Files
puter/src/backend/services/auth/AuthService.test.ts
T
Daniel Salazar ed7e0b9cc4 fix: sharing, events and worker-credential authorization hardening (#3855)
- PUT-1800: gate `createWorkerSessionToken` on actor type, so an app or an
  access token can no longer mint an app-less, root-shaped worker session;
  `WorkerDriver` binds on `effectiveApp` instead of `app`.
- PUT-1799: add `isAccountContext` and read it where "no app" was being read
  as "the account" — handler publish, events-worker listing, kv handle
  mint/revoke/list. A scoped API token is no longer an account session.
- PUT-1802: re-authorize a durable row before its backlog drains, settling it
  permanently when the grant is gone. Covers an ancestor-level unshare, which
  the revoke settle deliberately leaves to the delivery re-check.
- PUT-1803: mask the owner's absolute path out of deliveries and subscription
  anchors on a foreign node, the way every FS surface already does.
- PUT-1804: let a revoke reach rows already suspended for a resumable reason,
  re-stamping them so a resume cannot hand over the held backlog.
- PUT-1805: apply the subscribe path's audience gate to `/events/fetch` before
  the query, so a cursor can no longer count and name invisible notifications.
- PUT-1807: refuse `mode: 'manage'` from any actor holding an app — inside its
  own AppData the ACL short-circuit would otherwise supply the reach.
- PUT-1808: take the sending peer from the verified signature header rather
  than the request body.
- PUT-1810: re-base a kv share-handle row's stored match filter on the handle,
  so the owner's absolute key prefix stays hidden.
- PUT-1814: escape LIKE wildcards and anchor the issuer-prefix queries on a
  segment; anchor `manage:` stripping; reject a backslash in a share prefix;
  assert a resolved actor in `subscribeDurable`.
- PUT-1815: bound the char/varchar columns behind `event_subscriptions` and
  `kv_share_handles` at the store layer.
2026-09-11 21:18:49 -07:00

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/*
* Copyright (C) 2024-present Puter Technologies Inc.
*
* This file is part of Puter.
*
* Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
* by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
import { v4 as uuidv4 } from 'uuid';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { makeActor, type Actor } from '../../core/actor.js';
import { PuterServer } from '../../server.js';
import { setupTestServer } from '../../testUtil.js';
import { generateDefaultFsentries } from '../../util/userProvisioning.js';
import { FULL_API_ACCESS } from '../permission/consts.js';
import { AuthService } from './AuthService.js';
function createAuthService(): AuthService {
const [config, clients, stores, services] = [
{},
{},
{},
{},
] as ConstructorParameters<typeof AuthService>;
return new AuthService(config, clients, stores, services);
}
describe('AuthService.createAccessToken', () => {
it('rejects access-token actors so scoped tokens cannot mint broader tokens', async () => {
const authService = createAuthService();
const issuer: Actor = {
user: {
uuid: 'user-issuer',
id: 1,
username: 'issuer',
},
};
const actor: Actor = {
user: {
uuid: 'user-issuer',
id: 1,
username: 'issuer',
},
accessToken: {
uid: 'token-existing',
issuer,
authorized: null,
},
};
await expect(
authService.createAccessToken(actor, [['fs:abc:read']]),
).rejects.toMatchObject({
statusCode: 403,
legacyCode: 'forbidden',
});
});
it('rejects when the actor has no user', async () => {
const authService = createAuthService();
await expect(
authService.createAccessToken(
{ user: undefined } as unknown as Actor,
[['fs:abc:read']],
),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403 });
});
it('rejects a full-access mint by an app-under-user actor', async () => {
// Apps may hold scoped grants but must not be able to escalate to a
// blanket account-wide token. This throws on actor shape, before any
// DB / permission interaction, so the mock service is sufficient.
const authService = createAuthService();
const appActor = {
user: { uuid: 'user-issuer', id: 1, username: 'issuer' },
app: { id: 0, uid: 'app-x' },
} as Actor;
await expect(
authService.createAccessToken(appActor, [[FULL_API_ACCESS]]),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403, legacyCode: 'forbidden' });
});
});
// ── Real-server integration tests ───────────────────────────────────
describe('AuthService (integration)', () => {
let server: PuterServer;
let authService: AuthService;
beforeAll(async () => {
server = await setupTestServer();
authService = server.services.auth as unknown as AuthService;
});
afterAll(async () => {
await server?.shutdown();
});
const makeUser = async () => {
const username = `as-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`;
const u = await server.stores.user.create({
username,
uuid: uuidv4(),
password: null,
email: `${username}@test.local`,
free_storage: 100 * 1024 * 1024,
requires_email_confirmation: false,
});
return u;
};
describe('authenticateFromToken', () => {
it('returns null for a malformed/unverifiable token', async () => {
const actor = await authService.authenticateFromToken('not-a-jwt');
expect(actor).toBeNull();
});
it('returns null for a JWT signed with the wrong kind', async () => {
// Sign with the `otp` kind — `authenticateFromToken` calls
// `verify('auth', ...)` so a different-kind token fails verify
// and falls through to null.
const otpJwt = server.services.token.sign(
'otp',
{ user_uid: uuidv4(), purpose: 'something' },
{ expiresIn: '5m' },
);
const actor = await authService.authenticateFromToken(otpJwt);
expect(actor).toBeNull();
});
it('returns null for a legacy token (no `type` field)', async () => {
const legacyJwt = server.services.token.sign(
'auth',
{ user_uid: uuidv4() },
{ expiresIn: '5m' },
);
expect(
await authService.authenticateFromToken(legacyJwt),
).toBeNull();
});
it('returns null for a session token whose session row is gone', async () => {
const fakeSessionJwt = server.services.token.sign('auth', {
type: 'session',
version: '0.0.0',
uuid: uuidv4(),
user_uid: uuidv4(),
});
expect(
await authService.authenticateFromToken(fakeSessionJwt),
).toBeNull();
});
it('resolves a real session token to a user actor', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const { token } = await authService.createSessionToken(user, {});
const actor = await authService.authenticateFromToken(token);
expect(actor).toBeTruthy();
expect(actor!.user.uuid).toBe(user.uuid);
expect(actor!.session?.uid).toBeTruthy();
});
it('returns null for an app-under-user token referencing a missing user', async () => {
const jwt = server.services.token.sign('auth', {
type: 'app-under-user',
version: '0.0.0',
user_uid: uuidv4(),
app_uid: 'app-doesnotexist',
});
expect(await authService.authenticateFromToken(jwt)).toBeNull();
});
});
// ── Rich `authenticate()` result shape ──────────────────────────
describe('authenticate (reauth signal)', () => {
it('returns { actor } for a healthy v2 session token', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const { token } = await authService.createSessionToken(user, {});
const result = await authService.authenticate(token);
expect(result.actor?.user.uuid).toBe(user.uuid);
expect(result.reauth).toBeUndefined();
expect(result.invalid).toBeUndefined();
});
it('returns { reauth: session_revoked } when the row is soft-revoked', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const { token, session } = await authService.createSessionToken(
user,
{},
);
await server.stores.session.removeByUuid(
(session as { uuid: string }).uuid,
);
const result = await authService.authenticate(token);
expect(result.actor).toBeUndefined();
expect(result.reauth).toEqual({
reason: 'session_revoked',
auth_id: user.uuid,
});
});
it('returns { reauth: session_expired } when expires_at is in the past', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const { token, session } = await authService.createSessionToken(
user,
{},
);
// Backdate expires_at directly — the mint path sets it
// 30d in the future, so we have to forcibly age it for the
// test.
await server.clients.db.write(
'UPDATE `sessions` SET `expires_at` = ? WHERE `uuid` = ?',
[
Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 60,
(session as { uuid: string }).uuid,
],
);
// Invalidate the cached row so getByUuidAny re-reads from DB.
await server.clients.redis.del(
`sessions:v2:uuid:${(session as { uuid: string }).uuid}`,
);
const result = await authService.authenticate(token);
expect(result.actor).toBeUndefined();
expect(result.reauth).toEqual({
reason: 'session_expired',
auth_id: user.uuid,
});
});
it('returns { invalid } for a token that is not v2', async () => {
// v1 is fully removed: nothing but `kid: 'v2'` can verify, and an
// unrecognizable token is an ordinary invalid token — no reauth hint.
const result = await authService.authenticate('not-a-jwt');
expect(result.invalid).toBe(true);
expect(result.actor).toBeUndefined();
expect(result.reauth).toBeUndefined();
});
it('returns { invalid } for a v2-routed token with a bad signature', async () => {
const forged = jwt.sign({ t: 's', uu: 'nope' }, 'wrong-secret', {
keyid: 'v2',
});
const result = await authService.authenticate(forged);
expect(result.invalid).toBe(true);
expect(result.actor).toBeUndefined();
expect(result.reauth).toBeUndefined();
});
it('a v1-signed session token resolves no actor and no reauth signal (v1 fully removed)', async () => {
// The user's row and session are perfectly healthy; it is the token
// format that is retired, so the answer is a plain invalid token —
// no actor, no reauth hint.
const user = await makeUser();
const { session } = await authService.createSessionToken(user, {});
const legacyJwt = jwt.sign(
{
// v1 compression: type=session → t='s', uuid → u, user_uid → uu
t: 's',
u: Buffer.from(
(session as { uuid: string }).uuid.replace(/-/g, ''),
'hex',
).toString('base64'),
uu: Buffer.from(
user.uuid.replace(/-/g, ''),
'hex',
).toString('base64'),
},
'dev-jwt-secret-change-me',
);
const result = await authService.authenticate(legacyJwt);
expect(result.invalid).toBe(true);
expect(result.actor).toBeUndefined();
expect(result.reauth).toBeUndefined();
});
it('takeover regression: a forged no-kid token naming a victim uuid mints no reauth/actor', async () => {
// Previously, a v1-shaped token's unverified auth_id/user_uid was
// trusted as a reauth hint, letting an attacker who knows a victim's
// uuid mint a forged token and get a `reauth_token` for that
// identity. v1 is fully removed: this must resolve to a plain
// invalid token, nothing else.
const victim = await makeUser();
const forged = jwt.sign(
{ auth_id: victim.uuid },
'attacker-controlled-secret',
);
const result = await authService.authenticate(forged);
expect(result.invalid).toBe(true);
expect(result.actor).toBeUndefined();
expect(result.reauth).toBeUndefined();
});
// ── App-under-user verify path ─────────────────────────────
// Helper: insert a minimal app row so the verify path's
// `stores.app.getByUid(decoded.app_uid)` lookup succeeds. Without
// a real row the verify falls through to `{ invalid: true }`
// before it ever checks the session state we want to test.
const makeApp = async (): Promise<string> => {
const uid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
await server.clients.db.write(
'INSERT INTO `apps` (`uid`, `name`, `title`, `index_url`, `owner_user_id`) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)',
[uid, `n-${uid}`, `t-${uid}`, `https://${uid}.example/`, 1],
);
return uid;
};
it('app-under-user: returns reauth.session_revoked when the app session is revoked', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const appUid = await makeApp();
const appToken = await authService.getUserAppToken(
{
user: {
id: user.id,
uuid: user.uuid,
username: user.username,
},
} as Actor,
appUid,
);
// Pull the session_uid claim out of the JWT so we revoke
// the exact row the verify path will look up.
const decoded = server.services.token.verify('auth', appToken) as {
session_uid: string;
};
await server.stores.session.removeByUuid(decoded.session_uid);
const result = await authService.authenticate(appToken);
expect(result.actor).toBeUndefined();
expect(result.reauth).toEqual({
reason: 'session_revoked',
auth_id: user.uuid,
});
});
it('app-under-user: returns reauth.session_expired when the app session expires_at is in the past', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const appUid = await makeApp();
const appToken = await authService.getUserAppToken(
{
user: {
id: user.id,
uuid: user.uuid,
username: user.username,
},
} as Actor,
appUid,
);
const decoded = server.services.token.verify('auth', appToken) as {
session_uid: string;
};
await server.clients.db.write(
'UPDATE `sessions` SET `expires_at` = ? WHERE `uuid` = ?',
[Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 60, decoded.session_uid],
);
await server.clients.redis.del(
`sessions:v2:uuid:${decoded.session_uid}`,
);
const result = await authService.authenticate(appToken);
expect(result.actor).toBeUndefined();
expect(result.reauth).toEqual({
reason: 'session_expired',
auth_id: user.uuid,
});
});
// ── Access-token verify path ───────────────────────────────
it('access-token: returns reauth.session_revoked when the access-token session is revoked', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
// Use the auto-implicated `user:<own-uuid>:email:read`
// permission so the createAccessToken permission-subset
// check passes without a separate grant; the permission
// identity isn't what this test exercises.
const accessToken = await authService.createAccessToken(
{
user: {
id: user.id,
uuid: user.uuid,
username: user.username,
},
} as Actor,
[[`user:${user.uuid}:email:read`]],
);
const decoded = server.services.token.verify(
'auth',
accessToken,
) as { session_uid: string };
await server.stores.session.removeByUuid(decoded.session_uid);
const result = await authService.authenticate(accessToken);
expect(result.actor).toBeUndefined();
expect(result.reauth).toEqual({
reason: 'session_revoked',
auth_id: user.uuid,
});
});
it('access-token: returns reauth.session_expired when the access-token session expires_at is in the past', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
// Pass a short expiresIn so the row gets a non-NULL
// expires_at to start with — the verify path's expired-row
// check only fires when expires_at is non-NULL.
const accessToken = await authService.createAccessToken(
{
user: {
id: user.id,
uuid: user.uuid,
username: user.username,
},
} as Actor,
[[`user:${user.uuid}:email:read`]],
{ expiresIn: '1h' },
);
const decoded = server.services.token.verify(
'auth',
accessToken,
) as { session_uid: string };
await server.clients.db.write(
'UPDATE `sessions` SET `expires_at` = ? WHERE `uuid` = ?',
[Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 60, decoded.session_uid],
);
await server.clients.redis.del(
`sessions:v2:uuid:${decoded.session_uid}`,
);
const result = await authService.authenticate(accessToken);
expect(result.actor).toBeUndefined();
expect(result.reauth).toEqual({
reason: 'session_expired',
auth_id: user.uuid,
});
});
});
describe('createSessionToken / createGuiToken / createSessionTokenForSession', () => {
it('creates a session and signs verifiable session+GUI tokens', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const out = await authService.createSessionToken(user, {
user_agent: 'test',
});
expect(out.session).toBeTruthy();
expect(typeof out.token).toBe('string');
expect(typeof out.gui_token).toBe('string');
// Tokens differ — session vs. GUI type.
expect(out.token).not.toBe(out.gui_token);
const sessionDecoded = server.services.token.verify(
'auth',
out.token,
) as {
type: string;
};
expect(sessionDecoded.type).toBe('session');
const guiDecoded = server.services.token.verify(
'auth',
out.gui_token,
) as { type: string };
expect(guiDecoded.type).toBe('gui');
});
it('createGuiToken signs a gui token bound to a user + session uuid', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
// Auth-token uuid fields go through UUID compression in the
// signer, so a literal non-UUID string here would round-trip
// back as garbage. Always pass real UUIDs.
const sessionUuid = uuidv4();
const token = authService.createGuiToken(user, sessionUuid);
const decoded = server.services.token.verify('auth', token) as {
type: string;
user_uid: string;
uuid: string;
};
expect(decoded.type).toBe('gui');
expect(decoded.user_uid).toBe(user.uuid);
expect(decoded.uuid).toBe(sessionUuid);
});
it('createSessionTokenForSession signs a session token bound to a user + session uuid', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const token = authService.createSessionTokenForSession(
user,
uuidv4(),
);
const decoded = server.services.token.verify('auth', token) as {
type: string;
};
expect(decoded.type).toBe('session');
});
});
describe('removeSessionByToken', () => {
it('is a no-op on a malformed token (does not throw)', async () => {
await expect(
authService.removeSessionByToken('not-a-jwt'),
).resolves.toBeUndefined();
});
it('is a no-op on a token whose type is neither session nor gui', async () => {
const otpJwt = server.services.token.sign(
'auth',
{
type: 'access-token',
token_uid: uuidv4(),
user_uid: uuidv4(),
},
{ expiresIn: '5m' },
);
await expect(
authService.removeSessionByToken(otpJwt),
).resolves.toBeUndefined();
});
it('removes the underlying session row for a valid session token', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const { token, session } = await authService.createSessionToken(
user,
{},
);
const sessionUuid = (session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
// Sanity-check the row exists.
expect(
await server.stores.session.getByUuid(sessionUuid),
).toBeTruthy();
await authService.removeSessionByToken(token);
expect(
await server.stores.session.getByUuid(sessionUuid),
).toBeFalsy();
});
});
describe('listSessions / revokeSession', () => {
it('listSessions returns [] for an actor without a user.id', async () => {
const rows = await authService.listSessions({
user: { id: undefined },
} as unknown as Actor);
expect(rows).toEqual([]);
});
it('listSessions returns rows for the actor and flags the current one', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const { session } = await authService.createSessionToken(user, {
user_agent: 'agent',
});
const sessionUuid = (session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
session: { uid: sessionUuid },
} as unknown as Actor;
const rows = await authService.listSessions(actor);
expect(rows.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
const match = rows.find(
(r) => (r as { uuid: string }).uuid === sessionUuid,
);
expect(match).toBeTruthy();
expect((match as { current: boolean }).current).toBe(true);
});
it('revokeSession removes the session row', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const { session } = await authService.createSessionToken(user, {});
const sessionUuid = (session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
await authService.revokeSession(sessionUuid);
expect(
await server.stores.session.getByUuid(sessionUuid),
).toBeFalsy();
});
it('listSessions excludes kind="asset" rows', async () => {
// Asset rows are per-cookie children of `web` rows, revoked
// transitively via the cascade — surfacing them in the
// manage-sessions UI as standalone entries would be confusing.
const user = await makeUser();
const { session: webSession } =
await authService.createSessionToken(user, {});
const webUuid = (webSession as { uuid: string }).uuid;
const assetRow = await server.stores.session.create(user.id, {
kind: 'asset',
parent_session_id: webUuid,
});
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
session: { uid: webUuid },
} as unknown as Actor;
const rows = await authService.listSessions(actor);
expect(
rows.find(
(r) =>
(r as { uuid: string }).uuid ===
(assetRow as { uuid: string }).uuid,
),
).toBeUndefined();
expect(
rows.find((r) => (r as { uuid: string }).uuid === webUuid),
).toBeTruthy();
});
it('listSessions enriches rows with kind / expires_at / last_ip / created_via', async () => {
// Manage-sessions GUI keys on these fields to render the rich
// row layout (kind badge, IP, expires-in). Lock the shape so
// future GUI work can rely on them.
const user = await makeUser();
const { session } = await authService.createSessionToken(user, {
user_agent: 'shape-probe',
ip: '203.0.113.7',
});
const sessionUuid = (session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
session: { uid: sessionUuid },
} as unknown as Actor;
const rows = await authService.listSessions(actor);
const row = rows.find(
(r) => (r as { uuid: string }).uuid === sessionUuid,
) as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
expect(row).toBeTruthy();
expect(row!.kind).toBe('web');
expect(typeof row!.created_at).toBe('number');
expect(typeof row!.last_activity).toBe('number');
expect(row!.expires_at).toEqual(expect.any(Number));
expect(row!.last_ip).toBe('203.0.113.7');
// app_uid / app are null for web rows; present for app rows.
expect(row!.app_uid).toBeNull();
expect(row!.app).toBeNull();
// parent_session_id is null for top-level web rows but the
// field must be present so the GUI tree-builder can key on
// it; same for last_user_agent (powers UA→browser/OS render).
expect(row!).toHaveProperty('parent_session_id');
expect(row!.parent_session_id).toBeNull();
expect(row!).toHaveProperty('last_user_agent');
});
it('listSessions surfaces parent_session_id and last_user_agent for derived rows', async () => {
// GUI tree-nesting (PUT-1025) reads `parent_session_id` to
// attach children under the right parent; the UA parser
// reads `last_user_agent`. If either drops out of the
// projection the GUI degrades to a flat list with no client
// label.
const user = await makeUser();
const { session: parent } = await authService.createSessionToken(
user,
{ ip: '198.51.100.1', user_agent: 'parent-ua' },
);
const parentUuid = (parent as { uuid: string }).uuid;
const child = await server.stores.session.create(user.id, {
kind: 'app',
parent_session_id: parentUuid,
last_user_agent: 'child-ua',
last_ip: '198.51.100.2',
});
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
session: { uid: parentUuid },
} as unknown as Actor;
const rows = await authService.listSessions(actor);
const childRow = rows.find(
(r) =>
(r as { uuid: string }).uuid ===
(child as { uuid: string }).uuid,
) as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
expect(childRow).toBeTruthy();
expect(childRow!.parent_session_id).toBe(parentUuid);
expect(childRow!.last_user_agent).toBe('child-ua');
});
it('listSessions joins kind="app" rows with the apps table', async () => {
// App rows carry an `app_uid`; AuthService.listSessions does a
// batch lookup against the apps table so the GUI doesn't need a
// second round trip. If the app row exists, the response
// includes a non-null `app: { uid, name, title, icon }`.
const user = await makeUser();
const appUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
await server.clients.db.write(
'INSERT INTO `apps` (`uid`, `name`, `title`, `icon`, `description`, `index_url`, `owner_user_id`) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)',
[
appUid,
`app_name_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`,
'Listed App Title',
'',
'',
`https://${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}.example`,
user.id ?? null,
],
);
await server.stores.session.create(user.id, {
kind: 'app',
app_uid: appUid,
});
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as unknown as Actor;
const rows = await authService.listSessions(actor);
const appRow = rows.find(
(r) => (r as { kind?: string }).kind === 'app',
) as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
expect(appRow).toBeTruthy();
expect(appRow!.app_uid).toBe(appUid);
const app = appRow!.app as { title: string; icon: string };
expect(app.title).toBe('Listed App Title');
expect(app.icon).toBe('');
});
it('listSessions sorts the actor’s current session first, then by last_activity desc', async () => {
// Manage-sessions GUI anchors "you are here" at the top of the
// list; downstream rendering doesn't re-sort, so the backend
// order is what users see.
const user = await makeUser();
const { session: olderSession } =
await authService.createSessionToken(user, {});
const { session: newerSession } =
await authService.createSessionToken(user, {});
const { session: currentSession } =
await authService.createSessionToken(user, {});
const olderUuid = (olderSession as { uuid: string }).uuid;
const newerUuid = (newerSession as { uuid: string }).uuid;
const currentUuid = (currentSession as { uuid: string }).uuid;
// Bump `last_activity` to FUTURE values — updateActivity has
// a `last_activity < ?` guard that skips no-op updates, so
// any past timestamp gets silently dropped after the fresh
// rows created above stamped `last_activity = now`.
const future = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 60_000;
await server.stores.session.updateActivity(olderUuid, future);
await server.stores.session.updateActivity(
newerUuid,
future + 1000,
);
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
session: { uid: currentUuid },
} as unknown as Actor;
const rows = await authService.listSessions(actor);
const ourRows = rows.filter((r) =>
[olderUuid, newerUuid, currentUuid].includes(
(r as { uuid: string }).uuid,
),
);
expect(
(ourRows[0] as { uuid: string; current: boolean }).uuid,
).toBe(currentUuid);
expect((ourRows[0] as { current: boolean }).current).toBe(true);
// Newer non-current row comes before the older one.
const newerIdx = ourRows.findIndex(
(r) => (r as { uuid: string }).uuid === newerUuid,
);
const olderIdx = ourRows.findIndex(
(r) => (r as { uuid: string }).uuid === olderUuid,
);
expect(newerIdx).toBeLessThan(olderIdx);
});
});
describe('authenticate (ctx threading: IP/UA roam refresh)', () => {
// The touch path is throttled per-uuid by TOUCH_THROTTLE_MS, so a
// fresh session won't fire updateActivity again on the next
// authenticate() call. Backdating `last_activity` AND the
// in-memory throttle map is the smallest surgery to make the
// touch deterministic from the test.
const ageSessionForTouch = async (sessionUuid: string) => {
const ancient = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 3600;
await server.clients.db.write(
'UPDATE `sessions` SET `last_activity` = ? WHERE `uuid` = ?',
[ancient, sessionUuid],
);
// The store's in-memory throttle is keyed on uuid — clear it
// so the next touch isn't coalesced by the recent-create
// entry from createSessionToken.
const store = server.stores.session as unknown as {
['#lastSessionTouchMs']?: Map<string, number>;
};
// Private field access via the public clear path: a `clear()`
// helper isn't exposed, so we re-construct the touch by
// running it once with a long-ago timestamp that the SQL
// guard accepts. Simpler: read raw row directly after
// authenticate to confirm column was rewritten.
// (Throttle map values live on the instance — but at module
// boundary across `describe`s they should be empty for a
// fresh uuid.)
void store; // intentional no-op — kept as a docstring anchor
await server.clients.redis.del(`sessions:v2:uuid:${sessionUuid}`);
};
const readRawRow = async (uuid: string) => {
const rows = await server.clients.db.read(
'SELECT `last_ip`, `last_user_agent` FROM `sessions` WHERE `uuid` = ? LIMIT 1',
[uuid],
);
return rows[0] as
| { last_ip: string | null; last_user_agent: string | null }
| undefined;
};
it('session token: passing ctx.ip and ctx.userAgent refreshes the row', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const { token, session } = await authService.createSessionToken(
user,
{ ip: '1.1.1.1', user_agent: 'old-ua' },
);
const sessionUuid = (session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
await ageSessionForTouch(sessionUuid);
await authService.authenticate(token, {
ip: '9.9.9.9',
userAgent: 'new-ua',
});
const row = await readRawRow(sessionUuid);
expect(row?.last_ip).toBe('9.9.9.9');
expect(row?.last_user_agent).toBe('new-ua');
});
it('session token: omitting ctx leaves last_ip / last_user_agent unchanged', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const { token, session } = await authService.createSessionToken(
user,
{ ip: '5.5.5.5', user_agent: 'stable-ua' },
);
const sessionUuid = (session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
await ageSessionForTouch(sessionUuid);
await authService.authenticate(token);
const row = await readRawRow(sessionUuid);
expect(row?.last_ip).toBe('5.5.5.5');
expect(row?.last_user_agent).toBe('stable-ua');
});
it('app-under-user token: ctx refreshes the app session row', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
// makeApp helper from the outer describe isn't in scope; inline a minimal app row.
const appUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
await server.clients.db.write(
'INSERT INTO `apps` (`uid`, `name`, `title`, `index_url`, `owner_user_id`) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)',
[
appUid,
`n-${appUid}`,
`t-${appUid}`,
`https://${appUid}.example/`,
1,
],
);
const appToken = await authService.getUserAppToken(
{
user: {
id: user.id,
uuid: user.uuid,
username: user.username,
},
} as Actor,
appUid,
);
const decoded = server.services.token.verify('auth', appToken) as {
session_uid: string;
};
await ageSessionForTouch(decoded.session_uid);
await authService.authenticate(appToken, {
ip: '10.0.0.1',
userAgent: 'app-roam-ua',
});
const row = await readRawRow(decoded.session_uid);
expect(row?.last_ip).toBe('10.0.0.1');
expect(row?.last_user_agent).toBe('app-roam-ua');
});
it('access-token: ctx refreshes the access-token session row', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const accessToken = await authService.createAccessToken(
{
user: {
id: user.id,
uuid: user.uuid,
username: user.username,
},
} as Actor,
[[`user:${user.uuid}:email:read`]],
{ expiresIn: '1h' },
);
const decoded = server.services.token.verify(
'auth',
accessToken,
) as { session_uid: string };
await ageSessionForTouch(decoded.session_uid);
await authService.authenticate(accessToken, {
ip: '203.0.113.20',
userAgent: 'at-roam-ua',
});
const row = await readRawRow(decoded.session_uid);
expect(row?.last_ip).toBe('203.0.113.20');
expect(row?.last_user_agent).toBe('at-roam-ua');
});
});
describe('setSessionLabel', () => {
it('throws 403 when actor has no user', async () => {
await expect(
authService.setSessionLabel(
{ user: undefined } as unknown as Actor,
uuidv4(),
'x',
),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403 });
});
it('throws 404 when the uuid does not exist', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
await expect(
authService.setSessionLabel(actor, uuidv4(), 'nope'),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 404 });
});
it('throws 404 when the uuid belongs to another user', async () => {
const owner = await makeUser();
const interloper = await makeUser();
const { session } = await authService.createSessionToken(owner, {});
const sessionUuid = (session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
const interloperActor = {
user: {
id: interloper.id,
uuid: interloper.uuid,
username: interloper.username,
},
} as Actor;
await expect(
authService.setSessionLabel(
interloperActor,
sessionUuid,
'pwned',
),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 404 });
});
it('renames the row for the owning user', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const { session } = await authService.createSessionToken(user, {});
const sessionUuid = (session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
await authService.setSessionLabel(actor, sessionUuid, 'My Laptop');
const rows = await server.clients.db.read(
'SELECT `label` FROM `sessions` WHERE `uuid` = ?',
[sessionUuid],
);
expect((rows[0] as { label: string }).label).toBe('My Laptop');
});
it('trims whitespace and caps at 64 characters', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const { session } = await authService.createSessionToken(user, {});
const sessionUuid = (session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
// Lead/trail whitespace + 80 chars of body — expect trim then 64-char cap.
const padded = ' ' + 'a'.repeat(80) + ' ';
await authService.setSessionLabel(actor, sessionUuid, padded);
const rows = await server.clients.db.read(
'SELECT `label` FROM `sessions` WHERE `uuid` = ?',
[sessionUuid],
);
const stored = (rows[0] as { label: string }).label;
expect(stored.length).toBe(64);
expect(stored).toBe('a'.repeat(64));
});
it('stores null when label is empty / whitespace / explicit null', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const { session } = await authService.createSessionToken(user, {
user_agent: 'unused',
});
const sessionUuid = (session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
// Seed with a non-null label so we can prove a follow-up null clears it.
await server.clients.db.write(
'UPDATE `sessions` SET `label` = ? WHERE `uuid` = ?',
['initial', sessionUuid],
);
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
for (const empty of ['', ' ', null]) {
await authService.setSessionLabel(
actor,
sessionUuid,
empty as string | null,
);
const rows = await server.clients.db.read(
'SELECT `label` FROM `sessions` WHERE `uuid` = ?',
[sessionUuid],
);
expect((rows[0] as { label: string | null }).label).toBeNull();
// Re-seed for the next iteration.
await server.clients.db.write(
'UPDATE `sessions` SET `label` = ? WHERE `uuid` = ?',
['initial', sessionUuid],
);
}
});
});
describe('createWorkerSessionToken / createWorkerAppToken', () => {
// The test config's `jwt_secret_v2` is the source of truth for
// verifying claims; go through TokenService to mirror how
// production decodes the same tokens.
const decodeAuth = (token: string): Record<string, unknown> => {
return server.services.token.verify('auth', token) as Record<
string,
unknown
>;
};
const readMeta = (row: Record<string, unknown>) =>
(typeof row.meta === 'string'
? (JSON.parse(row.meta as string) as Record<string, unknown>)
: (row.meta as Record<string, unknown>)) ?? {};
it('createWorkerSessionToken mints a kind="worker" row tagged meta.worker_name with the WORKER_WINDOW_SECONDS expiry', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const before = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
const workerName = `wk-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
const { session, token, gui_token } =
await authService.createWorkerSessionToken(
makeActor({ user }),
user,
workerName,
{ user_agent: 'worker-agent' },
);
const row = (await server.stores.session.getByUuid(
(session as { uuid: string }).uuid,
)) as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(row.kind).toBe('worker');
expect(row.app_uid).toBeNull();
// expires_at lands in the ~99-year window — assert lower
// bound only so the test isn't fragile to small drift or a
// future constant adjustment.
expect(row.expires_at as number).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(
before + 50 * 365 * 24 * 60 * 60,
);
const meta = readMeta(row);
expect(meta.worker).toBe(true);
expect(meta.worker_name).toBe(workerName);
// Both JWTs carry the worker + worker_name claims so
// downstream code can distinguish without a DB hit.
expect(decodeAuth(token).worker).toBe(true);
expect(decodeAuth(token).worker_name).toBe(workerName);
expect(decodeAuth(gui_token).worker).toBe(true);
expect(decodeAuth(gui_token).worker_name).toBe(workerName);
});
it('createWorkerSessionToken refuses every delegated credential', async () => {
// The token it mints is `type: 'session'` with no app, so it walks
// past the gates that keep apps and tokens out of account
// management — including the one refusing an access token the
// right to mint another.
const user = await makeUser();
const workerName = `wk-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
const delegated: Actor[] = [
makeActor({ user, app: { uid: 'app-caller' } }),
makeActor({
user,
accessToken: {
uid: 'tok-scoped',
issuer: makeActor({ user }),
authorized: null,
fullAccess: false,
},
}),
makeActor({
user,
accessToken: {
uid: 'tok-pat',
issuer: makeActor({ user }),
authorized: null,
fullAccess: true,
},
}),
];
for (const actor of delegated) {
await expect(
authService.createWorkerSessionToken(
actor,
user,
workerName,
),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403 });
}
});
it('createWorkerSessionToken is idempotent on (user, worker_name) — redeploys reuse the row', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const workerName = `wk-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
const a = await authService.createWorkerSessionToken(
makeActor({ user }),
user,
workerName,
);
const b = await authService.createWorkerSessionToken(
makeActor({ user }),
user,
workerName,
);
expect((a.session as { uuid: string }).uuid).toBe(
(b.session as { uuid: string }).uuid,
);
});
it('createWorkerSessionToken with different worker_names mints distinct rows for the same user', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const a = await authService.createWorkerSessionToken(
makeActor({ user }),
user,
`wk-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}-a`,
);
const b = await authService.createWorkerSessionToken(
makeActor({ user }),
user,
`wk-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}-b`,
);
expect((a.session as { uuid: string }).uuid).not.toBe(
(b.session as { uuid: string }).uuid,
);
});
it('createWorkerSessionToken rejects an empty workerName (400)', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
await expect(
authService.createWorkerSessionToken(
makeActor({ user }),
user,
'',
),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
});
it('createWorkerAppToken mints a kind="worker" row with worker_name + WORKER_WINDOW_SECONDS expiry', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const appUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
const workerName = `wk-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
const before = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
const token = await authService.createWorkerAppToken(
actor,
appUid,
workerName,
);
const decoded = decodeAuth(token);
expect(decoded.type).toBe('app-under-user');
expect(decoded.worker).toBe(true);
expect(decoded.worker_name).toBe(workerName);
expect(decoded.app_uid).toBe(appUid);
expect(decoded.user_uid).toBe(user.uuid);
const row = (await server.stores.session.getByUuid(
decoded.session_uid as string,
)) as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(row.kind).toBe('worker');
expect(row.app_uid).toBe(appUid);
expect(row.expires_at as number).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(
before + 50 * 365 * 24 * 60 * 60,
);
const meta = readMeta(row);
expect(meta.worker).toBe(true);
expect(meta.worker_name).toBe(workerName);
});
it('createWorkerAppToken is idempotent on (user, app, worker_name)', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const appUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
const workerName = `wk-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
const a = await authService.createWorkerAppToken(
actor,
appUid,
workerName,
);
const b = await authService.createWorkerAppToken(
actor,
appUid,
workerName,
);
expect((decodeAuth(a) as { session_uid: string }).session_uid).toBe(
(decodeAuth(b) as { session_uid: string }).session_uid,
);
});
it('createWorkerAppToken coexists with an interactive app session for the same (user, app)', async () => {
// The point of `kind="worker"` is precisely to avoid the
// `idx_sessions_user_app_active` collision that bit us
// pre-schema-carve-out. Verify: getUserAppToken creates the
// interactive `kind="app"` row, then createWorkerAppToken
// for the SAME (user, app) succeeds and yields a distinct
// row with kind="worker".
const user = await makeUser();
const appUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
const workerName = `wk-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
const interactiveJwt = await authService.getUserAppToken(
actor,
appUid,
);
const interactiveDecoded = decodeAuth(interactiveJwt);
const interactiveSessionUid =
interactiveDecoded.session_uid as string;
const workerJwt = await authService.createWorkerAppToken(
actor,
appUid,
workerName,
);
const workerDecoded = decodeAuth(workerJwt);
const workerSessionUid = workerDecoded.session_uid as string;
expect(workerSessionUid).not.toBe(interactiveSessionUid);
const interactiveRow = (await server.stores.session.getByUuid(
interactiveSessionUid,
)) as Record<string, unknown>;
const workerRow = (await server.stores.session.getByUuid(
workerSessionUid,
)) as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(interactiveRow.kind).toBe('app');
expect(workerRow.kind).toBe('worker');
expect(workerRow.app_uid).toBe(appUid);
});
it('createWorkerAppToken with different worker_names under the same (user, app) mints distinct rows', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const appUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
const a = await authService.createWorkerAppToken(
actor,
appUid,
`wk-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}-a`,
);
const b = await authService.createWorkerAppToken(
actor,
appUid,
`wk-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}-b`,
);
expect(
(decodeAuth(a) as { session_uid: string }).session_uid,
).not.toBe((decodeAuth(b) as { session_uid: string }).session_uid);
});
it('createWorkerAppToken refuses an actor with no user (403)', async () => {
await expect(
authService.createWorkerAppToken(
{ user: undefined } as unknown as Actor,
'app-x',
'wk-x',
),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403 });
});
it('createWorkerAppToken rejects an empty workerName (400)', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
await expect(
authService.createWorkerAppToken(actor, `app-${uuidv4()}`, ''),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
});
it('createWorkerAppToken refuses an app actor targeting a different app (403)', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
app: { uid: `app-${uuidv4()}` },
} as Actor;
await expect(
authService.createWorkerAppToken(
actor,
`app-${uuidv4()}`,
'wk-x',
),
).rejects.toMatchObject({
statusCode: 403,
legacyCode: 'forbidden',
});
});
// An app may delegate a worker token to an app it created, which is
// what gives each generated project its own namespace. Everything
// else stays as strict as interactive delegation.
describe('delegation to a created app', () => {
const makeApp = async (
label: string,
ownerUserId: number,
appOwner?: number,
) => {
const name = `${label}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
return await server.stores.app.create(
{
name,
title: name,
index_url: `https://${name}.example.com/`,
},
{ ownerUserId, appOwner },
);
};
const appActorFor = (
user: { id: number; uuid: string; username: string },
app: { uid: string; id: number },
) =>
({
user: {
id: user.id,
uuid: user.uuid,
username: user.username,
},
app: { uid: app.uid, id: app.id },
}) as Actor;
it('mints a token scoped to an app the caller created', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const builder = await makeApp('builder', user.id);
const generated = await makeApp(
'generated',
user.id,
builder.id,
);
const token = await authService.createWorkerAppToken(
appActorFor(user, builder),
generated.uid,
'wk-generated',
);
// The whole point: the worker authenticates as the generated
// app, not as the builder that deployed it.
const decoded = decodeAuth(token);
expect(decoded.app_uid).toBe(generated.uid);
expect(decoded.user_uid).toBe(user.uuid);
expect(decoded.worker).toBe(true);
});
it('refuses an app the caller did not create (403)', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const builder = await makeApp('builder', user.id);
const unrelated = await makeApp('unrelated', user.id);
await expect(
authService.createWorkerAppToken(
appActorFor(user, builder),
unrelated.uid,
'wk-unrelated',
),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403 });
});
it('refuses a created app owned by a different user (403)', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const stranger = await makeUser();
const builder = await makeApp('builder', user.id);
const strangersApp = await makeApp(
'strangers',
stranger.id,
builder.id,
);
await expect(
authService.createWorkerAppToken(
appActorFor(user, builder),
strangersApp.uid,
'wk-stranger',
),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403 });
});
const tokenActorFor = (
user: { id: number; uuid: string; username: string },
fullAccess: boolean,
) =>
({
user: {
id: user.id,
uuid: user.uuid,
username: user.username,
},
accessToken: {
uid: uuidv4(),
issuer: { user },
fullAccess,
},
}) as unknown as Actor;
// The credential AuthMe hands the MCP connector and the CLI. Its
// reach is the user's own, and `puter.workers.create` binds every
// deploy to a `sandbox-<name>` app it creates under that user.
it('mints a token for a full-access token actor on its own app', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const target = await makeApp('target', user.id);
const token = await authService.createWorkerAppToken(
tokenActorFor(user, true),
target.uid,
'wk-token',
);
const decoded = decodeAuth(token);
expect(decoded.app_uid).toBe(target.uid);
expect(decoded.user_uid).toBe(user.uuid);
expect(decoded.worker).toBe(true);
});
it('refuses a full-access token actor on another user’s app (403)', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const stranger = await makeUser();
const strangersApp = await makeApp('strangers', stranger.id);
await expect(
authService.createWorkerAppToken(
tokenActorFor(user, true),
strangersApp.uid,
'wk-stranger-token',
),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403 });
});
it('refuses a full-access token actor naming an unknown app (403)', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
await expect(
authService.createWorkerAppToken(
tokenActorFor(user, true),
`app-${uuidv4()}`,
'wk-unknown-token',
),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403 });
});
it('still refuses a scoped access-token actor (403)', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const target = await makeApp('target', user.id);
await expect(
authService.createWorkerAppToken(
tokenActorFor(user, false),
target.uid,
'wk-scoped-token',
),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403 });
});
it('leaves interactive app-token delegation strict', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const builder = await makeApp('builder', user.id);
const generated = await makeApp(
'generated',
user.id,
builder.id,
);
// getUserAppToken mints a credential that acts as the app in
// full; the created-app allowance is deliberately not extended
// to it.
await expect(
authService.getUserAppToken(
appActorFor(user, builder),
generated.uid,
),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403 });
});
});
// ── Revocation flow ────────────────────────────────────────
it('revokeSession on a worker session — authenticate returns reauth.session_revoked', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const workerName = `wk-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
const { token, session } =
await authService.createWorkerSessionToken(
makeActor({ user }),
user,
workerName,
);
const sessionUuid = (session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
await authService.revokeSession(sessionUuid);
const result = await authService.authenticate(token);
expect(result.actor).toBeUndefined();
expect(result.reauth).toEqual({
reason: 'session_revoked',
auth_id: user.uuid,
});
});
it('createWorkerSessionToken after revoke mints a new session uuid (composite cache invalidates)', async () => {
// Pre-fix, the worker composite cache could short-circuit
// back to the revoked row. Verify cache invalidation runs on
// revoke so the re-create produces a fresh row.
const user = await makeUser();
const workerName = `wk-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
const first = await authService.createWorkerSessionToken(
makeActor({ user }),
user,
workerName,
);
const firstUuid = (first.session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
await authService.revokeSession(firstUuid);
const second = await authService.createWorkerSessionToken(
makeActor({ user }),
user,
workerName,
);
const secondUuid = (second.session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
expect(secondUuid).not.toBe(firstUuid);
// The new JWT authenticates; the old one does not.
const oldResult = await authService.authenticate(first.token);
const newResult = await authService.authenticate(second.token);
expect(oldResult.actor).toBeUndefined();
expect(newResult.actor?.user.uuid).toBe(user.uuid);
});
it('createWorkerAppToken after revoke mints a new session uuid', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const appUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
const workerName = `wk-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
const firstJwt = await authService.createWorkerAppToken(
actor,
appUid,
workerName,
);
const firstDecoded = server.services.token.verify(
'auth',
firstJwt,
) as { session_uid: string };
await authService.revokeSession(firstDecoded.session_uid);
const secondJwt = await authService.createWorkerAppToken(
actor,
appUid,
workerName,
);
const secondDecoded = server.services.token.verify(
'auth',
secondJwt,
) as { session_uid: string };
expect(secondDecoded.session_uid).not.toBe(
firstDecoded.session_uid,
);
});
it('removeSessionByToken on a worker token soft-revokes the row', async () => {
// The logout / signout path lands here. Worker JWTs carry
// type='session' so the same code path applies; verify it
// flips revoked_at and authenticate stops resolving the actor.
const user = await makeUser();
const workerName = `wk-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
const { token, session } =
await authService.createWorkerSessionToken(
makeActor({ user }),
user,
workerName,
);
const sessionUuid = (session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
await authService.removeSessionByToken(token);
const result = await authService.authenticate(token);
expect(result.actor).toBeUndefined();
expect(result.reauth?.reason).toBe('session_revoked');
// Row still present, just soft-revoked.
const rows = (await server.clients.db.read(
'SELECT `revoked_at` FROM `sessions` WHERE `uuid` = ? LIMIT 1',
[sessionUuid],
)) as Array<{ revoked_at: number | null }>;
expect(rows[0]?.revoked_at).not.toBeNull();
});
});
describe('appUidFromOrigin', () => {
it('throws 400 for an unparseable origin string', async () => {
await expect(
authService.appUidFromOrigin('not-a-url'),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
});
it('returns a deterministic app-<uuid> for arbitrary origins', async () => {
const origin = `https://stable-${uuidv4()}.example.com`;
const a = await authService.appUidFromOrigin(origin);
const b = await authService.appUidFromOrigin(origin);
expect(a).toBe(b);
expect(a).toMatch(/^app-/);
});
it.each([
'javascript:alert(document.domain)',
'data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>',
'file:///etc/passwd',
'vbscript:msgbox(1)',
])('throws 400 for non-http(s) scheme %s', async (origin) => {
// These parse fine via `new URL()` but must never become a
// bootstrap app `index_url` — that would be a stored XSS /
// code-execution vector when launched as `iframe.src`.
await expect(
authService.appUidFromOrigin(origin),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
});
});
describe('subdomainOwnerIdFromOrigin', () => {
// Test servers inherit the four hosting domains (production:
// puter.site / puter.host / puter.app / puter.dev) from
// config.default.json.
it.each([
'site.puter.localhost',
'host.puter.localhost',
'app.puter.localhost',
'dev.puter.localhost',
])(
'returns the subdomain owner for an origin under %s',
async (hostingDomain) => {
const user = await makeUser();
const subdomain = `own-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`;
await server.stores.subdomain.create({
userId: user.id,
subdomain,
});
await expect(
authService.subdomainOwnerIdFromOrigin(
`https://${subdomain}.${hostingDomain}`,
),
).resolves.toBe(user.id);
},
);
it('matches a hosted origin that carries an explicit port', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const subdomain = `own-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`;
await server.stores.subdomain.create({
userId: user.id,
subdomain,
});
await expect(
authService.subdomainOwnerIdFromOrigin(
`http://${subdomain}.site.puter.localhost:4100`,
),
).resolves.toBe(user.id);
});
it('returns null for an origin outside the hosting domains', async () => {
await expect(
authService.subdomainOwnerIdFromOrigin(
`https://external-${uuidv4()}.example.com`,
),
).resolves.toBeNull();
});
it('returns null for a subdomain of the main domain', async () => {
// `<sub>.puter.localhost` sits under the main `domain`, not a
// hosting domain — no owner resolves even when a subdomain row
// with the same name exists.
const user = await makeUser();
const subdomain = `own-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`;
await server.stores.subdomain.create({
userId: user.id,
subdomain,
});
await expect(
authService.subdomainOwnerIdFromOrigin(
`https://${subdomain}.puter.localhost`,
),
).resolves.toBeNull();
});
it('returns null for an unregistered subdomain and for the apex host', async () => {
await expect(
authService.subdomainOwnerIdFromOrigin(
`https://ghost-${uuidv4().slice(0, 8)}.site.puter.localhost`,
),
).resolves.toBeNull();
await expect(
authService.subdomainOwnerIdFromOrigin(
'https://site.puter.localhost',
),
).resolves.toBeNull();
});
it('returns null for an unparseable origin', async () => {
await expect(
authService.subdomainOwnerIdFromOrigin('not-a-url'),
).resolves.toBeNull();
});
});
describe('app origin blocklist enforcement', () => {
// The blocklist service caches with a TTL, so seed the row then
// invalidate the in-memory snapshot to force a reload for the test.
const blockOrigin = async (
domain: string,
includeSubdomains = false,
) => {
await server.clients.db.write(
'INSERT INTO `blocked_app_origins` (`domain`, `include_subdomains`) VALUES (?, ?)',
[domain, includeSubdomains ? 1 : 0],
);
(
server.services.appOriginBlocklist as {
invalidate: () => void;
}
).invalidate();
};
it('appUidFromOrigin throws 403 app_blocked for a blocked exact host', async () => {
const host = `blocked-${uuidv4()}.example.com`;
await blockOrigin(host);
await expect(
authService.appUidFromOrigin(`https://${host}/`),
).rejects.toMatchObject({
statusCode: 403,
legacyCode: 'app_blocked',
});
});
it('appUidFromOrigin throws for a subdomain of an include_subdomains entry', async () => {
const apex = `evil-${uuidv4()}.example.com`;
await blockOrigin(apex, true);
await expect(
authService.appUidFromOrigin(`https://app.${apex}/`),
).rejects.toMatchObject({
statusCode: 403,
legacyCode: 'app_blocked',
});
});
it('appUidFromOrigin still resolves an unrelated origin', async () => {
const uid = await authService.appUidFromOrigin(
`https://fine-${uuidv4()}.example.com/`,
);
expect(uid).toMatch(/^app-/);
});
it('rejects an already-issued app token once its origin is blocked', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const host = `late-block-${uuidv4()}.example.com`;
const appUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
// App row carries the to-be-blocked host as its index_url.
await server.clients.db.write(
'INSERT INTO `apps` (`uid`, `name`, `title`, `index_url`, `owner_user_id`) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)',
[appUid, `n-${appUid}`, `t-${appUid}`, `https://${host}/`, 1],
);
const appToken = await authService.getUserAppToken(
{
user: {
id: user.id,
uuid: user.uuid,
username: user.username,
},
} as Actor,
appUid,
);
// Before blocking the token authenticates normally.
const ok = await authService.authenticate(appToken);
expect(ok.actor?.app?.uid).toBe(appUid);
// After blocking the same token is rejected with the blocked signal.
await blockOrigin(host);
const blocked = await authService.authenticate(appToken);
expect(blocked.actor).toBeUndefined();
expect(blocked.blocked).toBeTruthy();
});
});
describe('getUserAppToken', () => {
it('throws 403 when actor has no user', async () => {
await expect(
authService.getUserAppToken(
{ user: undefined } as unknown as Actor,
'app-foo',
),
).rejects.toThrow(/Actor must be a user/);
});
it('signs an app-under-user JWT carrying user_uid + app_uid', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
const appUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
const token = await authService.getUserAppToken(actor, appUid);
const decoded = server.services.token.verify('auth', token) as {
type: string;
user_uid: string;
app_uid: string;
};
expect(decoded.type).toBe('app-under-user');
expect(decoded.user_uid).toBe(user.uuid);
expect(decoded.app_uid).toBe(appUid);
});
it('binds the JWT to a kind="app" session row and reuses it on repeat calls', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
const appUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
const first = await authService.getUserAppToken(actor, appUid);
const second = await authService.getUserAppToken(actor, appUid);
const decodedFirst = server.services.token.verify(
'auth',
first,
) as { session_uid: string };
const decodedSecond = server.services.token.verify(
'auth',
second,
) as { session_uid: string };
// Idempotent per (user_id, app_uid) — both tokens reference the
// same app session row.
expect(decodedFirst.session_uid).toBe(decodedSecond.session_uid);
});
// Delegation scope: a scoped actor (app-under-user or access-token)
// may only mint a token for its own app; only a root user session
// may request a token for an arbitrary app.
it('lets an app actor mint a token for its own app', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const ownApp = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
app: { uid: ownApp },
} as Actor;
const token = await authService.getUserAppToken(actor, ownApp);
const decoded = server.services.token.verify('auth', token) as {
app_uid: string;
};
expect(decoded.app_uid).toBe(ownApp);
});
it('refuses an app actor minting a token for a different app (403)', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
app: { uid: `app-${uuidv4()}` },
} as Actor;
await expect(
authService.getUserAppToken(actor, `app-${uuidv4()}`),
).rejects.toMatchObject({
statusCode: 403,
legacyCode: 'forbidden',
});
});
it('refuses an access-token actor minting an app token (403)', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const issuer = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
accessToken: {
uid: `tok-${uuidv4()}`,
issuer,
authorized: null,
},
} as Actor;
await expect(
authService.getUserAppToken(actor, `app-${uuidv4()}`),
).rejects.toMatchObject({
statusCode: 403,
legacyCode: 'forbidden',
});
});
it('lets a root user session mint a token for any app', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
const anyApp = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
const token = await authService.getUserAppToken(actor, anyApp);
const decoded = server.services.token.verify('auth', token) as {
app_uid: string;
};
expect(decoded.app_uid).toBe(anyApp);
});
});
describe('createAccessToken / revokeAccessToken', () => {
it('creates a verifiable access-token JWT for a user actor', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
const jwt = await authService.createAccessToken(actor, [
[`user:${user.uuid}:email:read`],
]);
const decoded = server.services.token.verify('auth', jwt) as {
type: string;
user_uid: string;
token_uid: string;
};
expect(decoded.type).toBe('access-token');
expect(decoded.user_uid).toBe(user.uuid);
expect(decoded.token_uid).toBeTruthy();
});
it('revokeAccessToken removes by JWT (signature-verified ownership)', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
const jwt = await authService.createAccessToken(actor, [
[`user:${user.uuid}:email:read`],
]);
await authService.revokeAccessToken(actor, jwt);
// Row is gone.
const decoded = server.services.token.verify('auth', jwt) as {
token_uid: string;
};
const rows = (await server.clients.db.read(
'SELECT 1 FROM `access_token_permissions` WHERE `token_uid` = ? LIMIT 1',
[decoded.token_uid],
)) as unknown[];
expect(rows).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('revokeAccessToken rejects with 404 when the token belongs to another user', async () => {
const u1 = await makeUser();
const u2 = await makeUser();
const a1 = {
user: { id: u1.id, uuid: u1.uuid, username: u1.username },
} as Actor;
const a2 = {
user: { id: u2.id, uuid: u2.uuid, username: u2.username },
} as Actor;
const jwt = await authService.createAccessToken(a1, [
[`user:${u1.uuid}:email:read`],
]);
await expect(
authService.revokeAccessToken(a2, jwt),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 404 });
});
it('revokeAccessToken removes by raw token UUID when the actor is the authorizer', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
const jwt = await authService.createAccessToken(actor, [
[`user:${user.uuid}:email:read`],
]);
const decoded = server.services.token.verify('auth', jwt) as {
token_uid: string;
};
await authService.revokeAccessToken(actor, decoded.token_uid);
const rows = (await server.clients.db.read(
'SELECT 1 FROM `access_token_permissions` WHERE `token_uid` = ? LIMIT 1',
[decoded.token_uid],
)) as unknown[];
expect(rows).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('revokeAccessToken throws 400 on a JWT that is not an access-token', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
const sessionJwt = server.services.token.sign('auth', {
type: 'session',
version: '0.0.0',
uuid: uuidv4(),
user_uid: user.uuid,
});
await expect(
authService.revokeAccessToken(actor, sessionJwt),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
});
it('revokeAccessToken throws 403 when the actor has no user', async () => {
await expect(
authService.revokeAccessToken(
{ user: undefined } as unknown as Actor,
'whatever',
),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403 });
});
// Regression for the post-#1001 token-inval check: an
// app-under-user actor must be able to mint a token for a file
// inside its own AppData. Without the `app-owns-appdata`
// implicator the issuer-subset gate 403s these — even though
// ACLService already allows the equivalent fs.read via its own
// short-circuit. puter-js getReadURL is the canonical caller.
it('app-under-user actor can mint fs:<uuid>:read for a file inside its own AppData', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
await generateDefaultFsentries(
server.clients.db,
server.stores.user,
user,
);
const appUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
await server.clients.db.write(
'INSERT INTO `apps` (`uid`, `name`, `title`, `index_url`, `owner_user_id`) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)',
[
appUid,
`n-${appUid}`,
`t-${appUid}`,
`https://${appUid}.example/`,
user.id,
],
);
const appDataPath = `/${user.username}/AppData/${appUid}`;
await server.services.fs.mkdir(user.id, {
path: appDataPath,
createMissingParents: true,
} as never);
const body = Buffer.from('hello');
await server.services.fs.write(user.id, {
fileMetadata: {
path: `${appDataPath}/note.txt`,
size: body.byteLength,
contentType: 'text/plain',
},
fileContent: body,
} as never);
const fileEntry = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(
`${appDataPath}/note.txt`,
);
expect(fileEntry).not.toBeNull();
const appActor: Actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
app: { id: 0, uid: appUid },
} as Actor;
const jwt = await authService.createAccessToken(appActor, [
[`fs:${fileEntry!.uuid}:read`],
]);
expect(typeof jwt).toBe('string');
});
// Negative side of the implicator: a file the user owns but
// that lives *outside* the app's AppData must still be
// rejected — the issuer-subset gate is the only thing
// preventing an authorized app from minting a token over
// arbitrary user-owned uuids.
it('app-under-user actor cannot mint fs:<uuid>:read for a user-owned file outside its AppData', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
await generateDefaultFsentries(
server.clients.db,
server.stores.user,
user,
);
const appUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
await server.clients.db.write(
'INSERT INTO `apps` (`uid`, `name`, `title`, `index_url`, `owner_user_id`) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)',
[
appUid,
`n-${appUid}`,
`t-${appUid}`,
`https://${appUid}.example/`,
user.id,
],
);
const body = Buffer.from('secret');
await server.services.fs.write(user.id, {
fileMetadata: {
path: `/${user.username}/Documents/secret.txt`,
size: body.byteLength,
contentType: 'text/plain',
},
fileContent: body,
} as never);
const fileEntry = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(
`/${user.username}/Documents/secret.txt`,
);
expect(fileEntry).not.toBeNull();
const appActor: Actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
app: { id: 0, uid: appUid },
} as Actor;
await expect(
authService.createAccessToken(appActor, [
[`fs:${fileEntry!.uuid}:read`],
]),
).rejects.toMatchObject({
statusCode: 403,
legacyCode: 'forbidden',
});
});
// -- Full-API-access tokens --
it('mints a full-access token for a user actor and stores the label', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
const jwt = await authService.createAccessToken(
actor,
[[FULL_API_ACCESS]],
{ label: 'My CLI' },
);
const decoded = server.services.token.verify('auth', jwt) as {
type: string;
token_uid: string;
session_uid: string;
full_access?: boolean;
};
expect(decoded.type).toBe('access-token');
// Full access is carried as a signed claim — NOT a stored grant.
expect(decoded.full_access).toBe(true);
const permRows = (await server.clients.db.read(
'SELECT `permission` FROM `access_token_permissions` WHERE `token_uid` = ?',
[decoded.token_uid],
)) as Array<{ permission: string }>;
expect(permRows).toHaveLength(0);
// The label lands on the access-token session row so it shows
// (and is revocable) in the manage-sessions UI.
const sessRows = (await server.clients.db.read(
'SELECT `label`, `kind` FROM `sessions` WHERE `uuid` = ?',
[decoded.session_uid],
)) as Array<{ label: string; kind: string }>;
expect(sessRows[0]?.kind).toBe('access_token');
expect(sessRows[0]?.label).toBe('My CLI');
});
it('full-access token resolves any permission the issuing user holds, but a scoped token does not', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
await generateDefaultFsentries(
server.clients.db,
server.stores.user,
user,
);
const body = Buffer.from('secret');
await server.services.fs.write(user.id, {
fileMetadata: {
path: `/${user.username}/Documents/secret.txt`,
size: body.byteLength,
contentType: 'text/plain',
},
fileContent: body,
} as never);
const fileEntry = await server.stores.fsEntry.getEntryByPath(
`/${user.username}/Documents/secret.txt`,
);
expect(fileEntry).not.toBeNull();
const userActor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
// Full-access token: the owner fs:read resolves *through the
// issuer*, even though the token holds no fs grant of its own.
const fullJwt = await authService.createAccessToken(userActor, [
[FULL_API_ACCESS],
]);
const fullActor = await authService.authenticateFromToken(fullJwt);
expect(fullActor).toBeTruthy();
// The signed claim is surfaced on the actor — this flag is what the
// resource gate and the permission scan both key off.
expect(fullActor!.accessToken?.fullAccess).toBe(true);
expect(
await server.services.permission.check(
fullActor!,
`fs:${fileEntry!.uuid}:read`,
),
).toBe(true);
// A scoped token (granted an unrelated permission) gets NO owner
// fs access — access-token actors are excluded from the owner
// implicator, so this stays the pre-existing behaviour.
const scopedJwt = await authService.createAccessToken(userActor, [
[`user:${user.uuid}:email:read`],
]);
const scopedActor =
await authService.authenticateFromToken(scopedJwt);
expect(scopedActor).toBeTruthy();
expect(scopedActor!.accessToken?.fullAccess).toBeFalsy();
expect(
await server.services.permission.check(
scopedActor!,
`fs:${fileEntry!.uuid}:read`,
),
).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('private-asset / public hosted-actor tokens', () => {
it('private-asset cookie name and options shape', () => {
expect(authService.getPrivateAssetCookieName()).toBe(
'puter.private.asset.token',
);
const opts = authService.getPrivateAssetCookieOptions({
requestHostname: 'example.test',
});
expect(opts.httpOnly).toBe(true);
expect(opts.path).toBe('/');
expect(typeof opts.maxAge).toBe('number');
expect(opts.hostname).toBe('example.test');
});
it('public hosted-actor cookie name', () => {
expect(authService.getPublicHostedActorCookieName()).toBe(
'puter.public.hosted.actor.token',
);
});
it('private-asset token round-trips and validates session binding', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const { session } = await authService.createSessionToken(user, {});
const sessionUuid = (session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
const appUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
const token = await authService.createPrivateAssetToken({
appUid,
userUid: user.uuid,
sessionUuid,
subdomain: 'priv',
});
const decoded = await authService.verifyPrivateAssetToken(token, {
expectedAppUid: appUid,
expectedSubdomain: 'priv',
});
expect(decoded.userUid).toBe(user.uuid);
expect(decoded.appUid).toBe(appUid);
expect(decoded.subdomain).toBe('priv');
// v2 cookies carry the *asset* session row's uuid, not the
// web session's. The asset row is parented to the web
// session so logout cascade still invalidates the cookie.
expect(typeof decoded.sessionUuid).toBe('string');
expect(decoded.sessionUuid).not.toBe(sessionUuid);
});
it('verifyPrivateAssetToken throws 401 when expected app_uid mismatches', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const appA = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
const appB = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
const token = await authService.createPrivateAssetToken({
appUid: appA,
userUid: user.uuid,
});
await expect(
authService.verifyPrivateAssetToken(token, {
expectedAppUid: appB,
}),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 401 });
});
it('verifyPrivateAssetToken throws 401 when the bound session is gone', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const { session } = await authService.createSessionToken(user, {});
const sessionUuid = (session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
const token = await authService.createPrivateAssetToken({
appUid: `app-${uuidv4()}`,
userUid: user.uuid,
sessionUuid,
});
await authService.revokeSession(sessionUuid);
await expect(
authService.verifyPrivateAssetToken(token),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 401 });
});
it('public hosted-actor token round-trips and enforces expectations', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const appUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
const token = await authService.createPublicHostedActorToken({
appUid,
userUid: user.uuid,
host: 'host.example',
});
const decoded = await authService.verifyPublicHostedActorToken(
token,
{
expectedAppUid: appUid,
expectedHost: 'host.example',
},
);
expect(decoded.userUid).toBe(user.uuid);
expect(decoded.appUid).toBe(appUid);
expect(decoded.host).toBe('host.example');
});
it('verifyPublicHostedActorToken rejects a private-kind token (kind mismatch)', async () => {
const user = { uuid: uuidv4() };
const privateToken = await authService.createPrivateAssetToken({
appUid: `app-${uuidv4()}`,
userUid: user.uuid,
});
await expect(
authService.verifyPublicHostedActorToken(privateToken),
).rejects.toThrow();
});
// -- v2 hosted-asset migration --
it('v2 cookie names', () => {
expect(authService.getPrivateAssetCookieNameV2()).toBe(
'puter_private_asset_token_v2',
);
expect(authService.getPublicHostedActorCookieNameV2()).toBe(
'puter_public_hosted_actor_token_v2',
);
});
it('private-asset v2 token carries auth_id pulled from the web session', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const { session } = await authService.createSessionToken(user, {});
const sessionUuid = (session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
const token = await authService.createPrivateAssetToken({
appUid: `app-${uuidv4()}`,
userUid: user.uuid,
sessionUuid,
});
const decoded = await authService.verifyPrivateAssetToken(token);
expect(decoded.authId).toBe(user.uuid);
});
it('public hosted-actor v2 token carries auth_id pulled from the web session', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const { session } = await authService.createSessionToken(user, {});
const sessionUuid = (session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
const token = await authService.createPublicHostedActorToken({
appUid: `app-${uuidv4()}`,
userUid: user.uuid,
sessionUuid,
host: 'host.example',
});
const decoded =
await authService.verifyPublicHostedActorToken(token);
expect(decoded.authId).toBe(user.uuid);
});
it('verifyPublicHostedActorToken 401s when the bound session is revoked', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const { session } = await authService.createSessionToken(user, {});
const sessionUuid = (session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
const token = await authService.createPublicHostedActorToken({
appUid: `app-${uuidv4()}`,
userUid: user.uuid,
sessionUuid,
host: 'host.example',
});
await authService.revokeSession(sessionUuid);
await expect(
authService.verifyPublicHostedActorToken(token),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 401 });
});
it('private-asset cookie revoked when parent web session is revoked (cascade)', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const { session } = await authService.createSessionToken(user, {});
const sessionUuid = (session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
const token = await authService.createPrivateAssetToken({
appUid: `app-${uuidv4()}`,
userUid: user.uuid,
sessionUuid,
});
// verify passes initially
await authService.verifyPrivateAssetToken(token);
// revokeCascade on the parent kills the asset row too
await authService.revokeSession(sessionUuid);
await expect(
authService.verifyPrivateAssetToken(token),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 401 });
});
it('a v1-signed hosted-asset cookie no longer verifies', async () => {
// The gate treats this as a stale cookie and re-mints under v2, so
// the only requirement here is that it does not verify.
const user = await makeUser();
const appUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
const v1Token = jwt.sign(
{
k: 'pr', // kind=private
uu: Buffer.from(
user.uuid.replace(/-/g, ''),
'hex',
).toString('base64'),
au: Buffer.from(
appUid.slice('app-'.length).replace(/-/g, ''),
'hex',
).toString('base64'),
},
'dev-jwt-secret-change-me',
);
await expect(
authService.verifyPrivateAssetToken(v1Token),
).rejects.toThrow();
});
});
// ── Revoke coverage ─────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('revokeAccessToken raw-uuid session-row coverage', () => {
// The JWT-input branch has always flipped the session row's
// revoked_at. The raw-uuid gap is closed by the
// `sessions.access_token_uid` column, which lets revoke find
// the row for v2-minted tokens even when no JWT was presented.
it('soft-revokes the v2 session row when revoked by raw token_uid', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
const jwt = await authService.createAccessToken(actor, [
[`user:${user.uuid}:email:read`],
]);
const decoded = server.services.token.verify('auth', jwt) as {
token_uid: string;
session_uid: string;
};
// Confirm session row is active before revoke.
const before = await server.stores.session.getByUuid(
decoded.session_uid,
);
expect(before).toBeTruthy();
await authService.revokeAccessToken(actor, decoded.token_uid);
// Row is soft-revoked, not just permissions-stripped.
const after = await server.stores.session.getByUuid(
decoded.session_uid,
);
expect(after).toBeNull();
});
it('revokes a full-access token by raw token_uid, which has no grant rows to resolve against', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
const jwt = await authService.createAccessToken(actor, [
[FULL_API_ACCESS],
]);
const decoded = server.services.token.verify('auth', jwt) as {
token_uid: string;
session_uid: string;
};
await authService.revokeAccessToken(actor, decoded.token_uid);
expect(
await server.stores.session.getByUuid(decoded.session_uid),
).toBeNull();
expect(await authService.authenticateFromToken(jwt)).toBeNull();
});
it('404s when another user names a full-access token by raw token_uid', async () => {
const owner = await makeUser();
const other = await makeUser();
const ownerActor = {
user: {
id: owner.id,
uuid: owner.uuid,
username: owner.username,
},
} as Actor;
const otherActor = {
user: {
id: other.id,
uuid: other.uuid,
username: other.username,
},
} as Actor;
const jwt = await authService.createAccessToken(ownerActor, [
[FULL_API_ACCESS],
]);
const decoded = server.services.token.verify('auth', jwt) as {
token_uid: string;
};
await expect(
authService.revokeAccessToken(otherActor, decoded.token_uid),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 404 });
expect(await authService.authenticateFromToken(jwt)).toBeTruthy();
});
});
describe('revokeSession on access-token rows', () => {
// The manage-sessions UI only ever holds the session uuid — the
// token itself is shown once at mint and never again — so revoking
// by uuid has to be enough to both kill the token and clear what it
// was allowed to do.
it('stops a full-access token authenticating when revoked by session uuid', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
const jwt = await authService.createAccessToken(actor, [
[FULL_API_ACCESS],
]);
const decoded = server.services.token.verify('auth', jwt) as {
session_uid: string;
};
expect(await authService.authenticateFromToken(jwt)).toBeTruthy();
await authService.revokeSession(decoded.session_uid);
expect(await authService.authenticateFromToken(jwt)).toBeNull();
});
it('clears the grant manifest of a scoped token revoked by session uuid', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
const jwt = await authService.createAccessToken(actor, [
[`user:${user.uuid}:email:read`],
]);
const decoded = server.services.token.verify('auth', jwt) as {
token_uid: string;
session_uid: string;
};
await authService.revokeSession(decoded.session_uid);
const rows = (await server.clients.db.read(
'SELECT 1 FROM `access_token_permissions` WHERE `token_uid` = ? LIMIT 1',
[decoded.token_uid],
)) as unknown[];
expect(rows).toHaveLength(0);
expect(await authService.authenticateFromToken(jwt)).toBeNull();
});
it('clears grants of token rows parented to a revoked session', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const parent = await server.stores.session.create(user.id, {
kind: 'app',
});
const tokenUid = uuidv4();
await server.stores.session.create(user.id, {
kind: 'access_token',
parent_session_id: parent.uuid,
access_token_uid: tokenUid,
});
await server.clients.db.write(
'INSERT INTO `access_token_permissions` (`token_uid`, `authorizer_user_id`, `authorizer_app_id`, `permission`, `extra`) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)',
[tokenUid, user.id, null, 'driver:test:call', '{}'],
);
await authService.revokeSession(parent.uuid);
const rows = (await server.clients.db.read(
'SELECT 1 FROM `access_token_permissions` WHERE `token_uid` = ? LIMIT 1',
[tokenUid],
)) as unknown[];
expect(rows).toHaveLength(0);
});
});
describe('revokeAllSessions', () => {
it('throws 403 when actor has no user', async () => {
await expect(
authService.revokeAllSessions({
user: undefined,
} as unknown as Actor),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403 });
});
it('revokes every web session except the caller by default', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const otherDevice = await authService.createSessionToken(user, {});
const otherUuid = (otherDevice.session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
const currentDevice = await authService.createSessionToken(
user,
{},
);
const currentUuid = (currentDevice.session as { uuid: string })
.uuid;
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
session: { uid: currentUuid },
} as unknown as Actor;
await authService.revokeAllSessions(actor);
// Caller's session survives.
expect(
await server.stores.session.getByUuid(currentUuid),
).toBeTruthy();
// Other device's session is gone.
expect(await server.stores.session.getByUuid(otherUuid)).toBeNull();
});
it('with includeCurrent=true also revokes the caller', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const currentDevice = await authService.createSessionToken(
user,
{},
);
const currentUuid = (currentDevice.session as { uuid: string })
.uuid;
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
session: { uid: currentUuid },
} as unknown as Actor;
await authService.revokeAllSessions(actor, {
includeCurrent: true,
});
expect(
await server.stores.session.getByUuid(currentUuid),
).toBeNull();
});
it('leaves app authorizations alone by default', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
const appUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
// Mint an app authorization (creates a kind='app' session row).
await authService.getUserAppToken(actor, appUid);
// Plus a web session that revoke-all should touch.
const web = await authService.createSessionToken(user, {});
const webUuid = (web.session as { uuid: string }).uuid;
await authService.revokeAllSessions({
user: actor.user,
session: { uid: 'unrelated' },
} as unknown as Actor);
// Web is gone, app survives.
expect(await server.stores.session.getByUuid(webUuid)).toBeNull();
const appSession = await server.stores.session.getOrCreateApp(
user.id,
appUid,
);
expect(appSession?.revoked_at ?? null).toBeNull();
});
it('with includeApps=true also revokes app authorizations', async () => {
const user = await makeUser();
const actor = {
user: { id: user.id, uuid: user.uuid, username: user.username },
} as Actor;
const appUid = `app-${uuidv4()}`;
const appToken = await authService.getUserAppToken(actor, appUid);
const appDecoded = server.services.token.verify(
'auth',
appToken,
) as {
session_uid: string;
};
await authService.revokeAllSessions(
{
user: actor.user,
session: { uid: 'unrelated' },
} as unknown as Actor,
{ includeApps: true },
);
expect(
await server.stores.session.getByUuid(appDecoded.session_uid),
).toBeNull();
});
});
});
// -- Origin alias groups ----------------------------------------------
describe('AuthService.appUidFromOrigin — aliased hosts', () => {
let server: PuterServer;
let authService: AuthService;
beforeAll(async () => {
server = await setupTestServer({
app_origin_aliases: [
['beta.example.com', 'ALPHA.example.com', ' beta.example.com '],
// Malformed entries must be skipped, not brick resolution.
'not-a-group',
[],
[42, ' '],
],
} as never);
authService = server.services.auth as unknown as AuthService;
}, 60_000);
afterAll(async () => {
await server?.shutdown();
}, 60_000);
it('collapses every member of a group onto one app uid', async () => {
const alpha = await authService.appUidFromOrigin(
'https://alpha.example.com',
);
const beta = await authService.appUidFromOrigin(
'https://beta.example.com',
);
// Case-insensitively too — config is normalized on read.
const shouty = await authService.appUidFromOrigin(
'https://BETA.example.com',
);
// Regression: the canonical member must land on the same uid as the
// aliases that redirect onto it, so the alias origin has to be
// normalized exactly the way a bare origin is.
expect(beta).toBe(alpha);
expect(shouty).toBe(alpha);
});
it('leaves hosts outside every group on their own uid', async () => {
const grouped = await authService.appUidFromOrigin(
'https://alpha.example.com',
);
const ungrouped = await authService.appUidFromOrigin(
'https://gamma.example.com',
);
expect(ungrouped).not.toBe(grouped);
});
it('keeps distinct ports distinct — the group names bare hosts', async () => {
// `alpha.example.com:8080` is not a group member, so it canonicalizes
// on its hostname instead and keeps the port in the resolved uid.
const withPort = await authService.appUidFromOrigin(
'https://alpha.example.com:8080',
);
const withoutPort = await authService.appUidFromOrigin(
'https://alpha.example.com',
);
expect(withPort).not.toBe(withoutPort);
});
});
describe('AuthService.subdomainOwnerIdFromOrigin — edge cases', () => {
let server: PuterServer;
let authService: AuthService;
beforeAll(async () => {
server = await setupTestServer();
authService = server.services.auth as unknown as AuthService;
}, 60_000);
afterAll(async () => {
await server?.shutdown();
}, 60_000);
it('returns null for an unparseable origin', async () => {
expect(await authService.subdomainOwnerIdFromOrigin('nope')).toBeNull();
});
it('returns null for the hosting domain apex itself', async () => {
expect(
await authService.subdomainOwnerIdFromOrigin(
'https://site.puter.localhost',
),
).toBeNull();
});
it('returns null for an origin outside every hosting domain', async () => {
expect(
await authService.subdomainOwnerIdFromOrigin(
'https://elsewhere.example.com',
),
).toBeNull();
});
it('returns null for an unregistered subdomain under a hosting domain', async () => {
expect(
await authService.subdomainOwnerIdFromOrigin(
`https://never-made-${uuidv4()}.site.puter.localhost`,
),
).toBeNull();
});
});