the shapes core reads and the calls it makes, and the
registries declare the pair as provided rather than built in. The service,
store and controller are registered by whatever runs the feature.
Typing them properly turned up eight AuthController call sites the previous
commit could not see: the controller reads its stores from the built-in
registry, so an absent `team` fell to an index signature and typed as
`unknown` instead of erroring. They now go through the same optional path as
the rest.
The feature's own tests move with it. The cases in core suites that build a
team to exercise a core rule still need relocating, so those suites are red
here.
* test: stub core's seat rules, rehome the rest with the feature
A core suite can no longer build a team, so the rules that refuse a seat get
`testFixtures/seatStub.ts` instead: it answers the contract, which is all
those rules read, and puts the registry back when the test ends.
Seventeen cases move that way. Four could not: group shares and a seat's 2FA
enrolment over HTTP need the real feature and the `/teams` route, so they go
with it, as does the whole of `GroupGrants.test.ts`.
Two whoami cases asserted a seat's team through `extension.import`, which
resolves the registry rather than the stores object. They now assert the
absent case, and the behaviour they covered is asserted against
`buildUserDetails`, which takes its stores as an argument.
Suite: 12252 passed, 38 skipped.
* refactor: take the teams console out of the built-in tabs
`TabTeams`, `teamsConsole` and `teamActionIcons` are no longer built in. The
dashboard already invites a tab through its `dashboard-will-open` event, so
whatever provides Teams contributes the console the same way.
Its 113 strings go with it and register into the shipped English dictionary
at load, so `i18n('teams_*')` resolves as it did. Only `en.js` ever carried
them, so no translation is lost.
Three modules stay, because things other than the console use them:
`teamBadge` (the dashboard shell), `orgSeat` (Home, Account, Security) and
`shareTeams` (the share picker). They already render nothing when the
account has no team. `teams_account_of` stays with `teamBadge` for the same
reason, and the `share_*` and `plan_team_*` strings stay with their callers.
The GUI builds clean with no console at all, and builds it in when the tab
is contributed.
* docs: seats past the owner's current limit get no allowance
Presigned URLs die with the credentials that signed them, and the SDK only refreshes temporary credentials five minutes before expiry, so a URL signed late in a credential's life could expire long before its requested lifetime (up to an hour). The chain provider now reports expiry an hour early and force-refreshes credentials that are already inside that window.
Node 26's bundled undici negotiates HTTP/2 by default with a 256 KB
per-stream receive window, which capped large downloads at about
window / RTT (8.6 MB/s vs 46 MB/s over HTTP/1.1 at 23 ms). The guard swaps
in an Agent of the same class with 4 MB stream / 16 MB connection windows.
* chore: move to Node 26
Docker image and CI run on Node 26 (bookworm-slim, same Debian base as before).
Node 26's bundled undici reads the global dispatcher from the
`undici.globalDispatcher.2` slot, so the guard's 10-minute timeout wrap on
`.1` no longer reached plain fetch() and provider calls fell back to the
5-minute headers timeout. The guard now wraps every present slot and tracks
wrapped dispatchers in a set, since compose() can return a Proxy that writes
a marker property through to the original dispatcher.
* test(puter-js): disable Node's web storage in test workers
Node 26 defines its own localStorage global, undefined without a storage
file, and vitest's jsdom environment doesn't replace globals that already
exist, so jsdom tests saw localStorage as undefined.
index_url may not point at a system host: the origin, the api host, or a
subdomain an extension has claimed. App create and update now apply the
same refusal to `<claimed>.<domain>` (any case, any port) that they apply
to the origin and api hosts.
The host-to-claim match is a new exported `subdomainLabelOf` in
hostRedirects, also used by the claim dispatch middleware, so both
decide the same way.
Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>
* fix(fs): support offset and byte_count in read operations
Allow partial content reads via offset and byte_count parameters in puter.fs.read and backend FS controllers.
- In puter.js read operation, check options.offset and options.byte_count against null/undefined so offset: 0 is preserved in query params.
- In handle_resp, accept any 2xx status code so 206 Partial Content responses resolve successfully.
- In backend FS controllers (LegacyFSController and FSController), derive the HTTP byte range from query offset/byte_count parameters when an explicit Range header is not present.
- Add unit and integration tests across controllers and SDK test suites.
* fix(fs): strict range params, 416 past EOF, drop format churn
- resolveReadRange accepts only decimal digit strings and safe integers
- readContent maps S3 InvalidRange to 416 instead of a 500
- revert unrelated union-type reformatting, restore truncated test comment
---------
Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>
* feat(ai): add Kling for video, image and speech generation
One `kling` API key now registers a provider on three drivers:
- txt2vid: Kling 3.0 Turbo, 3.0, 3.0 Omni, O1, 2.6 and 2.5 Turbo,
with first/last frames, reference images on the omni models, native
audio, and editing a source video on 3.0 Omni and O1. Billed per
second at the resolution, audio and video-input rate; an edit is held
at the longest source and billed for the clip Kling returns.
- txt2img: Kling Image 3.0, 3.0 Omni, O1 and 2.1, billed per image.
- txt2speech: Kling TTS with its English and Chinese voices, billed per
request.
Kling's business error codes map onto the driver error contract, so an
exhausted resource pack reports as credit exhaustion and a submit-time
content block as `moderation_flagged`. "Risk control" failures now
count as content-filter refusals.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ai): treat Kling's unknown-model codes as a Puter-side failure
Kling answers 1202/1203 when the method or model isn't one it serves.
Puter picks both, so these meant catalog drift but surfaced as a 400 that
blamed the caller and raised no alarm. They now return 502 upstream_failed
with a warning alarm.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ai): tighten Kling input checks and error mapping
- 3.0 Turbo takes at most 2,500 prompt characters with a first frame,
the image-to-video endpoint's limit.
- O1 refuses reference images together with a first and last frame.
- 3.0 Omni accepts a source of up to 15.5 seconds, and an edit is held
at 16 seconds to cover it.
- A source video Kling can't decode fails as 400 upstream_bad_request
instead of a Puter-side 502.
- A 1201 about the model counts as catalog drift, like 1202/1203.
- Auth failures no longer pass Kling's console wording to the caller.
Adds integration tests for the image, video and TTS providers, gated
on PUTER_TEST_AI_KLING_API_KEY.
* feat(ai): wait up to 14 minutes for a video job
Video jobs, Kling edits in particular, can take over 10 minutes. The
poll window and the Gemini Omni deadline move to 14 minutes, under the
SDK's 15-minute idle timeout, with holds and signed source links
lengthened to match. The keep-alive default moves to 920 seconds so it
stays above a 15-minute proxy idle timeout.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>
Sites and workers tied to an app go with it by FK cascade, on app delete and
on deleting the app owner's account. Only caches were dropped for them, so
the subdomain.delete listeners (CDN purge, worker script teardown, worker
sessions, site cleanup) never ran.
* feat(fs): finish a home rename that stopped partway
FSEntryStore.rebaseUserSubtree runs renameUserHome's owner-scoped
cascade on its own (same subtree matching, same rebased-cache
invalidation) and also drops the home row's cached copies at either
path. countUserSubtree counts the owner's rows under a prefix with that
same matching, from the primary. renameUserHome now uses the shared
cascade.
* fix(telemetry): resolve the tracer per span so a test's provider is the one used
withSpan held a ProxyTracer built at module load, which caches the first
provider it delegates to. Test files sharing a worker then sent spans to a
provider an earlier file had already shut down.
* fix(fs): drop cached copies of only the rows a home rebase moves
The owner-scoped rewrite read its invalidation set from everything under the new prefix, which for a finishing rebase is the whole live home; it now reads the rows it is about to move.
---------
Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>
`extension.claimSubdomain(name, { mainPipeline: true })` serves
`<name>.<domain>` the way core's own subdomains are served: through CORS,
body parsing, auth and every route, `subdomain: '*'` ones included. Routes
declared for the name are ordinary routes, with no option restrictions.
Gated claims (`{ authorize, checkRoute? }`) behave as before.
onlyoffice's subdomain now comes from its extension's claim, so core no
longer lists it among the subdomains it serves itself. Without that claim
`onlyoffice.<domain>` gets the unclaimed-subdomain 404 like any other name.
* feat(ai): edit a source video with txt2vid on Gemini Omni
txt2vid takes an `inputVideo` option (sent as `input_video`): a URL, data
URI or Puter file path to an MP4, QuickTime or WebM video of up to 32 MiB.
Gemini Omni receives it inline next to the prompt, which describes the
edit or extension. Google enforces the 10-second limit.
Models declare `videoInput` in the catalog, and the driver rejects a
source video for any other model instead of letting the provider drop it.
The credit hold adds 16,000 input tokens for a source video, since
countTokens reports far fewer tokens than the reply bills.
loadFileInput takes an optional `timeoutMs` for web URLs, and cancels
the body of a failed response.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(ai): edit a source video with FLUX 3 on Together AI
FLUX 3 takes `input_video` as Together's `media.source_video`. A web URL
goes through for Together to fetch; a data URI or Puter file is read with
the caller's access, capped at 32 MiB, sniffed as a video and sent inline.
Editing is estimated and billed at the 1080p rate of $0.54/s, since FLUX 3
jobs report no cost. Image inputs can't be combined with a source video.
Seedance 2.0 ignores `source_video`, treats `reference_videos` as a loose
reference rather than an edit, and Seedance 2.5 fails on reference videos,
so neither declares `videoInput`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(ai): name FLUX 3 as a video editor in the AI overview
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ai): match Hailuo 02 to Together's price and document estimate billing
Together quotes $0.56 for a Hailuo 02 clip; the catalog had $0.49.
Together's video jobs no longer report what they cost, so every Together
clip is billed at the catalog's highest published rate. The docs said the
charge was the amount Together reports; they now describe the estimate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: enforce video edit durations and propagate source fetch cancellation
* fix(ai): pass media inputs as Puter files and stream source videos
Source videos were read whole into the API process, base64-encoded and
sent twice to Gemini (countTokens and the interaction), which held about
128 MiB per in-flight edit for up to ten minutes.
- Video inputs are a URL, a Puter file path or a data URI of at most
1 MiB. Together gets a Puter file as a 15-minute presigned S3 URL and
fetches it itself; Gemini streams it into the request body with an
exact Content-Length, so it's never held as one string.
- Gemini counts only the prompt and image for a source video, and both
providers read the source only after the credit hold.
- txt2img and txt2vid image inputs accept Puter file paths, read within
the caller's access right before the provider call. Existing URL,
data URI and base64 inputs are unchanged.
- puter.js writes a Blob, File or data URI over 1 MiB to a temporary
file under .tmp, sends its path, and deletes it once the call settles.
- FLUX 3 edits bill at the 720p editing rate, matching their 1280x704
output.
* fix(ai): stage inputs after website sign-in, keep images working without a write
- puter.js chose the temporary file path before signing a website visitor
in, so it fell outside the app's data directory and the upload was
refused. It now signs in first, then picks the path.
- An image that can't be written (no access, storage full) is sent inline
as before instead of failing the call. Videos still fail, since a
large inline video isn't accepted.
- Telling raw JPEG base64 from a path decodes only the first 24
characters instead of the whole input.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: 404oops <oops404@util.404oops.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>
* fix(ai): validate large base64 without anchored regexp loops
Gemini TTS replies over ~4 MB of base64 (~65 s of audio) failed with
"Maximum call stack size exceeded". Once a process holds enough compiled
code, V8 compiles new regexps unoptimized, and `^[...]+={0,2}$` then
pushes a backtrack entry per character until its stack overflows.
TTS now searches for a character outside the alphabet instead. The raw
base64 icon/reference-image check drops its own anchored regexp;
decodeStrictBase64 already rejects the same inputs.
* perf(ai): validate base64 by decoded length instead of regexp passes
Unoptimized regexp scans dominated large payloads: 186 ms for max-length
TTS audio, 880 ms in decodeStrictBase64 for 30 MB of video. Buffer.from
skips characters outside the alphabet, so comparing the decoded length
with the one the input length predicts catches them for free.
decodeStrictBase64 now does that plus rejecting the URL-safe alphabet
(~10 ms for 30 MB), and TTS reuses it instead of its own check.
Non-canonical trailing bits now decode instead of being rejected.
* fix(ai): reject non-ASCII base64 that Node decodes by its low byte
Node reads code units above 0xFF by their low byte, so U+012B decodes
as '+' and keeps the decoded length the input predicts. Require ASCII
(~1-2 ms for 43M chars) before the length check.
PROPPATCH now requires write access on the target, like PUT and DELETE,
and its response href goes through the request's share-path masker the
way PROPFIND's do.
Pipeline
- CORS preflights send Access-Control-Max-Age: browsers stop re-preflighting authed calls every 5 s.
- `req.ua` is parsed on first read instead of on every request.
- JSON `rawBody` reuses the parsed buffer instead of copying it.
- `emitAndWait` returns early when nothing listens: no span or closure per unlistened driver call.
- SQLBatcher sends a lone query on the next tick while fewer than 8 flushes are in flight, and
waits `maxTimeInQueue` as before otherwise. Lone reads skip the 10/30 ms wait; batching under
load is unchanged.
Auth and permissions
- Token-to-actor auth starts the user, session and app lookups together and checks them in the
same order: fewer sequential Redis round trips per authed request.
- get-user-app-token and check-app reuse the resolved app row. getOrCreateApp skips the re-select
after its own insert and doesn't wait on the cache write for replica rows.
- getOrCreateApp reads the race winner from the primary when its insert loses, so it no longer
hands out a session that was never written.
- whoami runs the email check and the OIDC/taskbar/team lookups in parallel; key order unchanged.
- OIDC providers are memoized once every discovery succeeds, with one discovery fetch in flight
per URL, and the Apple key is parsed once.
- gui-token and sync-cookie use `req.actor.user` instead of re-reading the user.
- listSessions batches app lookups. App icon probes run together, and the original-icon probe
skips the lineage fallback.
- Default-granted permissions are answered from config before the scan cache, and exploded
options are deduped: one less Redis read per /drivers/call.
- ACL resolves ancestors lazily (owners and full-access tokens skip them) and scans the node
first, then the ancestors concurrently on a miss.
Filesystem
- Missing-path lineage lookups run 10 at a time: batch-upload path resolution drops from about
1.3 s to about 40 ms per 100 new files.
- MySQL single-file inserts return the row built from the written values, falling back to the
primary read: one less primary round trip per new file.
- Batch thumbnails are stored with one UPDATE per chunk (200 rows or 4M chars), with a per-row
fallback.
- storage.quota.bonus listeners run concurrently next to the usage SUM, and the payload carries
`userUuid`: quota checks and /df no longer serialize the listener reads.
- readdir cache backfill is one pipeline instead of 3xN SETEX.
- Profile reads skip the lineage fallback; the own profile is read alongside the user lookup.
- Legacy /stat runs is_empty (new `hasChildrenByParentUid`), owner and thumbnail concurrently.
- Downloads and the video proxy pipe through `pipeToResponse`: aborts release the storage stream
at once with no extra 'close' listeners, and the video proxy no longer crashes on a mid-stream
upstream error.
- mkdir looks up target and parent together.
- Upload completion reuses the session from the access check (status is still re-read before
completing), and multipart signing reads it once.
- Moving a shared file to Trash skips two lookups that always returned the entry itself.
Drivers and events
- Subscription resolvers run concurrently and are folded in registration order.
- SubdomainDriver and WorkerDriver overlap independent lookups.
- The events "anyone subscribed?" check is one Redis pipeline when the region is warm.
- Handler publish overlaps the count with the size check.
- Broadcast flushes peers concurrently over a keep-alive agent, so a slow peer no longer delays
cross-region invalidations to the others.
Sites, share and AI
- Hosted sites resolve the owner first, then the app and root together. Site config loads only
on 404s. The hosted-app query selects only the columns it uses and moves into AppStore.
- shareFlags asks about the plan only when an item is shared by link only.
- Share listings run the count, teams and plan reads alongside their page query.
- Claude attachment cleanup no longer blocks the response.
- New util `awaitLater` for promises started early and awaited later.
* fix(metering): pin metering writes to one replica, fence settles, idempotent monthly claim (PUT-2001)
store-kv-v1 is a last-writer-wins global table, and every region settled
its metering buffer into its local replica, so concurrent increments to the
same per-actor item from two regions could drop one side. Writes and
consistent reads of metering:* and policy:actor:* items now go to the
dynamo.home replica.
Buffered settles record each write on the claim with a fence token before
sending it, and the KV store refuses a token the item already holds, so a
re-driven claim applies its write once. Claims are serialized per counter
within a cache so one writer's tokens land in order.
The monthly charge claim is a set-if-absent of a random token, and a failed
claim write keeps its token for the retry, so a write that landed anyway
still charges exactly once.
* fix(metering): drop home-replica pinning; keep addon consumption off the purchase record (PUT-2001)
Pinning every metering write and exact read to one replica put a
cross-region round trip on credit checks near the allowance and on every
settle, and made one region's outage stall metering everywhere. The
per-item clash it guarded against is rare and undercharges at most a
flush window.
The one clash that loses money is a credit purchase and an overage settle
landing on the addons item in different regions at once. Consumption now
goes to its own item and getActorAddons sums it with what the purchase
record already holds.
* perf(metering): read addon consumption only for accounts with purchased credit (PUT-2001)
* perf(metering): settle counters through a sliding pool instead of waves (PUT-2001)
* feat(metering): consistent-read option on getActorAddons (PUT-2001)
Admin credit checks read the purchase record directly to get a consistent
read, which misses consumption now that it lives on its own item. They can
call getActorAddons with consistentRead instead. Also formats the lines this
PR added.
* Add Gemini Omni video generation with token metering
* Keep explicit Gemini video model selection within provider
* Settle reported Gemini video usage before validating output
---------
Co-authored-by: 404oops <oops404@util.404oops.com>
* feat(ai): add Gemini unary transcription
* Clarify transcription language results and omit pricing
* style(ai): keep Gemini transcription sources prettier-clean
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ai-speech2txt): charge Gemini transcriptions that fail after Google answers
Google bills an interaction it processed whether or not it completed, so an
incomplete, failed or malformed reply was free to the caller and paid by
Puter; audio whose transcript overran the output cap could be resubmitted at
no cost. Usage is now recorded before the reply is checked, falling back to
the counted audio tokens when the reported usage can't be read.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Preserve transcript text with optional malformed annotations
* Keep speech provider spacing consistent
---------
Co-authored-by: 404oops <oops404@util.404oops.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ai): keep Gemini speech instructions separate from transcript
* Clarify Gemini speech instructions
* style(ai-tts): keep Gemini cost comment prettier-clean
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Validate speech requests and settle reported Gemini usage
* Clarify speech settlement for unreadable responses
* Reserve the published Gemini speech token budget
* Clarify speech accounting for bounded responses
* Limit only Gemini TTS text to 3000 characters; charge overrun replies
The 3000-character text cap moves from the TTS driver into the Gemini
provider, so other providers keep their own limits.
The Gemini reply cap rises to 64 MiB, which fits the full 16,384-token
audio budget. A reply that still overruns it or times out reports no
usage, so it is charged the held budget and the error tells the caller
to split the text.
---------
Co-authored-by: 404oops <oops404@util.404oops.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>
* feat(ai): restore available Gemini models and align pricing
* Exclude deprecated Flash Image additions and share scheduled pricing
* Bill Gemini 2.5 Pro at its current list rates
Cache reads are $0.125/M, and prompts over 200k tokens bill every rate at
the long-context tier ($2.50 in, $15 out, $0.25 cached).
---------
Co-authored-by: 404oops <oops404@util.404oops.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>
* feat(ai): add Gemini 4 Argon with native usage metering
* test(ai): isolate Argon HTTP smoke test from optional extensions
* fix(ai): preserve Gemini native completion and refusal reasons
* Refer model specifications and pricing to the directory
* Bound unary Argon requests and reject unsupported content
* Keep Gemini tool metadata out of Claude requests
* Describe provider-specific chat timeout boundaries
* Keep Gemini extra_content off other providers; report Gemini timeouts as 504
Replayed tool calls only carry extra_content for providers that opt in
(Gemini), so OpenAI-compatible and Responses vendors don't see an unknown
field. The native Gemini client now owns its request deadline: the SDK's
own timeout aborted without a reason and read as an internal error. A
deadline timeout returns 504 upstream_timeout and leaves the route in
rotation.
---------
Co-authored-by: 404oops <oops404@util.404oops.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>
* Handle model access denials and filter batch chat variants
* Raise a low alarm when a provider denies model access
A 403 model_not_found still returns 400 upstream_bad_request, but now
alarms at info so a lost provider entitlement gets noticed. HttpError
gains an alarmSeverity option the terminal alarm gate honors.
---------
Co-authored-by: 404oops <oops404@util.404oops.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>
* feat: bound provisioning by what an owner may mint, not only what is live
Seat and team caps express how much may exist at one time. This adds the
other half of the rule: how much an owner may create over a window, and the
checks a provisioned account answers to.
- Provisioning puts each seat through `SignupService.runSignupGate`, the same
extension-owned gate a signup answers, and refuses what it blocks. It fails
closed, since a check that could not run is not a check that passed.
- A per-owner budget over a rolling window, sized to every seat the owner may
hold live across every team they may own, times the churn allowed on top.
It is spent on creation and is not returned.
Keyed on the owner's uuid so a recycled id cannot inherit someone else's
spend, and charged after validation so a taken username costs nothing.
* refactor: tighten the provisioning gate and budget after review
- The gate runs before the seat-cap lock. A listener has no deadline and the
lease is ten seconds with nothing to renew it, so the lock must not be held
across one.
- `failOpen: false` rethrows rather than returning false, so a backend outage
is answered 503 instead of escaping the handler.
- An address goes through `validateEmail` first, as it does on every other
path that creates an account.
- The gate always runs; a request only enriches what it is told, so one being
absent is no reason to skip it.
- The gate is told it is looking at a seat, whose address is optional.
- A refusal carries the gate's own code and request code, as a blocked signup
does, so support can correlate it.
- Restored `provisionAccount`'s docblock, which an insert had displaced.
Tests: the spy restores in `finally`, and the cap overrides are taken after
the fixtures, so one failure cannot cascade through the file.
* fix: show a provisioning refusal as a rule, not a failure
The console special-cases the seat cap and sends everything else to
"Something went wrong", which reads as a fault rather than an answer. The
provisioning budget refuses the same way the cap does, so it is presented
the same way.
* fix: count one app open per account per app per day
`app_opens` is read two ways at once: `open_count` is a row count and
`user_count` is distinct accounts. A repeated open moves the first
without the first moving the second, and the incentive report prices
opens.
An open is now marked as it is recorded and skipped for the rest of the
day, before both the row and the event ClickHouse ingests, so the two
stores agree. The marker is set only when absent, so the first open of
the day wins a race; an unreachable marker counts the open, since
counting twice beats not counting.
* fix: count one app open per account per app per day, at the count
Dropped the row-suppression approach. `app_opens` is not only a counter:
`getRecentAppOpens` orders the desktop's recent list by `MAX(_id)`, and
`app.opened` is the socket event other tabs reorder on. Suppressing the
repeat row froze both at the first open of the day.
Every open is recorded as before. `open_count` counts each account once
per day instead, which is the figure `user_count` is read against.
`countDistinctUserDays` folds the pair into one number because
`COUNT(DISTINCT a, b)` is MySQL-only, and `dayBucket` covers MySQL's
decimal division. ClickHouse has uniqExact over the tuple.
Note the figure's meaning changes at deploy: a period spanning it mixes
rows with account-days, so a comparison across that point is not one.
* fix: count one app open per account per app per hour
Review feedback: a day is too long a window for the repeat to collapse
into. The period is now an argument rather than a baked-in 86400, held in
one constant on AppStore beside the other store policy numbers, so the SQL
and ClickHouse sites cannot drift and a future change is one line.
The fold `COUNT(DISTINCT user * N + bucket)` is only injective while the
bucket index stays under N. Hourly buckets are 24x the day index and pass
the old 1000000 in 2084, so N moves to 10000000.
Buckets are clock hours, not a rolling window, so two opens a minute apart
either side of the hour still count twice — tested, and the same property
the day version had at UTC midnight.
The detailed-stats fixture gave its repeat open a 60s offset, which under
hourly buckets would have counted twice whenever the suite ran in the first
minute of an hour. It now shares a timestamp with the open it repeats.
- relay sign-in popups take the opener origin from the referrer only
- session revokes read the primary, batch per user, and tombstone caches in every region
- wisp relay tokens bound to the minting session; verify rechecks the account
- hosted origins keep app identity with the site owner; deleted app uids recorded in deleted_apps
- subdomain cache tombstoned on delete, update, reclaim and app/account cascades
- email lookups require an exact address match after the SQL lookup
- workers deploy only from files the deployer owns
- share_app_data:false enforced at ACL time, plus copy/move/rename/share/recursive listing
- kv remove returns no value without read; kv:expire op grant usable
- fs errors name the entry instead of the owner's path
- shared-by-me drops rows a delegate no longer has authority over
- private apps can't move index_url onto another user's origin
- GUI: default apps saved and launched by uid; save picker accepts only copy/move; permission dialog waits for focus; Publish as Worker hidden on others' files
* fix: give every route behind the user-protected gate a password budget
Five of the six routes behind the gate declare a per-user hourly bucket
for the password check. The sixth, delete-own-user, declared none.
The bucket moves into the gate itself, so it covers every route behind
it and a new one cannot be added without one.
It is charged by the outcome rather than by the request: a wrong answer
spends one and a right answer spends nothing, so a caller who knows the
password never meets the limit.
* fix: the review's findings on the password budget
Reading the budget and spending it on the outcome bounded rounds rather
than attempts: everything already in flight read the same budget and was
answered before any of it was spent. The charge lands before the
comparison now, so a burst is bounded by the same number as a sequence.
The key gained a route component. One bucket across all six meant ten
mistyped passwords on one route closed the other five for the hour,
including the one an account owing its team's 2FA has to reach.
getObjectStream now attaches an 'error' listener to every body it returns.
A body that fails before its consumer attaches (socket timeout, reset, or a
checksum mismatch on a truncated read) used to emit 'error' with no listener
and exit the process, failing every in-flight request on the task. It now
logs a warning; consumers that attach later still receive the error.
Daniel Salazar