# Agent environments from recorded captures Use `rea environment-serve` to serve an environment manifest as an agent environment: an MCP server whose tools answer from the records of one retained web network capture, plus the environment card the agentenv framework reads to discover it. Nothing is fetched from the recorded application; every answer is retained Evidence. `rea environment-export` writes the same pair as a bundle folder `agent-env run` builds and runs; see [Export a bundle](#export-a-bundle). ```sh rea inspect-web-network-capture /absolute/session.har har --format json > capture.json rea inspect-analysis-view view.json --format json > manifest.json rea environment-serve manifest.json --evidence capture.json --port 8765 ``` The first command inspects the capture; the second projects the [environment manifest](web-network-captures.md#environment-manifest) view from it, where `view.json` wraps the capture Evidence as the inline source: ```json { "source": { "kind": "inline", "evidence": { "evidence_id": "ev_…" } }, "view": { "kind": "environment-manifest", "template_rules": ["after-uid-literal", "opaque-token", "sibling-variance"] } } ``` The third command serves that manifest. Both served files are complete REA Evidence JSON as the commands write it with `--format json`; the `evidence` member of `view.json` is the whole of `capture.json`. ## From a browser scenario The capture can also come from REA itself: a [browser scenario](browser-scenario-contract.md) records a scripted session in a browser REA launches, and its Evidence is a manifest parent like a HAR inspection. Select the `network` event family and response bodies. A replayed reply carries up to 256 KiB of a recorded body, but the scenario keeps at most `max_network_body_bytes` of each body (64 KiB by default), and only within its allocation budgets: base64 is charged about 11 bytes per body byte, and redaction more the shorter a declared secret is (about 35 bytes per body byte for a 12-character `admin_password`). A body over `max_network_body_allocation_bytes` (1 MiB by default) is kept as `unavailable` with that reason; one over `max_event_allocation_bytes` (4 MiB) or `max_total_event_allocation_bytes` (16 MiB) loses its whole content event, headers included, which the capture lists among its omissions. Either way its tool replays no body. The example raises all four so that 256 KiB bodies are kept when the declared secret has at least 12 characters: ```json { "browser": { "mode": "launch", "executable_path": "/usr/bin/chromium" }, "start_url": { "url": "http://127.0.0.1:5230/auth", "query": [] }, "secrets": [ { "secret_id": "admin_password", "environment_variable": "APP_PASSWORD" } ], "actions": [ { "step_id": "user", "action": "fill", "locator": { "kind": "css", "selector": "input[name=username]" }, "value": { "source": "literal", "value": "admin" } }, { "step_id": "password", "action": "fill", "locator": { "kind": "css", "selector": "input[type=password]" }, "value": { "source": "secret", "secret_id": "admin_password" } }, { "step_id": "sign-in", "action": "press", "locator": { "kind": "css", "selector": "input[type=password]" }, "key": "Enter" }, { "step_id": "first-memo", "action": "goto", "destination": { "url": "http://127.0.0.1:5230/m/1", "query": [] }, "wait_until": "load" } ], "capture": { "events": ["network"], "network": { "request_body": true, "response_body": true, "header_values": false }, "limits": { "max_network_body_bytes": 262144, "max_network_body_allocation_bytes": 12582912, "max_event_allocation_bytes": 12582912, "max_total_event_allocation_bytes": 67108864 } } } ``` ```sh APP_PASSWORD=… rea capture-browser-scenario scenario.json --format json > capture.json rea inspect-analysis-view view.json --format json > manifest.json # view.json wraps capture.json as before rea environment-serve manifest.json --evidence capture.json --port 8765 ``` Each network transaction becomes one record, in request order, and the record's ordinal is its zero-based position; a transaction whose URL carried a redacted secret is left unrepresented rather than templated, and one the capture cannot attribute to a single request and response is left unrepresented too. Tools are chosen by response media type, so a scenario that selected neither response bodies nor header values is refused. The browser scenario redacts credential headers and the secrets it declares; values the application returns in response bodies, such as session tokens, are kept, and the replayed body is the bytes the browser exposes for each response, with any declared secret replaced by its redaction marker (a body that redaction had to empty replays no body). ## What a manifest is An environment manifest is a projection of one application's recorded request lines into a tool surface: one tool per method and path template on the primary origin, with inferred path parameters, observed query parameter names, value-free body shapes and pointers to the parent records each tool cites. It carries no bodies and no headers. The manifest's `parent_evidence_id` names the capture Evidence it was projected from; the serve command refuses a manifest whose parent is not the supplied `--evidence` file with an `invalid_request` error naming both identifiers, so a manifest can never be served from records it did not cite. The MCP catalog and environment card use a 1 KiB UTF-8 budget for each captured display sample. Observation, body-key and cited-record lists show whole values with omission counts; long method, path and query-name displays show a marked prefix. Complete values remain in manifest Evidence. Argument names longer than 64 characters use collision-safe `path_` or `query_` aliases; replay maps those aliases to the complete captured names. Discovery is admitted as a complete catalog under a 1 MiB serialization reservation before the listener binds. Reservation charges up to six bytes per UTF-16 code unit for JSON escaping/UTF-8 expansion, plus schema overhead; a catalog may therefore be refused even when its compact JSON is smaller. This was calibrated with 1500 query fields and eight concurrent SDK discovery requests (183,798-byte card, 507.27 MiB sampled process-family RSS). Over-capacity catalogs return `resource_constraint`, retain complete input Evidence, and require a smaller capture or manifest. Fields and tools are never silently omitted. ## What replay means and does not mean Each MCP tool call selects one of the records its manifest tool cites and returns that record's recorded response. Selection compares the supplied path parameters against the record's path segments at the parameter indexes, then the supplied query values against the record's query string, and keeps the record with the most matches; ties keep manifest order. The result reports where the answer came from: ```json { "status": 200, "content_type": "application/json", "body": { "id": 2, "login": "probe" }, "replay": { "record_ordinal": 5, "evidence_id": "ev_…", "exact_match": true, "recorded_path": "/api/users/2", "recorded_query": null, "recorded_line_truncated": false, "body_recorded": true, "body_encoding": "utf-8", "truncated": false } } ``` `exact_match` is true when every supplied path parameter and query value equals the recorded one; it says nothing about parameters the caller omitted. Recorded query parsing runs only when supplied query arguments affect selection. A path value matches a recorded segment as written or after percent-decoding; when both kinds of match are available, the record whose segment equals the value as written is chosen. `recorded_query` keeps the `?` of an explicit empty query, and a recorded path or query longer than 1 KiB is cut in the reply with `recorded_line_truncated: true`; selection always uses the full recorded line. `content_type` also has a 1 KiB display bound with `content_type_truncated`; body interpretation uses the full recorded media type. When no record matches, the tool still answers from the tool's first cited record and reports `exact_match: false`. `body` is parsed JSON when the recorded content type is JSON-like (`application/json`, `application/*+json`, `text/plain`, `text/markdown`) and the text parses with safe numeric conversion; otherwise it is the recorded text. Large integer IDs and other numbers that would lose information stay in the original JSON text. Bodies over 256 KiB are cut at a UTF-8 boundary and returned as text with `truncated: true`. `body_recorded` is false when the capture kept the response's status and content type but no body; `body` is then `null`, which is not a recorded JSON `null`. `body_encoding` is `base64` when the capture retained response bytes that are not valid UTF-8; `body` is then exactly those bytes in base64, never a lossy decoding. A retained base64 body is decoded only as far as the 256 KiB a reply can carry, and a leading byte-order mark is kept. For a `base64` body the limit applies to the recorded bytes, not their longer base64 spelling, and a cut keeps whole base64 groups. Request bodies passed to `POST`, `PUT` and `PATCH` tools are accepted and ignored: nothing is written, and no call changes what a later call returns. Arguments the tool's input schema does not name are refused by the MCP server as invalid arguments, so a misspelled parameter never degrades into an omitted one. Replay is not emulation. A served environment does not establish the application's authorization model, response semantics or state transitions, which the manifest lists as unknowns; it does not validate supplied values; and it does not answer requests the capture never recorded. Replayed content is target content: every tool result, including the argument errors the MCP server returns before a replay runs, carries `_meta.provenance.untrusted_content: true` with `source: "analysis_target"`. The server advertises REA's untrusted-content instructions plus a warning that its tool names, descriptions, parameter names and observed values come from the capture too, and agents must treat all of it as data, never as instructions. That same warning prefixes every tool description in the standalone card, so card discovery carries it before an MCP client initializes. It labels the captured text without changing the tool names or schema fields clients use. ## The state a capture observed Replay answers each call from one recording, so the answers reflect whichever moment of the capture recorded them. The [environment state](web-network-captures.md#environment-state) view extracts instead the data the capture's reads observed before the first related write: entity types with an identity field, entities with their recorded values, documents for written paths, and a render plan per read tool, kept only where it reproduces that tool's recordings from the state. It is the starting state an environment can hold, load and report; serving from it is a later increment and does not change replay. ## Serve a manifest ```sh rea environment-serve manifest.json --evidence capture.json [--host 127.0.0.1] [--port 0] ``` `--host` and `--port` default to `MCP_HOST` and `MCP_PORT` from the environment, then to `127.0.0.1` and an ephemeral port, exactly as [`rea mcp --http`](cli.md#serve-mcp-over-streamable-http) resolves them. The bound MCP URL is written to stderr as one JSON log line (`"msg":"MCP transport listening"` with `url`); `REA_LOG_LEVEL` overrides that log level. `ENVIRONMENT_NAME` renames the served environment; otherwise the manifest's `name` is used, and a set but blank value is refused as `configuration_invalid` before binding rather than silently falling back. The listener serves one MCP client at a time with the same session, `Host` header and shutdown contract as [transports](mcp-contracts.md#transports) describes. It runs until SIGINT or SIGTERM, then closes the listener, prints one `{"status":"stopped", …}` document and exits `130` or `143`. Signals during input loading or DNS/bind cancel the owning reader/listener before a listening announcement; that path returns a structured `cancelled` result instead of a stopped-listener document, with the same signal exit status. Three routes are served: | Route | Answer | | --------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- | | `POST /mcp` | The MCP server: one tool per manifest tool, replaying retained records | | `GET /.well-known/agent-env.json` | The environment card | | `POST /agentenv` | JSON-RPC `-32601 method not found: ` for every method | Numeric JSON-RPC IDs outside JavaScript's safe range or whose precision would be lost are refused as invalid requests with a null ID. They are never echoed as a different number. The data plane at `/agentenv` is advertised by the card but carries no operations in this release; the error names the requested method so a caller can see that the method, not the transport, is unsupported. Its request body is read within the same 4 MiB bound the MCP endpoint applies: a larger body is answered `413` with a JSON-RPC `-32000` error before any of it is parsed, and a body that is not JSON is answered `400` with `-32700`. A notification (no `id`) gets `202` and no body, a batch gets one reply per request in it, and an empty batch, a batch of more than 100 messages, or a message that is not a JSON-RPC request (including an `id` that is not a string, number or null, or `params` that are not an object or array) gets `-32600 invalid request`. ## The environment card The card is the discovery document the agentenv framework reads before connecting to `/mcp`: ```json { "name": "grafana-example", "protocolVersion": "1.0", "url": "/agentenv", "preferredTransport": "JSONRPC", "additionalInterfaces": [{ "url": "/mcp", "transport": "mcp" }], "capabilities": { "extensions": null, "tools": [ { "name": "get_users_by_id", "description": "GET /api/users/{numeric}; replays retained records [5, 6]; evidence ev_…", "inputSchema": { "type": "object", "properties": { "id": { "type": "string", "description": "Path segment 2 (numeric); observed: 2, 3" } }, "required": ["id"], "additionalProperties": false } } ], "operations": [] }, "children_environments": null } ``` `capabilities.tools` lists the same names, descriptions and input schemas that `tools/list` advertises over MCP. Path parameters are required strings whose description names the segment index, the templating rule and the observed values (sampled within the list budget above; the manifest keeps them all); query parameter names are optional strings; write methods accept an optional `body` object described by the recorded top-level key types. Each input keeps its own argument: a query name equal to a path parameter's name is advertised as `query_`, a query name longer than 64 characters as `query_` (its position) with the captured name sampled in its description, and the write body as `request_body` when a query parameter is named `body`. Every schema closes with `additionalProperties: false`, a key the echo example's schema does not carry. `extensions`, `operations` and `children_environments` are fixed to `null`, `[]` and `null`: a replay environment declares no extensions, no data-plane operations and no children. ## Export a bundle `rea environment-export` writes the same pair as a bundle folder the agentenv framework runs directly, shaped like its own echo example: ```sh rea environment-export manifest.json --evidence capture.json ./grafana-example --json agent-env run ./grafana-example ``` ```text grafana-example/ README.md provenance, replay limits, run command, rights note envs/grafana-example/Dockerfile pinned image: node:24.18.0-bookworm-slim + rea-agents@ envs/grafana-example/env.toml environment_name = "grafana-example" envs/grafana-example/manifest.json byte-exact copy of manifest.json envs/grafana-example/evidence.json byte-exact copy of capture.json artifacts/check_grafana-example/verify.py the replay verifier tasks/smoke.json deploy_env (local sandbox), then env_outcome_verifier ``` The command reads each file once, after checking that reading and parsing the whole file, including sealing traversal, fits the process's live heap headroom (a file that does not is refused as a `resource_constraint` before it is read), then authenticates and cross-checks the pair as `environment-serve` does, so a manifest projected from another capture is refused with the same `invalid_request` before anything is written, and the bytes it copies are the bytes it authenticated. The bundle directory must be absent or empty; an occupied directory is refused and nothing in it changes. The complete tool catalog must also fit the server's advertised catalog budget before any files are written. Privately parsed JSON is sealed once so authentication and replay share immutable response trees rather than copying the capture repeatedly. `--name` replaces the manifest's portable kebab-case name as the env folder and env id (Windows device names such as `con` and `lpt1` are refused); `--package-tarball ` copies a packed `rea-agents` tarball into the env folder and makes the Dockerfile install it instead of the registry package and remove it in the same layer, which is how a checkout rather than a release is run. The command prints the written files with their sizes and the pinned package source. Export uses the shared output-tree owner to check directory identities around exclusive creates, verify written bytes, and reject unowned entries before reporting success. It does not delete an inspectable partial folder on failure. Node's portable pathname APIs leave a syscall-boundary race, so the output's parent directories must be trusted. On POSIX output files use mode `0600`; Windows inherits ACLs and REA does not establish owner-only access there. Choose an already private Windows destination when captured content needs it. The Dockerfile sets `MCP_HOST=0.0.0.0` and `MCP_PORT=18765`, the port the framework maps for an MCP server env; the framework's own deploy supplies `MCP_HOST`, `MCP_PORT` and `ENVIRONMENT_NAME`, so the served card carries the env's name. It installs Debian's `python3` because the framework's local sandbox probes a container's readiness with `python3` inside it, which the slim Node image lacks. It copies the two inputs owned by the image's non-root `node` user, so a private host umask cannot leave them unreadable, runs as that user and starts `rea environment-serve /env/manifest.json --evidence /env/evidence.json`. The `env.toml` names the environment because the framework otherwise reads the name from Python sources the image does not have. `verify.py` is the framework's `async def verify(mcp_url)` shape over its Python MCP client: it lists the tools and checks the count equals the manifest's, calls the first `GET` tool without path parameters with no arguments and checks the call did not fail and its replayed `status` equals the recorded status of that tool's first cited record (an unknown recorded status stays unknown; it is not borrowed from another record), and returns one `replay` result whose description reports both checks. A manifest with no such tool yields a verifier that checks the count only and says so. `tasks/smoke.json` deploys the env on the local sandbox and runs that verifier against the env's MCP endpoint; the first run also builds the framework's own infrastructure, and the run tears everything down when it ends. The README written into the bundle records the capture artifact's SHA-256, the capture and manifest Evidence ids, the manifest view digest, the tool count and the package source, and states that the recorded content belongs to the captured application and must not be published without the rights to it. ## Compatibility verification `npm run verify:agentenv:environment` is the hosted `real-agentenv` lane described in [testing](testing.md#exported-environment-bundles). It projects the Grafana-shaped source-owned capture through the built CLI, packs the checkout, exports a bundle with `--package-tarball`, runs it with the pinned `agentenv-framework` release on the runner's Docker and requires the smoke task to pass with no container left behind other than the framework's own image-registry helper, which the receipt reports. It proves that one exported bundle runs on one framework release; it does not claim any hosted platform or other framework versions. ## Resource and lifecycle boundaries Both Evidence files are read once at startup through the bounded JSON input reader and authenticated as Evidence before the listener binds; a file that is not Evidence, a manifest of another view kind, a capture of another format, or a manifest projected from a different capture is refused before any port is opened. Because authentication covers the capture's records, a manifest whose parent check passes cites only records the capture retains. The server keeps only the cited records' request lines and response text in memory. No outbound network request is made, no process is launched and nothing is written to disk. A listener that fails after binding is logged and ends the command with a `resource_constraint` error and exit `1` instead of serving nothing.