A throwing prepare/shutdown hook stopped the loop, so shutdown() skipped
closeAllConnections and every later hook, including the final metering
flush; each hook now runs and failures are logged. Broadcast, events
forwarding and share digests joined nothing already in flight and could
drop what was queued behind it; their final flushes now wait for it, ship
the tail, and drain once more at shutdown. Local worker disposal and the
OpenAI image metering call are awaited. settleWithin and
FINAL_FLUSH_TIMEOUT_MS bound each final flush.
- relay sign-in popups take the opener origin from the referrer only
- session revokes read the primary, batch per user, and tombstone caches in every region
- wisp relay tokens bound to the minting session; verify rechecks the account
- hosted origins keep app identity with the site owner; deleted app uids recorded in deleted_apps
- subdomain cache tombstoned on delete, update, reclaim and app/account cascades
- email lookups require an exact address match after the SQL lookup
- workers deploy only from files the deployer owns
- share_app_data:false enforced at ACL time, plus copy/move/rename/share/recursive listing
- kv remove returns no value without read; kv:expire op grant usable
- fs errors name the entry instead of the owner's path
- shared-by-me drops rows a delegate no longer has authority over
- private apps can't move index_url onto another user's origin
- GUI: default apps saved and launched by uid; save picker accepts only copy/move; permission dialog waits for focus; Publish as Worker hidden on others' files
- PUT-1800: gate `createWorkerSessionToken` on actor type, so an app or an
access token can no longer mint an app-less, root-shaped worker session;
`WorkerDriver` binds on `effectiveApp` instead of `app`.
- PUT-1799: add `isAccountContext` and read it where "no app" was being read
as "the account" — handler publish, events-worker listing, kv handle
mint/revoke/list. A scoped API token is no longer an account session.
- PUT-1802: re-authorize a durable row before its backlog drains, settling it
permanently when the grant is gone. Covers an ancestor-level unshare, which
the revoke settle deliberately leaves to the delivery re-check.
- PUT-1803: mask the owner's absolute path out of deliveries and subscription
anchors on a foreign node, the way every FS surface already does.
- PUT-1804: let a revoke reach rows already suspended for a resumable reason,
re-stamping them so a resume cannot hand over the held backlog.
- PUT-1805: apply the subscribe path's audience gate to `/events/fetch` before
the query, so a cursor can no longer count and name invisible notifications.
- PUT-1807: refuse `mode: 'manage'` from any actor holding an app — inside its
own AppData the ACL short-circuit would otherwise supply the reach.
- PUT-1808: take the sending peer from the verified signature header rather
than the request body.
- PUT-1810: re-base a kv share-handle row's stored match filter on the handle,
so the owner's absolute key prefix stays hidden.
- PUT-1814: escape LIKE wildcards and anchor the issuer-prefix queries on a
segment; anchor `manage:` stripping; reject a backslash in a share prefix;
assert a resolved actor in `subscribeDurable`.
- PUT-1815: bound the char/varchar columns behind `event_subscriptions` and
`kv_share_handles` at the store layer.
* feat: bake published handlers into a generated events worker
* feat: deploy and address the per-app events worker behind a flag
* test: single delivery end to end through a real local worker
* feat: events workers run their own runtime, in their own namespace
An events worker was being deployed as an ordinary worker: default dispatch
namespace, a `subdomains` row, the router preamble, and an app-scoped worker
token baked in. The public dispatcher resolves any script in that namespace
straight off the hostname, so the worker answered at `<name>.puter.work`, and
the only thing in front of it was an unguessable name plus a check that a
`puter-auth` header was present — which the router never validates. Anyone who
learned the hostname could run an app's handlers with a body of their choosing,
in an isolate holding the owner's token as `me`.
Instead:
- Handlers run on their own runtime (`src/worker/src/events-runtime.js`), which
provides no `router` and no `me`, owns the single invoke route, and hands a
handler only `{ event, ctx, user, fetch, ack }`. `user` is built from the
invocation's delivery token, so a handler acts as the subscriber whose
delivery it is and nothing wider. The preamble build emits one bundle per
runtime; the shared half of the template is now included by both.
- The deploy target carries the runtime to prepend, the source to deploy, and
whether to mint a worker token at all, so an events worker deploys into the
`events` dispatch namespace from generated source with no token binding, no
`subdomains` row, and no claim on the owner's worker quota or worker list.
- An invocation carries a key derived from the deployment secret and the script
name, bound as a secret and checked in constant time inside the isolate,
which reads it once and drops it before handler code runs.
- Scripts are named after the handler set they contain, so publishing writes
rows and deploys nothing: a set is deployed the first time a delivery needs
it, and a changed set is a new script rather than an overwrite of a running
one. Publish responses keep the shape they had before the runtime existed.
- Invocations reach a worker only through the events dispatcher, which has no
zone route and requires the internal secret; the backend's own deploy path is
the rehydrate route the dispatcher calls on a namespace miss. Locally there is
no dispatcher, so the controller hands the service an in-process transport
that deploys on miss itself.
The SDK stops allowlisting `puter` as a handler global — a handler that reaches
for an ambient SDK is now refused at publish time, naming `user` instead, rather
than passing the scan and failing on its first delivery.
Requires `events.workerNamespace`, `events.dispatcherUrl` and
`events.internalSecret`; without them nothing is addressable and background
deliveries stay retriable, as they did with the runtime off.
* fix: a handler's delivery token gets through the read routes
An events handler acts as the subscriber through the access token its
invocation carried, but every FS read route refused scoped access tokens
outright, so `user.fs.stat(event.path)` — the design's own example — answered
403 inside the worker. The read-side routes now admit them; the ACL each
handler already runs intersects the token's grant with its issuer's, which is
the check that keeps a token to what it was minted for. The end-to-end suite
asserts the stat from inside the isolate.
* fix: shorthand-method handlers publish as functions
`{ ingest({ event }) { … } }` stringifies without the `function` keyword, so
its source is not an expression and the events worker baked it as a broken
stub — every delivery a retriable 500 until the subscription suspended, with
nothing at publish time to say why. The SDK now gives a shorthand method the
keyword before hashing and sending; getters, setters and computed names are
left for the server-side check to refuse.
* feat: an app's events worker is listable and destroyable
An app with published handlers has an events worker, and hosted deployments
bill it monthly per app, so its owner needs to see it and be able to take it
down. The core announces the lifecycle on the bus — `events.worker.create`
when an app's first handler is published, `events.worker.destroy` when its last
one goes — with the owner as the actor, so pricing can plug in from outside.
`GET /events/workers` lists the caller's workers (paginated, with the script
each set deploys as) and `POST /events/workers/destroy` removes every handler
of an app under the same owner scoping as the handler routes, suspending the
subscriptions bound to them. `puter.events.workers.list/destroy` in the SDK,
a docs page, and a 5 MB cap on an app's combined handler source
(`events_worker_too_large`) so a set that publishes can always deploy.
* fix: harden the events worker runtime for production
- A 4xx is terminal only when it carries the handled marker the runtime (and
the dispatcher) stamp on every answer that came from a script; an unmarked
4xx — an edge 404 for a wrong dispatcher hostname, a WAF page — stays
retriable and is logged, once per script per minute, with the runtime's
reason header.
- Script names are scoped to this backend's exposed API origin, so two
backends sharing a namespace never resolve one script with the wrong
endpoint binding or key. Shape unchanged.
- Each handler is validated in the exact context it is emitted into and the
whole generated file is compiled once; a source that would break the script
marks every handler broken instead of deploying a SyntaxError.
- Locally, events scripts live under their own registry key: the public local
worker host cannot reach them and an ordinary worker cannot take their name.
- A suspended or deleted app owner stops invocations; deploys are throttled
per app per hour; in-flight deploys are keyed by app and script; the
upstream deploy call times out; the generated source is size-capped with a
margin over the publish cap; boot fails when the runtime is on but its
preamble is not built. Byte-length secret compare, appUid shape check,
dispatcher URL prefix preserved, wider connection pool.
* feat: background workers are listed in the sessions manager
A user paying for an app's events worker needs somewhere to see it and take it
down. The sessions manager gets a section listing the apps that run event
handlers in the background, with a Destroy action that removes their published
handlers.
* feat(perms): add cross-app app-data permission vocabulary
* feat(perms): sweep app grants by permission prefix
* feat(perms): resolve and withdraw cross-app data grants
* feat(kv): support an authorized namespace override and per-key privacy
* feat(kv): gate cross-app KV access behind app-data grants
* feat(fs): allow cross-app AppData access and require a scope to delete
* feat(auth): accept permission lists and gate app-data grants
* feat(perms): add requestAppData to the puter.js SDK
* feat(gui): carry permission lists through the IPC and popup transports
* feat(gui): describe cross-app data requests in the consent dialog
* docs: document requestAppData and per-entry KV privacy
* perf(perms): sweep cross-app grants only for origin-bootstrapped apps
* fix(gui): stop double-encoding cross-app consent text
* fix(perms): close three gaps in cross-app grant enforcement
* fix(kv): meter and batch the per-entry privacy probe
* fix(perms): resolve app identifiers and scopes more strictly in the SDK
* test(perms): cover the cross-app consent flow end to end
* fix: small missing token resolution for app
also adds the same exclusion for the batchPut api, small change
* fix: make resolved actor optional
---------
Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>
* test: tests for puter.js
* fix: ship lockfile for coverage devDeps; tolerate missing base coverage
npm ci failed on CI because package.json gained the babel/istanbul
devDependencies without the matching package-lock.json update. Also make
the coverage workflow's base leg best-effort so a base ref that predates
the coverage script reports without the comparison column instead of
failing the run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* typeify subdomains wip
* initial (untested) logic for LocalWorkerService
* Make it work, add lifecycle expiry since workers are process heavy in current implementation
* fix type errors
---------
Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>
Daniel Salazar