CVE-2026-29065 - fix(backups): patch zip slip advisory, zip bomb, upload size limit, UUID validation, secret.txt leakage, and download edge cases

changedetectionio/blueprint/backups/__init__.py

@@ -40,11 +40,6 @@ def create_backup(datastore_path, watches: dict, tags: dict = None):
             zipObj.write(url_watches_json, arcname="url-watches.json")
             logger.debug("Added url-watches.json to backup")
 
-        # Add the flask app secret (if it exists)
-        secret_file = os.path.join(datastore_path, "secret.txt")
-        if os.path.isfile(secret_file):
-            zipObj.write(secret_file, arcname="secret.txt")
-
         # Add tag data directories (each tag has its own {uuid}/tag.json)
         for uuid, tag in (tags or {}).items():
             for f in Path(tag.data_dir).glob('*'):
@@ -151,19 +146,22 @@ def construct_blueprint(datastore: ChangeDetectionStore):
     def download_backup(filename):
         import re
         filename = filename.strip()
-        backup_filename_regex = BACKUP_FILENAME_FORMAT.format("\d+")
-
-        full_path = os.path.join(os.path.abspath(datastore.datastore_path), filename)
-        if not full_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(datastore.datastore_path)):
-            abort(404)
+        backup_filename_regex = BACKUP_FILENAME_FORMAT.format(r"\d+")
 
+        # Resolve 'latest' before any validation so checks run against the real filename.
         if filename == 'latest':
             backups = find_backups()
+            if not backups:
+                abort(404)
             filename = backups[0]['filename']
 
         if not re.match(r"^" + backup_filename_regex + "$", filename):
             abort(400)  # Bad Request if the filename doesn't match the pattern
 
+        full_path = os.path.join(os.path.abspath(datastore.datastore_path), filename)
+        if not full_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(datastore.datastore_path) + os.sep):
+            abort(404)
+
         logger.debug(f"Backup download request for '{full_path}'")
         return send_from_directory(os.path.abspath(datastore.datastore_path), filename, as_attachment=True)
 

changedetectionio/blueprint/backups/restore.py

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import io
 import json
 import os
+import re
 import shutil
 import tempfile
 import threading
@@ -14,6 +15,16 @@ from loguru import logger
 
 from changedetectionio.flask_app import login_optionally_required
 
+# Maximum size of the uploaded zip file. Override via env var MAX_RESTORE_UPLOAD_MB.
+_MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES = int(os.getenv("MAX_RESTORE_UPLOAD_MB", 256)) * 1024 * 1024
+# Maximum total uncompressed size of all entries (zip-bomb guard). Override via MAX_RESTORE_DECOMPRESSED_MB.
+_MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES = int(os.getenv("MAX_RESTORE_DECOMPRESSED_MB", 1024)) * 1024 * 1024
+# Only top-level directories whose name is a valid UUID are treated as watch/tag entries.
+_UUID_RE = re.compile(
+    r'^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-4[0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$',
+    re.IGNORECASE,
+)
+
 
 class RestoreForm(Form):
     zip_file = FileField(_l('Backup zip file'), validators=[
@@ -50,7 +61,18 @@ def import_from_zip(zip_stream, datastore, include_groups, include_groups_replac
     with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
         logger.debug(f"Restore: extracting zip to {tmpdir}")
         with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_stream, 'r') as zf:
-            zf.extractall(tmpdir)
+            total_uncompressed = sum(m.file_size for m in zf.infolist())
+            if total_uncompressed > _MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES:
+                raise ValueError(
+                    f"Backup archive decompressed size ({total_uncompressed // (1024 * 1024)} MB) "
+                    f"exceeds the {_MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES // (1024 * 1024)} MB limit"
+                )
+            resolved_dest = os.path.realpath(tmpdir)
+            for member in zf.infolist():
+                member_dest = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(resolved_dest, member.filename))
+                if not member_dest.startswith(resolved_dest + os.sep) and member_dest != resolved_dest:
+                    raise ValueError(f"Zip Slip path traversal detected in backup archive: {member.filename!r}")
+                zf.extract(member, tmpdir)
         logger.debug("Restore: zip extracted, scanning UUID directories")
 
         for entry in os.scandir(tmpdir):
@@ -58,6 +80,9 @@ def import_from_zip(zip_stream, datastore, include_groups, include_groups_replac
                 continue
 
             uuid = entry.name
+            if not _UUID_RE.match(uuid):
+                logger.warning(f"Restore: skipping non-UUID directory {uuid!r}")
+                continue
             tag_json_path = os.path.join(entry.path, 'tag.json')
             watch_json_path = os.path.join(entry.path, 'watch.json')
 
@@ -155,7 +180,9 @@ def construct_restore_blueprint(datastore):
         form = RestoreForm()
         return render_template("backup_restore.html",
                                form=form,
-                               restore_running=any(t.is_alive() for t in restore_threads))
+                               restore_running=any(t.is_alive() for t in restore_threads),
+                               max_upload_mb=_MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES // (1024 * 1024),
+                               max_decompressed_mb=_MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES // (1024 * 1024))
 
     @login_optionally_required
     @restore_blueprint.route("/restore/start", methods=['POST'])
@@ -173,10 +200,22 @@ def construct_restore_blueprint(datastore):
             flash(gettext("File must be a .zip backup file"), "error")
             return redirect(url_for('backups.restore.restore'))
 
-        # Read into memory now — the request stream is gone once we return
+        # Reject oversized uploads before reading the stream into memory.
+        content_length = request.content_length
+        if content_length and content_length > _MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES:
+            flash(gettext("Backup file is too large (max %(mb)s MB)", mb=_MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES // (1024 * 1024)), "error")
+            return redirect(url_for('backups.restore.restore'))
+
+        # Read into memory now — the request stream is gone once we return.
+        # Read one byte beyond the limit so we can detect truncated-but-still-oversized streams.
         try:
-            zip_bytes = io.BytesIO(zip_file.read())
-            zipfile.ZipFile(zip_bytes)  # quick validity check before spawning
+            raw = zip_file.read(_MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES + 1)
+            if len(raw) > _MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES:
+                flash(gettext("Backup file is too large (max %(mb)s MB)", mb=_MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES // (1024 * 1024)), "error")
+                return redirect(url_for('backups.restore.restore'))
+            zip_bytes = io.BytesIO(raw)
+            with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_bytes):  # quick validity check before spawning
+                pass
             zip_bytes.seek(0)
         except zipfile.BadZipFile:
             flash(gettext("Invalid or corrupted zip file"), "error")
@@ -201,6 +240,7 @@ def construct_restore_blueprint(datastore):
             name="BackupRestore"
         )
         restore_thread.start()
+        restore_threads[:] = [t for t in restore_threads if t.is_alive()]
         restore_threads.append(restore_thread)
         flash(gettext("Restore started in background, check back in a few minutes."))
         return redirect(url_for('backups.restore.restore'))

changedetectionio/blueprint/backups/templates/backup_restore.html

@@ -19,6 +19,10 @@
 
                 <p>{{ _('Restore a backup. Must be a .zip backup file created on/after v0.53.1 (new database layout).') }}</p>
                 <p>{{ _('Note: This does not override the main application settings, only watches and groups.') }}</p>
+                <p class="pure-form-message">
+                    {{ _('Max upload size: %(upload)s MB &nbsp;·&nbsp; Max decompressed size: %(decomp)s MB',
+                         upload=max_upload_mb, decomp=max_decompressed_mb) }}
+                </p>
 
                 <form class="pure-form pure-form-stacked settings"
                       action="{{ url_for('backups.restore.backups_restore_start') }}"

changedetectionio/tests/test_backup.py

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 from .util import set_original_response, live_server_setup, wait_for_all_checks
 from flask import url_for
 import io
-from zipfile import ZipFile
+from zipfile import ZipFile, ZIP_DEFLATED
 import re
 import time
 from changedetectionio.model import Watch, Tag
@@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ def test_backup(client, live_server, measure_memory_usage, datastore_path):
     # Check for changedetection.json (settings file)
     assert 'changedetection.json' in l, "changedetection.json should be in backup"
 
+    # secret.txt must never be included — it contains the Flask session key
+    assert 'secret.txt' not in l, "secret.txt (Flask session key) must not be included in backup"
+
     # Get the latest one
     res = client.get(
         url_for("backups.remove_backups"),
@@ -196,4 +199,63 @@ def test_backup_restore(client, live_server, measure_memory_usage, datastore_pat
     assert restored_tag2 is not None, f"Tag {tag_uuid2} not found after restore"
     assert restored_tag2['title'] == "Tasty backup tag number two", "Restored tag 2 title does not match"
     assert isinstance(restored_tag2, Tag.model), \
-        f"Tag 2 not properly rehydrated, got {type(restored_tag2)}"
+        f"Tag 2 not properly rehydrated, got {type(restored_tag2)}"
+
+
+def test_backup_restore_zip_slip_rejected(client, live_server, measure_memory_usage, datastore_path):
+    """Zip Slip path traversal entries in a restore zip must be rejected."""
+    import pytest
+    from changedetectionio.blueprint.backups.restore import import_from_zip
+
+    # Build a zip with a path traversal entry that would escape the extraction dir
+    malicious_zip = io.BytesIO()
+    with ZipFile(malicious_zip, 'w') as zf:
+        zf.writestr("../escaped.txt", "ATTACKER-CONTROLLED")
+    malicious_zip.seek(0)
+
+    datastore = live_server.app.config['DATASTORE']
+
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Zip Slip"):
+        import_from_zip(
+            zip_stream=malicious_zip,
+            datastore=datastore,
+            include_groups=True,
+            include_groups_replace=True,
+            include_watches=True,
+            include_watches_replace=True,
+        )
+
+
+def test_backup_restore_zip_bomb_rejected(client, live_server, measure_memory_usage, datastore_path):
+    """A zip whose total uncompressed size exceeds the limit must be rejected.
+
+    The guard reads file_size from the zip central-directory metadata — no
+    actual decompression happens, so this test is fast and uses minimal RAM.
+    100 KB of zeros compresses to ~100 bytes; monkeypatching the limit to
+    50 KB is enough to trigger the check without creating any large files.
+    """
+    import pytest
+    import changedetectionio.blueprint.backups.restore as restore_mod
+    from changedetectionio.blueprint.backups.restore import import_from_zip
+
+    # ~100 KB of zeros → deflate compresses to ~100 bytes, but file_size metadata = 100 KB
+    bomb_zip = io.BytesIO()
+    with ZipFile(bomb_zip, 'w', compression=ZIP_DEFLATED) as zf:
+        zf.writestr("data.txt", b"\x00" * (100 * 1024))
+    bomb_zip.seek(0)
+
+    datastore = live_server.app.config['DATASTORE']
+    original_limit = restore_mod._MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES
+    try:
+        restore_mod._MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES = 50 * 1024  # 50 KB limit for this test
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="decompressed size"):
+            import_from_zip(
+                zip_stream=bomb_zip,
+                datastore=datastore,
+                include_groups=True,
+                include_groups_replace=True,
+                include_watches=True,
+                include_watches_replace=True,
+            )
+    finally:
+        restore_mod._MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES = original_limit