* refactor(auth): one signup path for form, temp, OIDC and team accounts
Signup steps (validate hook, phone/card forcing, bonus verdict, provisioning,
signup events) move from AuthController and OIDCService into SignupService.
Username rules, availability and generation move to util/username.ts, and
user-row + group + default-folder creation to provisionUser, which
TeamService and DefaultUserService now share.
Behaviour fixes: a provisioned team seat joins default_user_group like every
other account, and generated temp usernames skip names whose home path is
occupied.
* refactor(auth): one web-session start for password and OIDC sign-in
startWebSession creates the session with the request's IP, user agent, origin
and host and sets the session cookie. OIDC sign-ins used to create their
session without that metadata, so they showed up blank in the session list.
* refactor(auth): one confirmEmail for the code and link confirmation routes
Both routes now re-run the email checks, refuse an address another account
confirmed, strip it from other rows, promote the group and push
user.email_confirmed to the account's sockets (with the originating socket id
on the code route). The link route's full-table UPDATE clearing other
accounts' pending change-email requests is dropped: /change_email/confirm
already refuses an address a confirmed account owns.
* refactor(auth): build window.user once for whoami and sign-in
buildUserDetails and scrubSensitive move from the whoami extension into
util/userDetails.ts. /whoami calls them; sign-in responses now return the same
user-actor payload, scrubbed, so the login copy no longer ships the phone
number and a no-reload login gets oidc_only/otp/directories up front. Taskbar
resolution is best-effort on both.
* refactor(http): userProtected route option replaces AuthController's route walker copy
The user-protected gate is materialized from a userProtected RouteOption
(implies requireUserActor), so AuthController no longer re-implements the
decorator walker to wire it per instance; those routes and the session
routes are plain decorators now. AuthRequired also counts requireVerified
and userProtected.
* refactor(http): internalAuth route option and a shared bodyRecord
EventsController and PeerController each checked x-puter-internal-auth by
hand with different compares; an internalAuth RouteOption now picks the
secret from config and one constant-time gate checks it. ShareController and
EventsController share bodyRecord instead of private copies.
* fix(fs): cap legacy /delete at 500 paths per request
The bulk form resolved, ACL-checked and removed an unbounded paths[] list one
by one. It now refuses more than FS_BATCH_WRITE_MAX_ITEMS (500), the cap the
batch write routes already use, before touching any entry.
* refactor(controllers): user and subdomain writes and reads through their stores
AuthController's 2FA setup/enable/disable and recovery-code writes go through
UserStore.update instead of raw UPDATEs plus a manual invalidate, and
/readdir-subdomains pages SubdomainStore.listByUserId instead of an unbounded
SELECT; the response shape is unchanged.
* refactor(auth): note SignupService's call-time peers
* fix(auth): type userDetails' taskbar deps independently of TaskbarDeps.clients
* fix: list a link share only while the owner's plan covers it
* fix: fs limits for signed urls
* feat: a paid plan counts as a verified card for the sharing gate
- declare rate + concurrency limits on every route and driver that lacked one
- add acquireConcurrent for websocket connections and the DAV mount
- bucket AI models by identity key only; keep resold duplicates of any vendor
- skip recently-failed provider routes; cap the fallback chain at 3 attempts
- let full-access access tokens bind a worker to an app their own user owns
- cache resolved subscriptions so tiered limits don't add a round trip
* feat(perms): add cross-app app-data permission vocabulary
* feat(perms): sweep app grants by permission prefix
* feat(perms): resolve and withdraw cross-app data grants
* feat(kv): support an authorized namespace override and per-key privacy
* feat(kv): gate cross-app KV access behind app-data grants
* feat(fs): allow cross-app AppData access and require a scope to delete
* feat(auth): accept permission lists and gate app-data grants
* feat(perms): add requestAppData to the puter.js SDK
* feat(gui): carry permission lists through the IPC and popup transports
* feat(gui): describe cross-app data requests in the consent dialog
* docs: document requestAppData and per-entry KV privacy
* perf(perms): sweep cross-app grants only for origin-bootstrapped apps
* fix(gui): stop double-encoding cross-app consent text
* fix(perms): close three gaps in cross-app grant enforcement
* fix(kv): meter and batch the per-entry privacy probe
* fix(perms): resolve app identifiers and scopes more strictly in the SDK
* test(perms): cover the cross-app consent flow end to end
* fix: small missing token resolution for app
also adds the same exclusion for the batchPut api, small change
* fix: make resolved actor optional
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Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>