morluto
8f229ede70
* feat: add autonomous Electron runtime analysis * feat(electron): add lifecycle and boundary telemetry * feat(electron): capture runtime boundary evidence * fix(electron): package boundary hook helper * feat(electron): report active capture coverage * fix(electron): account for bring-your-own runtime * feat(electron): expand agent-owned runtime scenarios * fix(ghidra): keep fixture credentials out of argv * perf(test): serialize local test and docs workloads * fix(electron): harden active runtime capture * fix(inspector): require exact runtime target authorization * fix(docs): make managed manifest host independent * fix(ci): make generated catalog portable * fix: unblock autonomous command and electron flows * fix(electron): close popup and detached helper gaps
72 lines
2.4 KiB
TypeScript
72 lines
2.4 KiB
TypeScript
import {
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browserOriginSchema,
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sanitizeBrowserUrl,
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} from "../domain/browserObservation.js";
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import type { JavaScriptRuntimeLocation } from "../domain/javascriptRuntimeObservation.js";
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import {
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authorizedElectronFile,
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canonicalElectronRoots,
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} from "./ElectronFileScope.js";
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export type RuntimeLocationDecision =
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| { readonly allowed: true; readonly location: JavaScriptRuntimeLocation }
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| {
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readonly allowed: false;
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readonly reason:
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| "outside_file_roots"
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| "outside_origins"
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| "unsupported_location";
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};
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/** Canonicalize exact filesystem scopes before Inspector attachment. */
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export const canonicalRuntimeRoots = canonicalElectronRoots;
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/** Authorize one protocol URL without retaining an out-of-scope value. */
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export const authorizeRuntimeLocation = async (
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value: string,
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roots: readonly string[],
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origins: readonly string[],
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): Promise<RuntimeLocationDecision> => {
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if (value.startsWith("node:") && value.length <= 4_096)
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return {
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allowed: true,
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location: { kind: "builtin", specifier: value },
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};
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if (value.startsWith("file:")) {
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const filePath = await authorizedElectronFile(value, roots);
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return filePath === undefined
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? { allowed: false, reason: "outside_file_roots" }
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: { allowed: true, location: { kind: "file", file_path: filePath } };
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}
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let url: URL;
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try {
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url = new URL(value);
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} catch {
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return { allowed: false, reason: "unsupported_location" };
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}
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if (!["http:", "https:"].includes(url.protocol))
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return { allowed: false, reason: "unsupported_location" };
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const parsedOrigin = browserOriginSchema.safeParse(url.origin);
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if (!parsedOrigin.success || !origins.includes(parsedOrigin.data))
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return { allowed: false, reason: "outside_origins" };
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return {
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allowed: true,
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location: {
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kind: "url",
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origin: parsedOrigin.data,
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sanitized_url: sanitizeBrowserUrl(value).url,
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},
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};
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};
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/** Authorize a target whose Node Inspector URL omits its main entry path. */
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export const authorizeRuntimeTargetLocation = async (
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value: string,
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targetType: string,
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roots: readonly string[],
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origins: readonly string[],
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): Promise<RuntimeLocationDecision> =>
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// A bare file:// URL contains no source identity. Do not attach to the
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// first configured root merely because the target happens to be Node.
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authorizeRuntimeLocation(value, roots, origins);
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