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3 Commits

7 changed files with 146 additions and 12 deletions
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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
# Read more https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/wiki
# Semver means never use .01, or 00. Should be .1.
__version__ = '0.55.3'
__version__ = '0.55.4'
from changedetectionio.strtobool import strtobool
from json.decoder import JSONDecodeError
+22 -1
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@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import os
import re
import threading
from changedetectionio.validate_url import is_safe_valid_url
@@ -278,8 +279,28 @@ class WatchSingleHistory(Resource):
if request.args.get('html'):
content = watch.get_fetched_html(timestamp)
if content:
# XSS mitigation (GHSA-cgj8-g98g-4p9x): this is an API endpoint, not a
# browser-rendered view. The bytes ARE HTML (that's what the caller asked
# for) but a programmatic client doesn't need text/html — and serving
# text/html lets attacker-planted <script> in a monitored site execute
# in our origin if someone opens the URL in a browser.
#
# text/plain + explicit utf-8 + nosniff = browser shows inert text,
# sniffing can't re-classify it as HTML, an absent charset can't be
# auto-detected as UTF-7 (an alternative XSS vector). API clients
# still get the raw bytes — they don't care about Content-Type.
response = make_response(content, 200)
response.mimetype = "text/html"
response.headers['Content-Type'] = 'text/plain; charset=utf-8'
response.headers['X-Content-Type-Options'] = 'nosniff'
# Include the timestamp in the download name so downloading multiple
# snapshots doesn't collide. No extension — the stored bytes are
# "whatever the fetcher captured" (HTML, JSON, XML, text…), so
# claiming .html on the download would be a false content-type label
# for non-HTML watches. The user/curl can rename if needed.
# Strip to safe filename chars (timestamp is already validated as a
# watch.history key — this is defense in depth against header injection).
safe_ts = re.sub(r'[^0-9A-Za-z_-]', '', str(timestamp))[:32] or 'snapshot'
response.headers['Content-Disposition'] = f'attachment; filename="snapshot-{safe_ts}"'
else:
response = make_response("No content found", 404)
response.mimetype = "text/plain"
+15 -2
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@@ -364,6 +364,10 @@ def process_notification(n_object: NotificationContextData, datastore):
# Should always be false for 'text' mode or its too hard to read
# But otherwise, this could be some setting
word_diff=False if requested_output_format_original == 'text' else True,
# HTML-format notifications must escape diff content (GHSA-q8xq-qg4x-wphg).
# FormattableDiff/Extract escape internally so {{ diff(...) }} stays callable —
# the post-Jinja escape loop below would otherwise convert them to plain str.
escape_output='html' in requested_output_format,
)
)
@@ -394,10 +398,19 @@ def process_notification(n_object: NotificationContextData, datastore):
# so they survive escape and are still replaced with <span> tags later.
if 'html' in requested_output_format:
from markupsafe import escape as html_escape
from changedetectionio.notification_service import FormattableDiff, FormattableExtract
_page_content_keys = {'raw_diff', 'current_snapshot', 'prev_snapshot', 'triggered_text'}
for key in [k for k in notification_parameters if k.startswith('diff') or k in _page_content_keys]:
if notification_parameters.get(key):
notification_parameters[key] = str(html_escape(str(notification_parameters[key])))
value = notification_parameters.get(key)
if not value:
continue
# FormattableDiff / FormattableExtract are callable str subclasses — {{ diff(lines=5) }}
# etc. relies on __call__. Wrapping them with str(html_escape(...)) here would lose
# __call__ and break those tokens. They escape internally via escape_output=True
# (set by add_rendered_diff_to_notification_vars above) for both __str__ and __call__.
if isinstance(value, (FormattableDiff, FormattableExtract)):
continue
notification_parameters[key] = str(html_escape(str(value)))
with (apprise.LogCapture(level=apprise.logging.DEBUG) as logs):
for url in n_object['notification_urls']:
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@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ class FormattableExtract(str):
Multiple changed fragments are joined with newlines.
Being a str subclass means it is natively JSON serializable.
"""
def __new__(cls, prev_snapshot, current_snapshot, extract_fn):
def __new__(cls, prev_snapshot, current_snapshot, extract_fn, escape_output=False):
if prev_snapshot or current_snapshot:
from changedetectionio import diff as diff_module
# word_diff=True is required — placemarker extraction regexes only exist in word-diff output
@@ -107,6 +107,12 @@ class FormattableExtract(str):
extracted = extract_fn(raw)
else:
extracted = ''
if escape_output and extracted:
# Placemarkers (@removed_PLACEMARKER_OPEN etc) contain no HTML chars,
# so html_escape leaves them intact — they still get swapped to <span>
# tags later by apply_service_tweaks. See GHSA-q8xq-qg4x-wphg.
from markupsafe import escape as html_escape
extracted = str(html_escape(extracted))
instance = super().__new__(cls, extracted)
return instance
@@ -128,16 +134,23 @@ class FormattableDiff(str):
Being a str subclass means it is natively JSON serializable.
"""
def __new__(cls, prev_snapshot, current_snapshot, **base_kwargs):
def __new__(cls, prev_snapshot, current_snapshot, escape_output=False, **base_kwargs):
if prev_snapshot or current_snapshot:
from changedetectionio import diff as diff_module
rendered = diff_module.render_diff(prev_snapshot, current_snapshot, **base_kwargs)
else:
rendered = ''
if escape_output and rendered:
# Placemarkers (@removed_PLACEMARKER_OPEN etc) contain no HTML chars,
# so html_escape leaves them intact — they still get swapped to <span>
# tags later by apply_service_tweaks. See GHSA-q8xq-qg4x-wphg.
from markupsafe import escape as html_escape
rendered = str(html_escape(rendered))
instance = super().__new__(cls, rendered)
instance._prev = prev_snapshot
instance._current = current_snapshot
instance._base_kwargs = base_kwargs
instance._escape_output = escape_output
return instance
def __call__(self, lines=None, added_only=False, removed_only=False, context=0,
@@ -163,6 +176,10 @@ class FormattableDiff(str):
if lines is not None:
result = '\n'.join(result.splitlines()[:int(lines)])
if self._escape_output and result:
from markupsafe import escape as html_escape
result = str(html_escape(result))
return result
@@ -236,7 +253,7 @@ class NotificationContextData(dict):
super().__setitem__(key, value)
def add_rendered_diff_to_notification_vars(notification_scan_text:str, prev_snapshot:str, current_snapshot:str, word_diff:bool):
def add_rendered_diff_to_notification_vars(notification_scan_text:str, prev_snapshot:str, current_snapshot:str, word_diff:bool, escape_output:bool=False):
"""
Efficiently renders only the diff placeholders that are actually used in the notification text.
@@ -249,6 +266,9 @@ def add_rendered_diff_to_notification_vars(notification_scan_text:str, prev_snap
prev_snapshot: Previous version of content for diff comparison
current_snapshot: Current version of content for diff comparison
word_diff: Whether to use word-level (True) or line-level (False) diffing
escape_output: If True, the rendered diff output is HTML-escaped. Used for HTML-format
notifications so attacker-controlled page content can't inject live markup.
Both the cached str representation and the result of {{ diff(...) }} calls are escaped.
Returns:
dict: Only the diff placeholders that were found in notification_scan_text, with rendered content
@@ -287,10 +307,10 @@ def add_rendered_diff_to_notification_vars(notification_scan_text:str, prev_snap
if not re.search(pattern, notification_scan_text, re.IGNORECASE):
continue
if key in diff_specs:
ret[key] = FormattableDiff(prev_snapshot, current_snapshot, **diff_specs[key])
ret[key] = FormattableDiff(prev_snapshot, current_snapshot, escape_output=escape_output, **diff_specs[key])
rendered_count += 1
elif key in extract_specs:
ret[key] = FormattableExtract(prev_snapshot, current_snapshot, extract_fn=extract_specs[key])
ret[key] = FormattableExtract(prev_snapshot, current_snapshot, extract_fn=extract_specs[key], escape_output=escape_output)
rendered_count += 1
if rendered_count:
+75 -1
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@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import json
import threading
import uuid as uuid_module
from flask import url_for
from .util import live_server_setup, wait_for_all_checks, delete_all_watches
from .util import live_server_setup, wait_for_all_checks, wait_for_watch_history, delete_all_watches
import os
@@ -653,6 +653,80 @@ def test_api_history_edge_cases(client, live_server, measure_memory_usage, datas
delete_all_watches(client)
def test_api_history_html_does_not_serve_as_text_html(client, live_server, measure_memory_usage, datastore_path):
"""
GHSA-cgj8-g98g-4p9x: GET /api/v1/watch/<uuid>/history/<timestamp>?html=true
must not serve the stored snapshot with Content-Type: text/html. The bytes
are an external site's HTML — if the response is labelled text/html, a
<script> the attacker planted on that site executes in our origin when an
operator opens the URL in a browser (stored XSS).
The fix is text/plain; charset=utf-8 + X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff so
browsers render inert text and can't sniff back to HTML/UTF-7. API clients
don't care about Content-Type and still receive the same bytes.
This test injects the snapshot directly via Watch.save_history_blob() and
save_last_fetched_html() so we exercise the API endpoint's response
shaping without depending on the live-fetch pipeline.
"""
api_key = live_server.app.config['DATASTORE'].data['settings']['application'].get('api_access_token')
test_url = url_for('test_endpoint', _external=True)
res = client.post(
url_for("createwatch"),
data=json.dumps({"url": test_url}),
headers={'content-type': 'application/json', 'x-api-key': api_key},
)
watch_uuid = res.json.get('uuid')
# Plant a payload that would execute if the response were rendered as HTML.
malicious_html = (
"<html><body>"
"<script>window.__CD_XSS_PROBE = 1</script>"
"<img src=x onerror=\"window.__CD_XSS_PROBE = 1\">"
"</body></html>"
)
ts = '1700000000'
watch = live_server.app.config['DATASTORE'].data['watching'][watch_uuid]
watch.save_history_blob(contents=malicious_html, timestamp=ts, snapshot_id=ts)
watch.save_last_fetched_html(timestamp=ts, contents=malicious_html)
# The actual XSS-relevant assertion: how is the snapshot served?
res = client.get(
url_for("watchsinglehistory", uuid=watch_uuid, timestamp=ts) + '?html=true',
headers={'x-api-key': api_key},
)
assert res.status_code == 200, f"unexpected status {res.status_code}: {res.data!r}"
ctype = res.headers.get('Content-Type', '')
assert 'text/html' not in ctype, \
f"snapshot must not be served as text/html (got {ctype!r}) — see GHSA-cgj8-g98g-4p9x"
# Explicit utf-8 closes the UTF-7 sniffing bypass — without a charset, some
# browsers will auto-detect UTF-7 from byte patterns and a crafted snapshot
# can still execute via `+ADw-script+AD4-...`
assert 'charset=utf-8' in ctype.lower(), \
f"Content-Type must pin charset=utf-8 to defeat UTF-7 sniffing XSS (got {ctype!r})"
nosniff = res.headers.get('X-Content-Type-Options', '')
assert nosniff.lower() == 'nosniff', \
f"X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff required to defeat MIME-sniffing (got {nosniff!r})"
# Download filename should include the timestamp so multiple snapshots from
# the same watch don't overwrite each other on disk.
disp = res.headers.get('Content-Disposition', '')
assert 'attachment' in disp and ts in disp, \
f"Content-Disposition should be attachment + per-timestamp filename (got {disp!r})"
# API contract: the raw bytes must still be the original HTML — programmatic
# consumers depend on getting the stored snapshot back.
assert b'<script>' in res.data, \
"Response body must still contain the raw stored bytes (the API contract)"
# Cleanup
client.delete(url_for("watch", uuid=watch_uuid), headers={'x-api-key': api_key})
delete_all_watches(client)
def test_api_notification_edge_cases(client, live_server, measure_memory_usage, datastore_path):
"""
Test notification configuration edge cases.
@@ -634,6 +634,12 @@ def _test_color_notifications(client, notification_body_token, datastore_path):
def test_html_color_notifications(client, live_server, measure_memory_usage, datastore_path):
_test_color_notifications(client, '{{diff}}',datastore_path=datastore_path)
_test_color_notifications(client, '{{diff_full}}',datastore_path=datastore_path)
# Regression: the html-output escape pass in handler.py used to convert
# FormattableDiff into a plain str, stripping its __call__ and breaking any
# {{ diff(...) }} / {{ diff_added(...) }} token on htmlcolor/html notifications
# with 'str' object is not callable (see commit 08d30c6 + #3923).
# word_diff=false reproduces the exact form the user-reported failure used.
_test_color_notifications(client, '{{diff(word_diff=false)}}', datastore_path=datastore_path)
def _test_custom_html_in_notification_body_not_escaped(client, datastore_path, content_type=None):
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@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@
#, fuzzy
msgid ""
msgstr ""
"Project-Id-Version: changedetection.io 0.55.3\n"
"Project-Id-Version: changedetection.io 0.55.4\n"
"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: EMAIL@ADDRESS\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2026-05-19 10:29+0200\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2026-05-19 11:38+0200\n"
"PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n"
"Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n"
"Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL@li.org>\n"