Files
puter/extensions/whoami.ts

295 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript

import { Context } from '@heyputer/backend/src/core';
import { extension } from '@heyputer/backend/src/extensions';
import { getTaskbarItems } from '@heyputer/backend/src/util/taskbarItems.js';
import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
import TimeAgo from 'javascript-time-ago';
import localeEn from 'javascript-time-ago/locale/en';
const stores = extension.import('store');
const services = extension.import('service');
const clients = extension.import('client');
const timeago = (() => {
TimeAgo.addDefaultLocale(localeEn);
return new TimeAgo('en-US');
})();
// User timestamps come off the DB as SQL datetime strings; the wire format
// for all of them is unix seconds. Unparseable values are dropped rather
// than sent as NaN.
const toUnixSeconds = (value: unknown): number | undefined => {
if (!value) return undefined;
const ms = new Date(value as string | number | Date).getTime();
return Number.isNaN(ms) ? undefined : Math.round(ms / 1000);
};
// Allowlist of `config.feature_flags` keys safe to surface via /whoami.
// Anything not listed here stays server-side, so internal flags
// (payment_bypass, staff_only_*, etc.) cannot leak by accident. Add a
// flag here when, and only when, the client actually needs to read it.
const CLIENT_VISIBLE_FEATURE_FLAGS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
'create_shortcut',
'download_directory',
'prompt_user_when_navigation_away_from_puter',
]);
// Keys that must never leave the server, whoever put them on the response.
// `details` is an explicit pick, but the `whoami.details` event hands
// listeners the full UserRow next to the object they may write to, and
// `metadata` is a free-form blob — so any of these can arrive on the
// response without an edit to the pick above. The scrub runs last, over the
// whole payload, and is the one place that decides what "sensitive" means.
//
// Credentials and single-use tokens, the payment/phone identifiers used for
// verification (`card_fingerprint` is the Stripe fingerprint, stable per
// card number), the network identity recorded at signup, and internal
// anti-abuse bookkeeping. `requires_phone_verification` /
// `requires_card_verification` stay: they are the flags the GUI acts on, and
// they carry no identifier.
const SENSITIVE_KEYS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
'password',
'tmp_password',
'pass_recovery_token',
'email_confirm_code',
'email_confirm_token',
'change_email_confirm_token',
'otp_secret',
'otp_recovery_codes',
'card_fingerprint',
'phone',
'clean_email',
'signup_ip',
'signup_ip_forwarded',
'signup_user_agent',
'signup_origin',
'signup_server',
'audit_metadata',
]);
// Depth-limited, cycle-safe walk deleting every SENSITIVE_KEYS entry it finds
// at any level (`metadata` and `taskbar_items` are both nested structures).
const scrubSensitive = (
value: unknown,
seen: Set<object> = new Set(),
depth = 0,
): void => {
if (depth > 8 || value === null || typeof value !== 'object') return;
if (seen.has(value as object)) return;
seen.add(value as object);
if (Array.isArray(value)) {
for (const entry of value) scrubSensitive(entry, seen, depth + 1);
return;
}
for (const key of Object.keys(value as Record<string, unknown>)) {
if (SENSITIVE_KEYS.has(key)) {
delete (value as Record<string, unknown>)[key];
continue;
}
scrubSensitive(
(value as Record<string, unknown>)[key],
seen,
depth + 1,
);
}
};
export const handleWhoami = async (
req: Request,
res: Response,
): Promise<void> => {
const actor = Context.get('actor');
if (!actor?.user?.id) {
res.status(401).json({ error: 'Authentication required' });
return;
}
const isUser = !actor.app;
const user = await stores.user.getById(actor.user.id);
if (!user) {
res.status(404).json({ error: 'User not found' });
return;
}
const oidcOnly = user.password === null;
const ALLOWED_ICON_SIZES = new Set([16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512]);
const rawIconSize =
typeof req.query?.icon_size === 'string'
? Number(req.query.icon_size)
: undefined;
const iconSize =
rawIconSize !== undefined && ALLOWED_ICON_SIZES.has(rawIconSize)
? rawIconSize
: undefined;
const noIcons = !iconSize;
// Feature flags come from `config.feature_flags`. We only forward keys
// listed in CLIENT_VISIBLE_FEATURE_FLAGS so internal flags can't leak.
// Non-boolean values (e.g. `"true"` as a string) are coerced so the
// client never has to guess.
const rawFlags = extension.config.feature_flags ?? {};
const feature_flags: Record<string, boolean> = {};
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(rawFlags)) {
if (CLIENT_VISIBLE_FEATURE_FLAGS.has(k)) {
feature_flags[k] = Boolean(v);
}
}
// Deep-copied (it is decoded JSON) so the scrub below edits the response
// and not the cached UserRow. Sensitive keys inside it — tmp_password and
// anything else on the denylist — are removed by scrubSensitive.
const metadata = user.metadata
? structuredClone(user.metadata)
: user.metadata;
const details: Record<string, unknown> = {
username: user.username,
uuid: user.uuid,
email: user.email,
unconfirmed_email: user.email,
email_confirmed: user.email_confirmed || user.username === 'admin',
requires_email_confirmation: user.requires_email_confirmation,
// The phone number itself is deliberately absent: nothing on the
// client reads it, and it is PII that would otherwise be handed to
// every app actor. Only the verification flag ships.
requires_phone_verification: user.requires_phone_verification,
requires_card_verification: user.requires_card_verification,
desktop_bg_url: user.desktop_bg_url,
desktop_bg_color: user.desktop_bg_color,
desktop_bg_fit: user.desktop_bg_fit,
is_temp: user.password === null && user.email === null,
is_user_token: true,
oidc_only: oidcOnly,
taskbar_items: isUser
? await getTaskbarItems(
user,
{
clients,
stores,
services,
apiBaseUrl: String(extension.config.api_base_url ?? ''),
},
{ iconSize, noIcons },
)
: undefined,
otp: !!user.otp_enabled,
feature_flags,
created_ts: toUnixSeconds(user.timestamp),
human_readable_age: user.timestamp
? timeago.format(new Date(user.timestamp as string))
: null,
metadata,
hasDevAccountAccess: !!user.metadata?.hasDevAccountAccess,
};
// OIDC revalidate URL for password-less accounts
if (oidcOnly) {
try {
const provider = await services.oidc.getLinkedProviderForUser(
user.id as number,
);
if (provider) {
const origin = (extension.config.origin ?? '').replace(
/\/$/,
'',
);
details.oidc_revalidate_url = `${origin}/auth/oidc/${provider}/start?flow=revalidate&user_uuid=${encodeURIComponent(user.uuid)}`;
}
} catch {
// OIDC not configured
}
}
// Directories — only sent to user actors
if (isUser) {
const directories: Record<string, unknown> = {};
const nameToProp: Record<string, string> = {
desktop_uuid: `/${user.username}/Desktop`,
appdata_uuid: `/${user.username}/AppData`,
documents_uuid: `/${user.username}/Documents`,
pictures_uuid: `/${user.username}/Pictures`,
videos_uuid: `/${user.username}/Videos`,
trash_uuid: `/${user.username}/Trash`,
};
for (const k in nameToProp) {
directories[nameToProp[k]] = user[k];
}
details.directories = directories;
}
// Last activity
const lastActivityTs = toUnixSeconds(user.last_activity_ts);
if (lastActivityTs !== undefined) {
details.last_activity_ts = lastActivityTs;
}
// Strip sensitive fields for app actors
if (!isUser) {
const canReadEmail = await services.permission
.check(actor, `user:${user.uuid}:email:read`)
.catch(() => false);
if (!canReadEmail) {
delete details.email;
delete details.unconfirmed_email;
}
delete details.desktop_bg_url;
delete details.desktop_bg_color;
delete details.desktop_bg_fit;
delete details.human_readable_age;
delete details.created_ts;
delete details.is_user_token;
delete details.metadata;
}
if (actor.app) {
details.app_name = actor.app.uid;
}
try {
await clients.event.emitAndWait(
'whoami.details',
{ user, details, isUser },
{},
);
} catch {
/* best-effort */
}
const subscription = details.subscription as
{ offering?: Record<string, unknown> } | undefined;
if (subscription?.offering) {
delete subscription.offering.group;
delete subscription.offering.benefits;
delete subscription.offering.price_id;
}
// Last word on what ships, after every listener has had its say.
scrubSensitive(details);
res.json(details);
};
extension.get(
'/whoami',
{
subdomain: 'api',
requireAuth: true,
allowUnconfirmed: true,
// The GUI polls this, and each call fans out to every `whoami`
// event listener — so it costs more than the response suggests.
//
// It is also the call everything else leans on to find out who it is
// talking to, so it rides along with unrelated work rather than
// arriving at its own pace: the ceiling has to clear whatever the
// busiest session is doing, not what a person clicks.
rateLimit: {
scope: 'whoami',
limit: 1_800,
window: 60_000,
key: 'user',
},
},
handleWhoami,
);