408 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Daniel Salazar	590c87c00a	refactor(stores): one row cache and keyset page helper, batched cache round trips, dead store methods removed (#4191) ... * refactor(stores): one read-through RowCache for UserStore and AppStore UserStore and AppStore each carried the same multi-key row cache: key builder, cache read, tombstone-guarded backfill, broadcast refresh, invalidate and tombstone-on-delete. They now share RowCache on PuterStore, which also single-flights concurrent misses for one key and batches getByIds/getByUids: one pipelined tombstone check for the loaded rows and one pipelined backfill instead of per-row awaits. Cache keys and TTLs are unchanged. * perf(apps): invalidate cached app lists by generation, not by tracker scan Every app write SMEMBERS'd a global set of every cached list key, parsed each key back into its filters and deleted the matches. List pages are now keyed by their owner's generation token (or a shared one for unscoped lists), and a write replaces the tokens it affects: O(1) per write, and a page loaded before a write can no longer be cached after it. * refactor(stores): one keyset page helper for store listings Thirteen store listings each cut a LIMIT n+1 read to a page and sealed the last row's position, and each opened an id cursor its own way. They now use keysetPage() and openIdCursor() from util/pagination. Cursor payloads and sealing are unchanged; a cursor without a usable id still fails with 400 in ShareStore and still restarts the listing elsewhere (strict option). * refactor(stores): delete store methods nothing calls AppStore.existsByIndexUrl, OIDCStore.unlinkByUserId, TeamStore.listByOwner/listActiveSeatUuids, SubdomainStore.getByDomain/ listByDomain, FSEntryStore.ensureDirectoriesForUser, ShareStore.listByIssuer/listByRecipientEmail/deleteByRecipientEmail/ getDailyShareCount/listByHolderAndFsentries and PermissionStore.invalidateScanCache/deleteUserUserPermsByPermissionPrefix had no production callers. ShareStore.listByFsentries was a copy of listReaching; its callers use the latter. SubdomainStore SMEMBERS'd a per-user prefix-list tracker on every write and broadcast its deletion, but nothing ever wrote that set or cached a prefix listing. The reads are gone. * refactor(stores): shared escapeLike and bumpGeneration helpers escapeLike replaces the LIKE escaping copied into PermissionStore (twice), ShareStore and FSEntryStore, and now also guards SubdomainStore's prefix filters, which passed caller prefixes into LIKE unescaped. bumpGeneration sends INCR and EXPIRE in one pipeline instead of two awaited commands in PermissionStore, EventSubscriptionStore and PresenceStore. * refactor(stores): read affected rows off WriteResult Every database client returns affectedRows and anyRowsAffected, so the `affectedRows ?? changes ?? 0` fallbacks in ShareStore, NotificationStore, UserStore and UserBlockStore read those directly. * perf(stores): batch flat-permission KV deletes and durable cache drops PermissionStore deleted each flat KV entry with its own kv.del; one kv.batchDel now covers the set. DurableSubscriptionStore's suspend and reap dropped each row from the cache separately; EventSubscriptionStore gains dropDurables, which drops them per owner in one pass, and dropDurable calls it. suspend keeps one conditional UPDATE per row, which is how concurrent settles learn which rows each of them suspended. * refactor(fs): fold FSEntryStore's duplicate getters, sort maps and cache keys - getEntryByUuid and getEntryById share one by-column getter. - listChildren and listChildrenPage read one sort table; the offset listing now coalesces NULL modified/size like the cursor listing, so both order NULLs the same way on every engine. - Entry cache keys come from one builder instead of hand-built strings. - getEntriesByIds, getEntriesByPaths and the per-user path reader fetch their cache hits in one pipelined round trip instead of a GET per key, through readCacheValues, which RowCache.readMany now uses too. * fix(apps): cache the row a lost createFromOrigin race reads from the primary Keeps AppStore's private #writeCache as a RowCache write, so code that still calls it (#4166's read-back) loads in either merge order.	2026-10-11 22:07:53 -07:00
Daniel Salazar	45f6e9d8ee	refactor(drivers-wiring): AppService views and launch gates, batched app lookups, shared driver policy and guards (#4186) ... * perf(workers): skip hot-reload lookups for files no worker is bound to The fs.write.file / fs.remove.node / fs.move.node listeners listed every workers.puter.* row of the file's owner on every event, for every user. The event's FSEntry already carries the worker rows bound to it, so a file with none returns before any I/O; a bound file reads just its own rows, batched, from the primary. * perf(apps): read the uid alias only after a direct lookup misses Every AppDriver uid lookup fired an uncached system-KV GetItem for the merge alias in parallel with the direct read, even when the direct read hit. The alias is now read only on a miss. * refactor(apps): one app view with the launch gates, built by AppService AppDriver's serializer and its private-app / hosted-backing gates move to AppService.views, built on a pure toAppView that is the one place index_url is withheld. AppDriver, the subdomains driver's embedded apps and the GUI shell view all use it. Visibility of protected apps (filterReadable) moves with it. Subdomain embeds (associated_app, app_owner) used to return index_url with no gate; they now withhold it from a viewer who may not open a private app or whose hosted backing is gone, and carry privateAccess, godmode and feedback_enabled like a direct app read. * refactor(apps): one toAppSummary; batch the recommended and taskbar lookups SuggestedApps, RecommendedApps, /get-launch-apps and the taskbar each built their own launch summary; they now share toAppSummary (the extra feedback_enabled / external flags appear on the lists that lacked them). getRecommendedApps awaited getByName once per recommended app (29) and getTaskbarItems did the same per taskbar entry on every whoami; both now make one batched call per key through the new AppStore.getByNames, which keeps getByName's case-insensitive and old-name matching. The taskbar's raw UPDATE of the user row goes through UserStore.update, and /get-launch-apps checks hosted backings in one batch and reaches the stores without casts. * refactor(apps): app routes read through AppService; /delete-site calls the subdomains driver AppController used the global driversContainers through a getter whose boot-order comment no longer held; it uses the injected drivers and AppService. GET /apps/:name looked each name up, read it again through the driver and resolved private access a second time, emitting app.privateAccess.resolveLaunch twice per private app; it now batches the names and resolves once. POST /query/app did a lookup, a driver read and a raw app_filetype_association SELECT per selector (up to 200, serially); it now makes one batched lookup per key, one grant check and one filetype read. The driver's read shape is a pure toAppReadView both use. HostingController's /delete-site re-implemented the subdomains driver's delete (protected check, delete, subdomain.delete event); it keeps its owner-scoped 404 and calls the driver. Hosting and Desktop controllers drop constructors that discarded the drivers argument, and trivial getters. * refactor(drivers): one per-method policy validator and resolver; drop @Driver Four policy blocks (rateLimit, concurrent, requireSubscription, requireReputation) share the { default, methods } shape but each had its own validator and resolver. They become validatePerMethod(value, label, policy) and resolvePerMethod(cfg, method); error messages are unchanged. The @Driver class decorator and the prototype keys it wrote had no users outside its own tests; drivers declare their fields, and resolveDriverMeta reads only those. DriverController takes the driver name from the meta it already resolved instead of probing the prototype. resolveDriverMethodRateLimit/Concurrent stay as deprecated aliases for the email extension. * refactor(drivers): shared actor guards and crud-q concurrency policy The apps, subdomains, workers and notifications drivers each carried a private #requireActor, two carried the same #requireVerified, and apps and subdomains the same owner/app_owner write predicate. These become requireContextActor, requireContextUserActor, assertActorEmailVerified and actorOwnsRow in core/actor.ts; each driver keeps its own error for the cases that differed (system actors still read apps; notifications still answer 403 for an actor without a user). The identical crud-q concurrency block is one CRUD_CONCURRENT constant. The metering, installedApps and appTelemetry extensions re-checked an actor their routes already require; those checks and the tests for them go. * refactor(extensions): store methods instead of raw SQL in OSS extensions installedApps and appTelemetry queried user_to_app_permissions directly and metering read apps by name with its own SELECT. PermissionStore gains listAppsGrantedByUser, listAppAuthenticatedUsers (with the email-share check folded in) and countAppUsers; metering uses AppStore.getByName. * refactor(server): one layer builder and one lifecycle hook runner PuterServer built each of its five layers with its own copy of the same loop (built-ins, then extension additions, into the layer and its export container), and ran each lifecycle hook with five near-identical loops per hook. Both are now one helper each: #instantiateLayer and #runHook(order, hook). Construction order, the args each layer receives, and hook order (start and prepare bottom-up, shutdown top-down) are unchanged. * fix(workers): tear down a deleted source's worker after its FK nulls root_dir_id	2026-10-11 22:04:23 -07:00
Daniel Salazar	d162549c1d	refactor(controllers): one signup, login, confirm and window.user path; userProtected/internalAuth route options (#4189) ... * refactor(auth): one signup path for form, temp, OIDC and team accounts Signup steps (validate hook, phone/card forcing, bonus verdict, provisioning, signup events) move from AuthController and OIDCService into SignupService. Username rules, availability and generation move to util/username.ts, and user-row + group + default-folder creation to provisionUser, which TeamService and DefaultUserService now share. Behaviour fixes: a provisioned team seat joins default_user_group like every other account, and generated temp usernames skip names whose home path is occupied. * refactor(auth): one web-session start for password and OIDC sign-in startWebSession creates the session with the request's IP, user agent, origin and host and sets the session cookie. OIDC sign-ins used to create their session without that metadata, so they showed up blank in the session list. * refactor(auth): one confirmEmail for the code and link confirmation routes Both routes now re-run the email checks, refuse an address another account confirmed, strip it from other rows, promote the group and push user.email_confirmed to the account's sockets (with the originating socket id on the code route). The link route's full-table UPDATE clearing other accounts' pending change-email requests is dropped: /change_email/confirm already refuses an address a confirmed account owns. * refactor(auth): build window.user once for whoami and sign-in buildUserDetails and scrubSensitive move from the whoami extension into util/userDetails.ts. /whoami calls them; sign-in responses now return the same user-actor payload, scrubbed, so the login copy no longer ships the phone number and a no-reload login gets oidc_only/otp/directories up front. Taskbar resolution is best-effort on both. * refactor(http): userProtected route option replaces AuthController's route walker copy The user-protected gate is materialized from a userProtected RouteOption (implies requireUserActor), so AuthController no longer re-implements the decorator walker to wire it per instance; those routes and the session routes are plain decorators now. AuthRequired also counts requireVerified and userProtected. * refactor(http): internalAuth route option and a shared bodyRecord EventsController and PeerController each checked x-puter-internal-auth by hand with different compares; an internalAuth RouteOption now picks the secret from config and one constant-time gate checks it. ShareController and EventsController share bodyRecord instead of private copies. * fix(fs): cap legacy /delete at 500 paths per request The bulk form resolved, ACL-checked and removed an unbounded paths[] list one by one. It now refuses more than FS_BATCH_WRITE_MAX_ITEMS (500), the cap the batch write routes already use, before touching any entry. * refactor(controllers): user and subdomain writes and reads through their stores AuthController's 2FA setup/enable/disable and recovery-code writes go through UserStore.update instead of raw UPDATEs plus a manual invalidate, and /readdir-subdomains pages SubdomainStore.listByUserId instead of an unbounded SELECT; the response shape is unchanged. * refactor(auth): note SignupService's call-time peers * fix(auth): type userDetails' taskbar deps independently of TaskbarDeps.clients	2026-10-11 22:00:53 -07:00
Daniel Salazar	576e893a5b	refactor(services-core): read-only socket reauth, one token-grant read per check, shared grant/revoke and hosted-asset paths (#4187) ... * perf(socket): re-check live sockets without touching their sessions The 5-minute sweep reused the request-path authenticate(), which slid every connected session's expiry and wrote user activity each tick, and could fill SessionStore's touch-throttle map. authenticate() now takes touch: false for re-checks; the sweep uses it, checks credentials through runWithConcurrencyLimitSettled, and a call while a sweep runs joins it instead of starting another. * perf(acl): read a scoped token's grants once per check ACLService.check did a Redis GET + JSON.parse of the token's grant list for every ancestor x mode, and the permission scan did the same per option. Both now read the list once (PermissionStore.listAccessTokenPerms, which replaces the per-permission hasAccessTokenPerm) and test it in memory. * refactor(metering): incrementUsage goes through batchIncrementUsages incrementUsage was a copy of the batch path that let an infinite amount through and skipped NaN, where the batch path counts either as one unit. It now calls batchIncrementUsages with a one-entry batch, so both apply the batch clamping (documented on batchIncrementUsages). The overuse alarm loses the single-path fields nothing sets any more. * perf(metering): memoize an actor's spent addons on the increment path Every increment and credit refresh read the actor's addons record from the KV store. A record with no purchased credit left can only change through a grant, and every grant announces credits-changed, so it is now kept per actor beside the credit memo and dropped with it. Records with credit left are still read fresh, since increments on other nodes draw them down without announcing it. A read that straddles a drop isn't kept. * refactor(services): route raw table writes through their stores - access_token_permissions: AuthService inserted grants one row at a time through a cast to the store's db client, read the authorizer, and deleted the manifest with raw SQL, then asked PermissionStore to drop its cache. PermissionStore now owns insertAccessTokenPerms (chunked multi-row insert), deleteAccessTokenPerms and getAccessTokenAuthorizerId, and invalidates inside the writes. - TeamService's 2FA reset clears the OTP columns through UserStore.update. - AppIconService's data-URL icon swap is AppStore.replaceDataUrlIcon. * fix(user): correct cascadeDelete's FK note; seat cleanup is best effort The header said most user_id foreign keys are ON DELETE SET NULL; the migrations cascade nearly all of them and keep SET NULL for audit and analytics history. forgetSeat ran unguarded after the row was already gone, so a cache failure there failed the whole delete; it is now logged and stepped over like the other teardown steps. * refactor(acl): one grant/revoke path per holder kind ACLService's user and group stat/set pairs were copies differing only in which PermissionService methods they called. They now share #stat and #set over a holder adapter ({ lockKey, query, grant, revoke }); lock keys and errors are unchanged. PermissionService's eleven grant/revoke methods repeated the same guard blocks. Each keeps its own order of checks, now through shared helpers (#requireUserId, #refuseAppActor, #assertCanManage, #requireUser, #requireApp, #assertFitsColumn, #audit), so every refusal keeps its status, legacyCode and wording. Audit writes stay fire-and-forget. * refactor(auth): one hosted-asset token API keyed by kind The private-asset and public hosted-actor cookies had separate create/ verify methods, four cookie-name getters and two identical options getters, differing only in the kind claim and what the host field was called. They are now createHostedAssetToken(kind, claims), verifyHostedAssetToken(kind, token, expected), getHostedAssetCookieOptions(), and the exported HOSTED_ASSET_COOKIES names. Token claims, cookie names and every error message are unchanged; puterSite and privateAppGate call the new methods. * refactor(auth): one revoked/expired check for every actor builder The session, app-under-user and access-token builders (and the access token's parent-session check) each spelled out the same revoked/expired tests. They now share #endedSession, which returns the same reauth results; only a session token passes its auth_id. Adds coverage for an access token whose parent session expires, is revoked, or is gone.	2026-10-11 21:55:20 -07:00
Daniel Salazar	ecef154630	refactor(services): page fs subtree walks, gate share fan-out, one fs ACL helper (#4190) ... * refactor(acl): read ancestor chains from FSEntryStore and share one fs ACL helper getAncestorChain (split a path, batch-read the entries) moves to FSEntryStore, with getAncestors for callers that want the rows. Services read it from the store instead of calling FSService sideways; FSService.getAncestorChain stays for drivers and extensions. ACLService gains fsDescriptor (memoized chain), assertFsAccess, assertFsCreate and refusal, plus the pure aclRefusal mapping. The eight hand-rolled descriptor and safe-error copies in FSService, ShareService, events/authorization, FSController, legacyFsHelpers, LegacyFSController, AuthController and WebDAVController use them. Each route keeps its status, legacyCode and message: fs routes answer access_denied on a 403, the legacy routes still hide refusals from apps as 404, share and events keep forbidden and their own 404 text. * perf(fs): page recursive deletes and batch their event dispatch A recursive delete read every descendant into memory, and an empty-check for a non-recursive one did the same. It now walks the subtree a page at a time in descending path order (children before the directory holding them, so the parent_id cascade never takes a row before it is handled), deleting objects and rows and publishing each page as it goes. A non-recursive delete probes with one LIMIT 1 query. Removals publish once per entry, after the row is gone (the same change as the open fix for the double emit), with one surviving-ancestor chain read at most once for the whole subtree. Events-API dispatch for a batch runs as one background task at bounded concurrency instead of a fire-and-forget promise per entry. FSEntryStore gains hasDescendants and listDescendantsInOrder (keyset paged by path, then id). * perf(fs): copy directories a level at a time A directory copy walked every descendant in memory and copied them one by one: an insert per directory and, per file, an S3 CopyObject, a batchCreateEntries of one and its read-back. It now pages the source in ascending path order (parents before children) and takes each page a depth at a time: rows for directories, links and empty files at bounded concurrency, then the depth's S3 copies at bounded concurrency and one batchCreateEntries for all of them. A single-file copy goes through the same path. A failed S3 copy still fails the call (a ghost file still answers 404), but only after the objects that did copy have their rows, so nothing is left in the bucket unreferenced. Copied entries publish per depth in one dispatch. * refactor(share): build masked share paths in one place sharePathMask exports maskedRoot(owner, uuid, name) and maskUnder(root, realPath). ShareService's maskedPathVia goes, its maskedSelfPath and shareDeepLink's maskedSharePath build on them, and the masker, maskUnderAnchor and learnShareRoots use maskedRoot. Output is byte-for-byte the same; tests pin it. * fix(share): send old_path on a recipient's item.moved The desktop's item.moved handler reads old_path; ShareService sent the former masked path only as from_path. Both are sent now. * perf(share): skip the audience lookup for owners with nothing shared Every fs write, create, rename, move and delete looked for share recipients: an ancestor walk plus two share queries, for an owner who in nearly every case has shared nothing. #sharesReaching now reads the chain through FSEntryStore.getAncestors (no third copy of the walk) and asks a per-owner "has anything shared" flag before the share queries. The flag is the per-user cache events already keeps for subscriptions (SubscriptionCache): one ShareStore.ownerHasShares read per owner per TTL, coalesced across a burst. Creating a share (user, team, claimed invite) or moving a subtree to a new owner bumps it locally and over outer.pubsub.share.ownerShared; the TTL covers a process that misses the bump. A failed lookup reads as shared, so the full lookup decides. * perf(share): batch the per-row reads behind share listings Share listings looked things up one row at a time: - teams by id: TeamStore.getByIdsIncludingDeleted (the single-id read calls it) for listSharedByMe, listSharesOf and #revokeGroupSharesBy - team shares per node and ancestor: ShareStore.listGroupOnFsentries, one query for the chain, in the same node-then-ancestor order - #liveGroupGrants: PermissionStore.queryIssuerGroupPermsByPrefixes reads every issuer/group pair under every prefix in one query - #revokeGroupSharesBy: the five canManagePermission checks per row run together instead of one after another - ShareNotificationService #unblocked: users via getByIds and blocks via UserBlockStore.blockersAmong, two queries instead of two per member - digest flush: entries are taken at bounded concurrency rather than one at a time * perf(events): ask background consent once per holder and app on a revoke settle Withdrawing events:background re-checked consent row by row, resolving the holder's actor and asking the permission service for every one of their background rows. Rows of one holder and app stand on one consent, so it is asked once and shared. * refactor(events): drop the registry's unused push fields notify, defaultDelivery, PushMessage, NotifyProjection and pushProjection were read only by registry.test. Every subject was unpushable and broadcast by default; the subscription's delivery class stays in DeliveryClass, which the stores use. * refactor(share): retire trashed shares through onEntryOwnerChanged onEntryTrashed was a copy of onEntryOwnerChanged: the same subtree share sweep, grant retire and row delete. * fix(fs): page subtree walks by depth, not path MySQL sorts a PAD SPACE string on its first max_sort_length (1024) bytes, so under utf8mb4_unicode_ci paths past about 512 characters tie and fall back to id. A file moved under a newer directory then sorted after it: the delete walk reached the directory first and the parent_id cascade took the file without its object delete or event, and the keyset skipped or repeated rows. Pages now order by segment count, then id, which no collation can reorder. * fix(share): cache an owner as shared when the bump arrives A bump only dropped the cached answer, so the next lookup could read a replica that hadn't applied the new share yet and cache "nothing shared" for another TTL. The bump now records "shared" outright. * fix(fs): probe a directory for children by parent_id, from the primary * fix(fs): keep the copied-size check in the batched directory copy A copied file records the size CopyObject actually duplicated; growth past the source row is charged against the allowance, and a copy that no longer fits is deleted and refused, as a single-file copy already does.	2026-10-11 21:54:13 -07:00
Daniel Salazar	b5eefaa9cc	fix(fs): include supplementary-character names in subtree path queries on MySQL (PUT-2135) (#4198) ... * fix(fs): include supplementary-character names in subtree path queries on MySQL (PUT-2135) MySQL ends the idx_fsentries_path range for `path LIKE 'p/%'` at 'p/' + U+FFFF, and utf8mb4_unicode_ci sorts supplementary characters above it, so a child whose name starts with one (most emoji) was skipped with its whole subtree by listing, delete, copy, rename/move rewrites, counts and sizes. On MySQL, FSEntryStore now looks up those children by parent_id and ORs a LIKE pattern for each onto the subtree match, recursing into directories. Every extra pattern starts with the prefix, so only the scanned ranges widen; rewrites past 500 patterns run in several statements. The prefix rewrite also passed a UTF-16 length to SUBSTR, which counts characters, so a rename under a path holding an emoji dropped characters from every descendant path on all engines. It now counts code points. * test(fs): seed the supplementary-name subtree with createNonFileEntry	2026-10-11 21:21:18 -07:00
Daniel Salazar	2131b980ce	fix(redis): release locks with an atomic compare-and-delete (#4183) ... * fix(redis): release locks with an atomic compare-and-delete ACLService, TeamService and the share digest flush each hand-rolled a SET NX lock whose release was a GET-then-DEL (or a blind DEL), so a holder whose TTL lapsed could delete the next holder's lock. They now share withRedisLock, which claims with a random token and releases via a Lua compare-and-delete. * chore(team): place the redis lock import with the other runtime imports	2026-10-11 21:19:37 -07:00
Daniel Salazar	906d6b7886	fix(email): one canonicalization and blocklist for every address path (#4176) ... Share invites, share notifications and app feedback checked addresses through EmailClient.clean/validate, a second copy of the rules in util/email.ts that stripped dots on iCloud, stripped `+tags` on every domain, and matched the blocklist case-sensitively. They now use util/email.ts: isBlockedEmail for the blocklist, abuseKey for the per-address notification budget, and cleanEmail for the invite digest key. EmailClient keeps transport and templates only. isBlockedEmail also lowercases the configured suffixes, so a mixed-case blocklist entry still matches.	2026-10-11 18:24:28 -07:00
Daniel Salazar	6a938bd8e8	fix(db): detect duplicate keys with isUniqueViolation everywhere (#4175) ... FSService, OIDCStore, UserStore and TeamService each carried their own duplicate-key check. FSService only matched mysql and the bare SQLITE_CONSTRAINT code, so the mkdir/move race recovery never ran for a SQLite or Postgres unique violation. OIDCStore matched any message containing "UNIQUE" or the bare SQLITE_CONSTRAINT code, UserStore any SQLITE_CONSTRAINT_* code, and TeamService any message mentioning unique or duplicate. All four now use util/dbError's isUniqueViolation; UserStore still checks the index name on top.	2026-10-11 18:24:13 -07:00
Daniel Salazar	7ad963bacf	fix(cache): broadcast fs entry and team invalidations to peer regions (#4169) ... * fix(cache): broadcast fs entry and team invalidations to peer regions FSEntryStore's invalidations called publishCacheKeys without broadcast, so a delete, move, rename or overwrite only cleared the writer's cluster; other regions served the old row until the 60 s TTL. They now broadcast. Batch paths (deleteEntries per chunk, the batch overwrite) send one event for the whole batch. Read-path backfills stay local. TeamStore's busts were a local redis.del, so a removed member kept passing getMembership in other regions until the TTL. They now go through publishCacheKeys with broadcast, and softDelete busts every key in one call. Remove FSEntryCacheInvalidationEventHandler. It re-derived the same invalidations from outer.gui.item.* with a replica SELECT per holder, and its fs.remove.node branch never ran (FSEntry has no get()). The store's own broadcast covers what it did. * fix(fs): cap how many entry invalidations a node broadcasts per window FSEntryStore now broadcasts at most 10,000 entries' cache invalidations per broadcast flush window (outbound_flush_ms, 2 s by default). Past that, keys are dropped locally only and peers fall back to the 60 s entry-cache TTL; the store logs once per window when this happens. Each flush goes to a peer as one POST that is re-sent whole on failure, so a large recursive delete could otherwise build a batch the peer rejects on every retry. The budget is per store instance, not per call, so a delete issued page by page is bounded too, and single-entry writes count against the same budget.	2026-10-11 17:53:26 -07:00
Daniel Salazar	0066d49f74	fix(fs): emit fs.remove.node once per entry on recursive delete (#4167) ... #removeDescendantsStorage emitted fs.remove.node for every file descendant while grouping S3 keys, and remove() emitted it again for every descendant after deleting the rows, so file listeners ran twice. Drop the storage-pass emit; remove() now emits once per entry after its row is deleted.	2026-10-11 17:52:27 -07:00
Daniel Salazar	b67acdbf6f	fix(stores): return written rows without reading them from a lagging replica (#4166) ... * fix(stores): read rows back from the primary after writing them ShareStore (create, upsertPending, upsertActive, upsertActiveGroup, applyPending, upsertAnyone), AppStore (create, createFromOrigin, update, claimOwnership), NotificationStore.create, SubdomainStore.update and NotificationDriver.create returned the row they had just written by reading it back through `db.read`, which goes to the replica. Under replica lag that came back null or stale. Those read-backs now go to the primary, through a `primary` option on the getters. AppStore caches the primary copy on create, and claimOwnership no longer reads through getById, which cached the replica's pre-claim row on a miss. * fix(stores): skip the notify read-back; read OIDC link conflicts from the primary NotificationStore gains `insert`, which writes and returns the uid; `create` is now `insert` plus the primary read-back. NotificationService .notify ignores the row, so it uses `insert` and no longer pays a primary round trip per recipient. NotificationDriver.create still reads the row back from the primary. OIDCStore.link reads the conflicting row from the primary after a unique violation, so a replica that has not seen another account's link can no longer make the call report success. * perf(stores): return written rows instead of reading them back ShareStore.create, NotificationStore.create, AppStore.create and AppStore.createFromOrigin build the row they return from the values they inserted and the insert id, instead of reading it back from the primary. The DB-defaulted creation timestamp is now written explicitly from unix seconds (`timestampFromUnixSql`), so the returned value matches what a read returns (`timestampValue`); postgres INSERTs add RETURNING id. The AppStore rows fill every column the INSERT leaves to the schema and are cached as before. ShareStore.upsertPending's re-invite branch selects the full pending row in its dedupe read and returns it with the new mode and data; it falls back to the primary only when the UPDATE matched nothing. The remaining primary read-backs stay and say why: the share upserts and the new-invite insert (an upsert's surviving uid/created_at and the entry-owner subquery are only known to the primary), applyPending and claimOwnership (only an id or uid in hand), AppStore.update and SubdomainStore.update (the base row is a replica copy that would be cached), NotificationDriver.create (notify returns only the uid) and the OIDC link conflict.	2026-10-11 17:51:38 -07:00
Daniel Salazar	f88cadb4b9	fix: a copy records the size of the bytes it duplicated (#4197) ... A copied file's row took its size from the source row the request had resolved, which can predate an overwrite whose bytes CopyObject then copied. The copy now reads the new object's size and records that. When it is larger than the source row said, the allowance is checked again against the real size; a copy that no longer fits is refused with 413 and its object deleted. If the size check fails, the copy falls back to the source row's size, as completing a signed upload already does.	2026-10-11 10:48:52 -07:00
Daniel Salazar	491729e060	fix: backend test flakes and a socket shutdown hang (#4170) ... - SocketService's prepare-shutdown hook awaited io.close(), which also closes the http server and waits for every HTTP connection to end. A connection mid-request when close() runs stays open for the keep-alive timeout, so shutdown stalled before PuterServer severs connections. The hook no longer waits on the http close. - Test servers disable Ollama unless a test configures it. Its boot probe logged after files had ended, which failed shared-worker shards with EnvironmentTeardownError. - vitest ignores that teardown error for a console call still in flight. - setupPuterTestEnv boots again on a fresh port after EADDRINUSE, and a failed setupTestServer start shuts the server down. - UploadReservationStore expiry tests pin the clock instead of racing a 50 ms TTL.	2026-10-10 19:34:32 -04:00
Daniel Salazar	d4589caefe	fix: session store revokes (#4168)	2026-10-10 07:55:43 -07:00
Daniel Salazar	4fca4809b9	fix(health): discount total event-loop stall time from db liveness latency (#4160) ... The stall watcher kept only the longest gap, so a saturated loop with many sub-second stalls still failed database-liveness. It now sums blocked time across the probe (ignoring timer jitter) and reports total and longest.	2026-10-09 18:14:48 -07:00
Daniel Salazar	6060de8fbd	fix(alerts): overspend alarm in credits at warning; no-choices completions stop paging (#4154) ... - The per-account overspend alarm now reads in credits and raises at warning so it reaches the pager instead of only chat. - A non-stream completion with no choices (an upstream answering 200 with an error body) threw a TypeError that classified as internal_error and paged critical. It now throws bad_response, which falls back like any other empty response and surfaces as a 400.	2026-10-09 18:13:44 -07:00
Neal Shah	5fb025c109	Misc subdomain and worker fixes (#4157) ... * PUT 1902 * LocalWorker fetch policy fixes for 127.0.0.1	2026-10-09 19:59:52 -04:00
Juan Fernando Castro	50bcdc9c6c	fix: let a revocation be seen by the reads and the nodes that outlive it (#4151) ... * fix: let a revocation be seen by the reads and the nodes that outlive it Four places where a revoke lands on the primary and the next reader can still be told the old answer. The u2a cache key was dropped but not re-filled, so the next miss read a replica that may still carry the row and cached it for the TTL -- and a revoke's own settling pass is usually that miss. It re-fills from the primary, as the u2u side already does. A revoked session dropped its keys the same way. It now leaves the revoked row in the cache, read from the primary, so there is nothing for a lagging replica to re-introduce. A link share is its own authority rather than an index over a permission, so a replica still carrying a withdrawn row answers with it. For a short window after one is withdrawn, those reads go to the primary. Socket eviction rode a local event, so it only reached the node that did the revoking. It is announced on the fan-out channel too, which is where the node actually holding the connection hears it. * refactor: carry the revocation on outer.* instead of outer.pubsub.* Eviction runs through `io.in(room).disconnectSockets()`, which goes via the socket.io Redis adapter a cluster shares, so one node handling the event disconnects that user on every node in it. Fanning out to siblings had each of them repeat the same cluster-wide disconnect. The adapter's Redis is per-cluster, so peer clusters still need the hop -- `outer.*` reaches them and skips the sibling fan-out. The local `auth.sessions.revoked` goes with it: `outer.*` fires on the emitting node too, and nothing else subscribed.	2026-10-09 16:36:26 -04:00
Juan Fernando Castro	ff35fbd66e	Share attribution and cascade: finish PUT-1856 and PUT-1857 (#4119) ... Replayed onto main after #4118 squash-merged. Same tree as the reviewed head (8d8bd871f); only the redundant merges from the old base are gone.	2026-10-09 16:23:18 -04:00
Juan Fernando Castro	1ff5d93244	fix: a signed overwrite lands on the live key only once its completion is accepted (#4136) ... * fix: a signed overwrite lands on the live key only once its completion is accepted A presigned overwrite URL was signed against the live object key, so the browser's PUT replaced the owner's bytes directly. That PUT never passes through Puter, which leaves the access check on `completeWrite` with nothing left to protect: by the time it runs, what /read serves has already changed. The upload now goes to a key of its own. `completeWrite` is already the authorized step, so that is where the staged object is copied onto the live key, server-side, and the staged one dropped. The entry keeps its uuid, so everything written against it still holds. Aborting deletes the staged object, which the old shared key made unsafe to do. `copyObjectOfAnySize` carries the copy past the single-request ceiling by copying part by part, so a large file is no different. Two behaviours follow from the key no longer being shared: completing an overwrite that uploaded nothing is refused rather than reported as an overwrite of unchanged bytes, and abort always drops the session's object. Only the two presigned paths changed; `prepareBatchWrites` uploads server-side within one authorized request and still writes in place. * fix: the review's findings on the staged overwrite The batch signed path still signed against the live key, so the route the SDK's signed upload actually takes was unchanged. It stages now, which also makes the abort simplification safe: the guard that had protected a shared key was removed while that path still shared one, so aborting a batch overwrite would have deleted the owner's object. The completion is allowed against a path but lands on the uuid captured at start, and a move between the two puts the bytes somewhere the caller was never authorized for. The promote refuses unless the entry is still where the check looked. The batch promote failing left every session pending with its lease held; it now fails them as the rest of the function does. The pending GUI tile and the thumbnail key were keyed on the staged uuid, which no entry ever carries, so neither correlated with what the completion emitted. Responses carry `entryUid` for that. * fix: do not treat a pre-staging session's key as this upload's own A session signed by the previous release points straight at the live key, since `objectKey` was `existingEntry?.uuid ?? uuidv4()`. Completing one is already handled -- the promote returns early when the two keys match -- but abort deleted `objectKey` unconditionally, which during a rolling deploy would take the owner's file rather than the upload's litter. Abort now deletes only a key the upload owns. The multipart branch was always safe: discarding parts never touches an object already in place.	2026-10-09 16:22:36 -04:00
Juan Fernando Castro	86cc3490f7	fix: settle which plan an org seat resolves to, and confirm a seat's address (#4139) ... * fix: settle which default plan an org seat resolves to, and what counts as paid Default subscription resolvers ran in registration order, which is boot order: whichever layer registered first answered first. A seat is provisioned by a team and its address is never confirmed, so the seat resolver now states a priority and wins over anything a deployment infers from an address. The seat cap asked whether the owner's plan was outside the free set, which a default plan can be without anyone having bought it. Metering now reports whether an explicit subscription answered, and the cap rests on that. * fix: the review's findings on plan resolution `fromDefault` was read off which resolver answered, not off which policy applied. An explicit id naming a policy nobody registered falls through to the default one, and that read as bought. It follows the applied policy now. A deployment with unlimited metering has no explicit resolver, so every owner on it became unpaid and its teams dropped from the paid seat cap to the free one. Unlimited answers for what a paid plan would, so it counts as one. Also: the new constants had been placed between `FREE_SUBSCRIPTION_IDS` and its docblock, the register docstring still described first-wins, and prettier had reflowed an untouched licence header. * feat: a seat confirms the address its team typed in An address on a seat is the team's claim about someone else's inbox, and nothing asked the inbox. It is now demanded and sent a code, so the address counts for nothing until the seat hands it back. Resolvers that read a domain are the reason this matters. No address is still fine and demands nothing: the team is the trust anchor for the account, not for a mailbox it does not hold. `/confirm-email` allows an unconfirmed actor, so a seat can sign in with its temporary credential and clear the demand; nothing locks it out. * fix: clear the confirmation demand with the address it names `clearUnconfirmedEmail` releases a seat's address so the inbox's owner can sign up with it. The demand to confirm that address has to go at the same write: the gate reads `requires_email_confirmation && !email_confirmed`, and once the address is gone there is nothing left to send a code to. * fix: keep a seat's address correctable, and only ask what can be answered Review of the confirmation demand turned up two ways a seat could be left holding one it had no way to meet: - With no mail transport configured, the code is never sent and a resend cannot reach the seat either, so the demand stood with nothing able to lift it. The seat is now gated only when a code can actually travel. - An address the owner mistyped gated the seat on an inbox nobody could read, and the gate itself closes `/user-protected/change-email`, the route the seat would have fixed it by. `updateSeatEmail` lets the owner who typed the address retarget it, and refuses once it is confirmed, when it belongs to whoever proved it. Also resolves the owner's plan sequentially, so the second read takes the cache the first wrote and the pair cannot come from two resolutions, and restores the licence header a jsdoc reflow had rewrapped. * fix: let the confirm-email window open before the profile has loaded Booted from a stored token, the window renders before `window.user` is populated, and reading `.email` off null threw inside the window itself -- so the one screen that could have asked for the code never drew, leaving a blank page. Reproducible without a team: sign up, then load the GUI again before confirming. The address is now encoded rather than interpolated raw, and both forms of the line are i18n keys; it was hardcoded English before.	2026-10-09 16:17:51 -04:00
Juan Fernando Castro	7de8360a6e	Sharing cleanup: bounded outbound listings, and what see does not reach (#4118) ... * fix: keep a file name to one line in a subject, and the inbound total to the account **A name reaches the digest subject as the user typed it.** Subjects compile with `noEscape` on purpose -- a header is not HTML, and escaping would show entities to the reader -- and the comment there says free-form values collapse whitespace upstream. A file name does not: `#assertUsableName` refuses only an empty name, a slash, `.` and `..`, so a name may carry newlines. It is collapsed to one line and bounded before it goes in. **`includeTotal` answered an app with the account's figure.** The page is filtered by what the caller can reach -- an app sees only what its user handed it -- while `countByHolder` counts every inbound share. The docs already call `total` an approximation for the filtering; they did not cover an app reading the size of everything else. It is answered only for a caller acting as the account now, and the page documents that. The team-share fixture built its actor as `{ user }` with no `effectiveApp`, which reads as an app rather than a session. A session acts as the account, so it says so. * fix: stop `see` reaching inside a folder, and bound mode changes **A `see`-only folder recipient was pushed every child's name, size and type.** The fan-out picked holders by reach -- any live grant on a reaching root -- and `see` is a grant. But `see` says a node is there; `list` is what says what is inside it, and the payload carries exactly what `list` would: name, path, `is_dir`, type, size, modified. Descendants now go only to a holder whose mode reaches inside. A change to the shared node itself still goes to everyone who holds it, which is what `see` covers. **Mode changes skipped the daily quota entirely.** Not spending share budget is right -- changing a mode is not new reach, and the existing test says so -- but unbounded it lets one account write a pair as fast as it can ask. They have their own budget now, ten times the share limit by default and configurable, so the exemption stays an exemption from *that* budget rather than from any. * fix: let a half-finished downgrade be finished, and stop Trash answering **A mode downgrade that failed between its two halves could not be repaired.** `setUserUser` grants the new mode and then revokes the superseded ones. If the revokes did not all land, the higher grant stood -- and the retry returned early, because the mode it was asked for was now present. "Nothing to do" now means this mode is the only one standing, so asking again is what finishes it. The same two halves, and the same early return, were in the group variant. **Trashing someone else's item answered for what is in their Trash.** Moving into the owner's Trash is deliberately authorized without write on it -- that is what lets a recipient delete from a shared folder -- but a name collision there came back as `An entry already exists at /owner/Trash/<name>`. The mover picks the name, so that is a question they can ask about a folder they cannot list. It dedupes instead, which is also what the GUI wants: trashing should not fail over a name. * perf: record the entry's owner on the share row The outbound listings answer "shares on things I own that someone else issued" by joining `share` to `fsentries` and filtering on the owner there. Neither side of that join bounds the work: driven from `fsentries` it walks every file the user owns, driven from `share` it walks every share until it has a page. For a user who owns a lot and delegates nothing, that is the whole table for an empty result. `#outboundAppsSql` is worse than the ticket says -- it has no LIMIT at all, so every call aggregates the join across both tables. The owner now rides on the row, indexed with `id`, so all three read it directly. An entry cannot change owner -- a move out of the owner's tree is refused -- so it is written once, with the row. Set in SQL from `fsentry_id` rather than threaded through callers: four insert sites, each of which already has the id, and none of which can now forget. The risk in denormalising is a write path that does: a row with no owner recorded is a share that silently stops appearing in its owner's listing. The new test covers exactly that -- it fails when one insert is made to write NULL. Verified against a real boot: a pre-existing share row, on a database that genuinely predates the column, comes out with the owner its entry has. * fix: the review's findings on this branch **The Trash collision still had both halves open.** `overwrite` was checked before the trash case, so a caller setting it -- it is wire-supplied -- could still delete whatever it collided with in the owner's Trash, and the 409 survived for anyone who did not. The trash case is decided first now. Dedupe alone did not close it either: a name that changes only when there is a collision answers the same question the refusal did, and the mover sees that name even though the path is masked. Trashing someone else's item renames it every time, so the result carries no signal. `original_name` already records the real name, which is what a restore reads. Two tests pinned the old name; they say what it is now. **The owner column had no fallback.** Reads went only through it, so a row written by anything that predates it -- a pod mid-roll -- would never appear in its owner's listing again. The three reads now also cover `IS NULL` rows through the old join, indexed on the null and empty once none remain. **The grant became conditional on a replica read.** `if (!already)` skipped it on a stale row while the revokes below stayed unconditional, which could leave the holder with nothing where the old early return left their access alone. It grants unconditionally again; only the early return changed. **The re-issue budget covered one path of four.** Team, link and invite re-issues reserved nothing, so three ways round it were left open. They share one `#reserveRemodeQuota` now. Two docblocks had been pushed off the functions they describe, and two comments still described the join that is gone. * chore: one-line the comments added here * test: measure the prefix walk by what it keys on, not by the clock `checks many long paths without re-reading every prefix of each` gave the walk 1500ms of wall clock. It measured nothing useful: the shape it guards against — keying each step on the accumulated prefix text rather than on the parent id — costs 29ms against the current 8ms on that input, so both ends sit far under the bound. Under coverage the same test ran 1511ms and failed, which is the only thing the number could ever report on. `PathPrefixIds` now counts the characters it keys on, and the walk is asserted on that: proportional to the input, and twice the depth costs twice as much rather than four times. Keying on the accumulated text fails both. The original case keeps its real assertion, that a request this size is refused. * fix: keep the recorded entry owner current, and the trash guard on the retry A move into someone else's tree re-owns the whole subtree, which the migration comment claimed could not happen. The shares on it are re-pointed at the new owner, or they drop out of the listing the column keys and stay in the old owner's. The unique-violation retry re-entered the collision resolver without the trash flag, which is the one call site the guard was not threaded through.	2026-10-09 16:14:23 -04:00
Daniel Salazar	8a6929847d	Auth limits, reborn-app tokens, seat addresses, drop-area encode (#4148) ... * auth: per-account 2FA code limit, single-use otp-login tokens, recovery mail limits - /login/otp and /login/recovery-code share a per-account bucket charged on wrong codes; an otp-login token completes one sign-in. - /send-pass-recovery-email adds an IP bucket, a per-account cap and captcha, and reuses the outstanding recovery token instead of rotating it. - Reauth tokens carry the rejection reason; /signup re-attaches a temp account only from an expired session. * auth: app-issued access tokens older than their app stop authenticating An access token whose row or parent session predates the app now holding its uid is refused, the same check app and worker sessions already get. * teams: signup can take an address a seat never confirmed Password signup, save-account and a provider-verified OIDC sign-up take an address a team seat holds unconfirmed; the seat's copy is cleared at the write. A seat address that was confirmed still blocks. * dev-center: encode dropped directory child names	2026-10-09 00:12:59 -07:00
Daniel Salazar	360f6b1079	fix(events): bill reached deliveries, bound dispatch reads, seal cursors (PUT-1900) (#4146) ... * fix(events): bill reached deliveries only, bound dispatch reads, seal cursors - A broadcast socket copy is billed only when a connection for its holder exists on this node, anywhere in this region (connection count) or, for a durable row, in a region presence names. Without peers it bills as before. - Compiled match filters are held in a bounded LRU with a TTL, and dropped when another process reports a subscription ended. - GET /events/fetch reads the continuation from `cursor`, falling back to `after`. - Cursors from /events/fetch, /events/subscriptions and /events/kv-handles are encrypted with sealCursor/openCursor; plain cursors still read. - A durable subscribe counts again after its insert and removes its own row when over the cap; the generation bump for that removal is published. - Subscribe checks access before reading the anchor's owner, and an anchor gone in between answers with the subject the caller sent. - Dispatch reads at most the rows per token routing can use, scanning large token hashes; a removal still settles every row on the removed anchor. - puter.events.unsubscribe() stops routing after the server ends the subscription or reports it gone; fetch() accepts `cursor`. * fix(events): forward kv values only to regions with rows that ask - A region counts its session rows asking for kv values per token and announces the token's value variant (`v#<token>`) over the existing `watch` item on the first such row, withdrawing it with the last. Add, remove, reap, reanchor and refresh all keep it, reading `includeValue` off the row as it is dropped. - A kv write reads the value variants alongside the watch index and attaches the value only to forwards bound for a region that announced one. * fix(pagination): seal id-keyed cursors on every list endpoint Apps, subdomains, workers, team (members, directory, teams, audit, own audit), shares (inbound, outbound), the user-to-user permission audit and readdir/descendant listings now hand out cursors sealed with sealCursor and read them with openCursor, so a cursor no longer carries a row id. Plain cursors issued before still read. * test(events): pass socket ids to noteConnect in the billing tests	2026-10-09 00:08:13 -07:00
Daniel Salazar	dcfb1263de	fix(events): single-writer presence items, live-socket counts and region-wide leave grace (PUT-1759) (#4142) ... * fix(events): keep each region's presence item written only by that region - A region that receives a forward for a pair it holds no socket for retires its own presence item through the pin-ordered leave path, gated by a region-shared claim. The sender no longer retires another region's item, and the forward reply no longer carries noSocket. - Presence reads skip items for regions outside the peer list instead of retiring them. - removeConnection decrements and deletes the count in one script. - A failed join releases the join pin, and any connect that finds the pin free writes the join. - A single delivery treats a socket on any node of the region as local, using the region-wide connection count, and picks the next remote candidate by the regions already tried instead of by index. - Correct the connection-count TTL comment. * fix(events): count presence by live socket and honor the leave window region-wide - A region's presence for a pair is a sorted set of socket ids scored by last renewal under a new key, replacing the integer count. A socket counts while renewed within the concurrency-slot window; add, renew and remove each prune lapsed members and report the live count in one script, so a node that dies stops holding the pair. - The last socket going marks the pair as leaving region-wide for the grace window, in the same script; a connect clears it. A forward that lands on another node inside the window does not retire the item. - Add the events.presence.write counter, labelled by op (join, leave, refresh, retire).	2026-10-08 23:55:55 -07:00
Daniel Salazar	7adc03cb75	fix: team seats caps (#4141)	2026-10-08 17:50:45 -07:00
Juan Fernando Castro	c55437245b	fix: settle the url file-access gate from a grant held on a folder above (#4132) ... * fix: settle the url file-access gate from a grant held on a folder above The gate asks `/auth/check-permissions` with `app_uid`, which resolved through the permission scan. `fs:` access inherits down a tree and only ACL walks that, so a grant on a folder never answered for a file inside it and the gate asked again, writing another per-file row on each Allow. The `app_uid` branch now routes `fs:<uid>:<mode>` through `ACLService.check` as the app-under-user actor, which is the same authority the operation itself will face. Everything else keeps the scan, including `puter.perms.holds`, which sends no `app_uid`. * fix: the review's findings on the consent gate A permission that is not a string reached `startsWith` and faulted the whole request, where it used to answer false inside the catch; both parsers now refuse a non-string, which also covers the other callers that read a request's list. The path spelling of a permission took the scan while the uid spelling took ACL, so one file could answer two ways. Both spellings resolve to their entry and take the same route. The checks run together rather than one after another: the caller gives up after five seconds and prompts, and a deep path is several reads.	2026-10-08 15:05:01 -04:00
Juan Fernando Castro	d1d55a6bc3	SDK auth plumbing: cache scope, dedupe keys and the token listener (#4112) ... * fix: pin the token sender, scope the grant flag, and stop two stragglers Five of the SDK auth-plumbing items. **The global `puter.token` handler pinned origin but not source.** Its three siblings all pin both, and each says why: the GUI origin is shared by every frame on that domain, so origin alone identifies a domain, not a sender. `signIn` pins its popup and binds `msg_id`, the consent dialog pins its popup, and the reauth wait pins the embedder. This one pinned the embedder only when `env === 'app'`. Since `authenticateWithPuter` now hands off to `signIn`, which adopts the token itself, the embedder is the only sender this handler is left serving, so it pins in every environment. **`is_grant_user_app_permission` was a request-wide flag held across an await.** It tells the `app-root-dir` rewriter that a row is being written, and while it is set that rewriter resolves to a real `fs:` permission instead of `PERMISSION_FOR_NOTHING_IN_PARTICULAR`. Anything evaluating an `app-root-dir:` permission beside the grant -- the grant route runs one under `Promise.all` with fs work -- read the same flag. It now lives in a scope derived for that call, so what the write needs to say about itself is not also said to its neighbours. `runInDerivedContext` is new: `runWithContext` starts an empty store, which would drop the `actor` the rewriter reads. **`fs.stat` and `fs.readdir` deduped on parameters alone**, so two identities in one realm could share a result. They now key on origin and token as `os/user.js` does, which documents the reason. **`signIn`'s relay poll never stopped.** Closing the popup settles the promise; the loop kept asking `/login/wait` every second for the life of the page. **`triggerReauth`'s five-minute timeout was never cleared**, so a successful reauth left a timer to fire into a settled promise. The concurrency test parks the rewrite and reads the flag while it is held -- my first attempt read before the flag was even set and passed either way. * fix: scope the fs cache per identity, and retarget two paths that never ran The remaining SDK auth-plumbing items. **`puter._cache` outlived the identity that filled it.** `_clearAuthToken` dropped the token and the stored session but left the cache and `whoami` as they were, and its keys were raw paths -- `item:/alice/Documents` and a `~`-relative key alike, identical whoever asked. A GUI user switch without a reload could be served the previous user's stat or readdir. Keys now carry the origin and token they were read as, built in one place so the writers, the readers, the invalidations and the warm-up probes cannot drift apart, and signing out drops the cache and `whoami` with the token. **The driver permission prompt could not fire.** Both paths waited for a 200 carrying `{success:false, error:{code:'permission_denied'}}`. The driver route answers `success: true` or throws, so a refusal arrives as a 403 -- the shape the retry now reads. Its two tests synthesised the old envelope, so they passed against a response the API does not send; they use the real one now, and the prompt goes from never called to called once. This is a behaviour change: a driver call refused for permissions will now prompt, which is what the path was written to do. Happy to delete it instead if the prompt is not wanted. The half-written copy of the same idea in `utils.js` is gone -- it prompted for one hard-coded interface and its retry was a `// todo`. **The verification-gate single-flight was keyed on nothing**, so a phone-gated request in flight beside an email-gated one took the email answer, replayed, failed again and surfaced raw without ever asking. Keyed per gate: same gate still shares one dialog, a different gate gets its own. * test: ask the cache the same way the code does The API suites built `item:<path>` keys by hand, so they stopped finding anything once the real keys carried the identity they were read as. They go through `fsCacheKey` now, which is the point: a test that spells the key itself passes until the moment the spelling changes, and then fails for a reason that has nothing to do with the behaviour it is guarding. These run against a live server, so a plain `vitest run` does not reach them -- they were green locally and red in CI. * fix: the review's findings on this branch Eight, and three of them were regressions this branch introduced. **Pinning the token sender to `globalThis.parent` in every environment broke the case it was meant to protect.** On a top-level page `parent` is the page itself, and the token arrives from a popup, so the handler stopped accepting anything. The GUI posts `puter.token` to `window.opener` for the file pickers too, not only for sign-in, and this handler is their only consumer -- a site calling `showOpenFilePicker()` would have signed the user in, dropped the token and run the following read with none. It now pins the embedder when framed and a window this SDK opened when not; `UI.js` already tracked its picker popups for the same reason, so that set is shared rather than duplicated. **The GUI still spelled a cache key by hand.** `updateSubdomainsForItems` built `item:<path>`, which no longer matches what the SDK writes, so its `get` could not hit and its `set` wrote an orphan nothing reads and nothing evicts -- a published website's badge quietly stopped appearing on a cached render. It goes through `fsCacheKey` now, and that is the last hand-spelled key in the tree. **Retargeting the driver permission prompt to 403 was wrong and is reverted to the deletion the ticket asked for.** The route refuses with `forbidden`, not `permission_denied`, so the retarget still missed it; meanwhile a driver that raises `permission_denied` for its own reasons would have opened a prompt that had nothing to do with the refusal. And the prompt asks for `driver:<iface>:<method>` while the route checks `service:<driver>:ii:<iface>`, so granting it changes nothing. The path cannot work as written. The rest were pre-existing or latent: `cacheWhoami_` wrote its answer without checking the token it was issued under was still current, so a reauth landing mid-flight could repopulate `whoami` with the previous identity. `_dropIdentityCaches` also left `whoamiCache_`, which other call sites await. `setAuthToken` now drops the identity caches when the token actually changes: keys carry the token and the store is persisted with no TTL, so a rotation that did not go through `_clearAuthToken` orphaned a whole key space with nothing to reclaim it. The verification-gate entry was registered after the body could already have deleted it -- a synchronous throw stranded a resolved "not verified" in the map for the life of the page. It registers first and clears on a microtask. `signIn`'s poll is bounded as well as settle-checked: on a cross-origin isolated page opened from a gesture, nothing watches the popup, so closing it never settled the promise and the loop ran on exactly as before. `runInDerivedContext` says in its docblock that callee writes do not survive; only the one flag needs the scope, and a future caller should not expect to hand a value back through it. * fix: the review's findings on the SDK auth plumbing **The relay bound stopped asking without saying so.** The deadline left the `signIn` promise pending and its listener attached. On an isolated page opened from a gesture the relay is the only thing that can settle it -- nothing watches the popup there -- so a user who took longer than the deadline was left with a promise that never resolved, and `authenticateWithPuter` queues every later implicit-auth call behind it. It rejects now. **Pinning the token source left `signIn`'s own popup untracked.** Only the picker popups registered, so on a top-level page the global handler bailed on a sign-in it had opened itself: `puter.onAuth` never fired, and `puterAuthState.authGranted` was never set. `openAuthPopup` is the one place auth popups are opened, so they register there. **A closed popup is ours too.** Rejecting one that had already closed loses a message from a popup that posts and then closes itself, which is why `UI.js` tolerates the same case. Kept, with the set bounded instead. **The gate key carried the factors**, so one route naming them and another not opened two dialogs for the same gate. It keys on the gate, as `ctx.done` does. **`fsCacheKey` left `~` unresolved**, so a writer and an invalidation spelling the same place differently missed each other -- the drift the one key builder was meant to end. The dead `opts.permission` went with the path that used to read it. Four workerd-runner failures are left: `ai > chat stream adapter supports cancellation`, `kv > a GUI boot key written by another client reads fresh` and two cache-warmer ones. All four fail the same way on `origin/main`, and the node and browser runners pass. * chore: one-line the comments added here * chore: reflow the comments the removed retry cause left ragged	2026-10-08 15:04:49 -04:00
Daniel Salazar	80736de0f1	test(events): wait for the recorded failure, not any future lease score (#4127) ... The in-flight claim's lease (2x the invoke timeout) is also a future score, so polling heldForMs > 0 could pass before the failed attempt's hold was written: the backoff test read 600 instead of 2000, and the 404/hang/429/suspended-owner tests ended while their attempt was still in flight, letting it land in the next test. Wait on the subscription's failure counter instead, which only moves after the hold or gap marker is written.	2026-10-08 11:39:06 -07:00
Filip Kujundžić	b6150d63f3	Merge pull request #4090 from HeyPuter/fix/ai-stream-cancellation ... fix(ai): propagate cancellation and stream termination failures	2026-10-08 13:33:50 +02:00
Daniel Salazar	199d72cbdf	fix(events): refuse scoped access tokens on durable events routes (PUT-2048) (#4105) ... Durable subscribe, list, fetch and unsubscribe now apply the same scoped token check as the handler, worker and kv-handle routes: `isAccessTokenActor(actor) && !isAccountContext(actor)`. An access token an app issued (effectiveApp = the app) is treated the same as one the account issued: subscribe answers 403 `events_durable_requires_account`, list and fetch return an empty page, unsubscribe answers 404. `rowInActorScope` returns false for these tokens, which covers durable unsubscribe and ack. The session verbs that also use it already refuse access tokens at the socket handshake. Full-access tokens, app tokens and sessions are unchanged.	2026-10-07 22:35:09 -07:00
Juan Fernando Castro	cf574e4b34	Merge pull request #4110 from HeyPuter/juancastro/icloud-dot-significance ... Treat dots as significant on Apple's mail domains	2026-10-07 17:11:59 -04:00
Nariman Jelveh	b5bd917119	Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/HeyPuter/puter	2026-10-07 12:39:47 -07:00
Nariman Jelveh	3999dd062f	Update RecommendedAppsService.ts	2026-10-07 12:39:34 -07:00
Daniel Salazar	3e234d7329	fix: 402 error messaging (#4114)	2026-10-07 12:34:45 -07:00
Daniel Salazar	f674e51b4d	fix: answer lost write races with 4xx, and time health-check timeouts against loop stalls (#4107) ... - signup: a username taken by a concurrent signup between the duplicate check and the insert now returns the pre-check's 400 instead of surfacing the unique-key error as a 500. The holder is read from the primary. - fs move: when the UPDATE trips the (parent_id, name) unique key after the collision probe missed the occupant, re-read it from the primary and resolve it the same way the probe would have (overwrite, dedupe, or the 409 item_with_same_name_exists), then retry the move once. - server health: a check that hits the per-check timeout reports how long the event loop was blocked during it, like the database-liveness latency failure already does.	2026-10-07 12:02:05 -07:00
Juan Castro	0555ea6479	Merge branch 'main' into juancastro/icloud-dot-significance	2026-10-07 11:01:12 -04:00
Juan Castro	cf817b0f0a	fix: treat dots as significant on Apple's mail domains ... `cleanEmail()` applied gmail's `dots_dont_matter` rule to icloud.com, me.com and mac.com. Apple allocates the exact string: `j.smith@icloud.com` and `jsmith@icloud.com` are two mailboxes with two owners. Collapsing them made one canonical address stand for both. What that canonical address feeds: - `findEmailOwner` falls back to it, so an OIDC sign-in whose verified claim is the dotted address resolves to the account holding the undotted one, and `linkProviderToUser` has nothing left to object to -- the provider verified a real mailbox and the account's address is confirmed. - The unique index on COALESCE(clean_email, lower(email)) reads it, so the rightful owner of a dotted Apple address is refused signup because the undotted account already "owns" it. - Pending share invites are stored and claimed on it. Subaddressing is untouched: Apple does fold `+tag`, so that rule stays. Gmail keeps both rules -- there the fold is correct. A migration recomputes `clean_email` for those domains on all three engines, since rows written before this still hold the collapsed value and the index reads the stored one. Verified the SQL against the function rather than by inspection: same five inputs through `cleanEmail()` and through sqlite give byte-identical output. It can only split rows apart, never merge them, so it cannot collide with the unique index. Not changed: `findUserByEmail` still matches on the canonical address. The cross-match it documents is correct where the provider really does fold -- `foo.bar+tag@gmail.com` is the same inbox as `foobar@gmail.com`. Requiring an exact match would break that for no benefit here; the fix is for the data to say what the provider does.	2026-10-07 09:17:03 -04:00
Daniel Salazar	e477bca3eb	test(events): wait for the failure hold, not any future lease score ... The in-flight claim's lease (2x the invoke timeout) is also a future score, so polling for "held" could read it before the failed attempt's backoff hold was written. Wait for deferAfterFailure to settle instead.	2026-10-06 22:32:02 -07:00
Juan Castro	ad1be70d06	Merge branch 'juancastro/flat-permission-view-scope' into juancastro/permissions-access-control-cleanup	2026-10-06 19:44:37 -04:00
Juan Castro	6277f106c4	Merge branch 'main' into juancastro/flat-permission-view-scope	2026-10-06 19:44:19 -04:00
Juan Castro	738a8058ef	fix: close the path oracle where it actually was ... Local testing against a running instance found the service-side fix was not enough. Both answers were 403, but they did not read the same: exists -> permission_denied: fs:/other/rd:read missing -> Cannot create outside your home directory (forbidden) The second comes from `#planFsPathCreate` in the controller, which probes the path itself and only calls the create guard once it knows the path is absent. Its comment said so outright -- checked "only once the path is confirmed missing, so an existing shared path outside the caller's home is not a new rejection" -- which is the oracle stated as an intention. A foreign path now refuses word for word whichever it is. Responses are byte-identical apart from the caller's own input. `rewritePermissionForActor` collapses the create guard's `forbidden` the same way it already collapsed the 404, for the paths that reach it through the service rather than the controller. The existing test pinned `forbidden` here; its subject is that nothing is created in someone else's tree, which still holds. Alongside it is the invariant itself: refuse a present and an absent foreign path, mask the path, compare the whole error. Without the controller check that fails.	2026-10-06 19:41:55 -04:00
Juan Fernando Castro	0e2f9663b2	Merge pull request #4091 from HeyPuter/juancastro/teams-cleanup ... Teams cleanup: pagination, resumable delete, and credentials that stop leaving by mail	2026-10-06 19:27:09 -04:00
Juan Castro	b8fcbffe3f	fix: the five remaining review findings ... **The path oracle was not closed.** The rewrite only remapped the *error*, so success-vs-403 still answered whether a foreign path exists. Narrower than reported: every other grant path already gates on `canManagePermission`, and only `grantUserAppPermission` has no authority check -- deliberately, since granting your own app something you don't hold is inert. It now refuses a foreign path the actor cannot see, with the same error a missing one gives. My first test for this passed without the fix: `makeUserActor` creates no fsentries, so both paths 404'd and nothing distinguished them. It inserts a real entry now, and the control fails with "expected null to match 403" -- null being the grant that succeeded, which is the oracle. **`#validateEmail` still failed open** on the main signup / change-email / confirm path while its OIDC twin was hardened. Same shape as OIDC now: a gate that did not run is not a pass. **The 16-permission cap broke `puter.perms.check()`** for longer lists. The SDK's own docblock promised "one round trip however many are asked about", which the cap made untrue, so it batches instead. The reported second half -- the UI grant poller burning its timeout -- is not reachable: `MAX_REQUESTED_PERMISSIONS` already caps that path at the same 16. **`listener_failed` was set by wildcard listeners.** An unrelated observer on `email.*` throwing would refuse every signup. Only an exact-key listener implements the event, so only that one speaks for the gate. **`whoami()` labelled everything `Unauthorized`.** A 502 with an HTML body is not a 401; the server's `code` now rides along and the fallback names the status.	2026-10-06 19:23:40 -04:00
Juan Castro	bd5aa901ab	perf: batch the per-page reads in a team delete ... Measured first, against a real server, counting DB round trips: a 40-seat delete was 284 queries, 7.1 per seat, scaling linearly. Four of those seven answered for the whole page and had no reason to be asked per account. 120x SELECT * FROM `user` WHERE `id` = ? 41x INSERT INTO `audit_team_membership` 40x SELECT COALESCE(SUM(size), 0) FROM fsentries 40x UPDATE `user` SET `suspended` = ? 40x SELECT `uuid` FROM `sessions` WHERE `user_id` = ? The page now reads who is already suspended, what each holds, and the rows the notices need in one query each, and writes the audit as one statement. What is genuinely per account -- the suspension, its billing event, the mail -- stays per account under the same concurrency bound. Same 40-seat delete is now 170 queries, 4.3 per seat. Three new store methods rather than raw SQL at the call site: `getSuspendedByIds` reads the primary, deliberately not `getByIds`, which is cache-first. A stale `suspended` is exactly what re-charges a seat on a retry, which is the thing this path was just fixed to stop doing. `getHeldBytesForUsers` is `getHeldBytes` with a GROUP BY. `appendAuditMany` is `appendAudit` as one multi-row insert, still written before any suspension, so a failed append cannot leave an unlogged one. What is left is concentrated in `#suspend`: the UPDATE, the forced re-read the user store does afterwards to refresh its cache, and the session drop. Those are shared store paths and batching them means owning their cache invalidation, so they are not in scope here.	2026-10-06 18:55:53 -04:00
Juan Castro	edb0c2a712	Merge branch 'main' into juancastro/flat-permission-view-scope	2026-10-06 18:13:27 -04:00
Juan Castro	66774ff90c	Merge branch 'main' into juancastro/permissions-access-control-cleanup	2026-10-06 18:12:39 -04:00
Juan Castro	0fbb6def5a	Merge branch 'main' into juancastro/flat-permission-view-scope	2026-10-06 18:12:25 -04:00
Juan Castro	0495ea0f9d	fix: close the holes the review found in the storage gate ... Four, all real. The gate threw on a non-string. `validator.isEmail` asserts its argument, and two call sites hand it an unvalidated body value -- `send-pass-recovery-email` is public, so `{"email": 1}` was a 500 rather than a 400. The check belongs in the gate, not in each caller, which is the whole premise of having one. OIDC signup never shape-checked the claim at all. `claims.email` went from a truthiness check straight into `user.create`, so a provider we do not run could store exactly the string this branch exists to keep out. `email_verified` attests the mailbox, not the characters. The change-email confirm handler promoted the staged column without re-reading it through anything. A row staged before this deploys still lands on `email`; one check at promotion closes that window. The invite path kept its own regex, and it was never the same rule. It admitted `a..b@x.com`, `.a@x.com`, `a@-x.com`, `a;b@x.com` and `a,b@x.com` -- the last of which nodemailer reads as two recipients -- each one a permanent pending row that spent daily quota, which is the failure the comment above the constant said it existed to prevent. It uses the gate now, and the second regex is gone. A regression test each, all four confirmed to fail without their fix.	2026-10-06 17:20:35 -04:00