fix: PUT-1398 (#3478)

src/backend/controllers/apps/AppController.test.ts

@@ -92,6 +92,11 @@ const uniqueName = (prefix: string) =>
 const uniqueIndexUrl = () =>
     `https://example-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}.test/`;
 
+// 1x1 transparent PNG. The `icon` write path validates the decoded payload,
+// not just the declared MIME, so icon fixtures must be real images.
+const MINIMAL_PNG_BASE64 =
+    'iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNkYAAAAAYAAjCB0C8AAAAASUVORK5CYII=';
+
 const createApp = async (
     actor: Actor,
     overrides: Record<string, unknown> = {},
@@ -718,7 +723,9 @@ describe('AppController GET /app-icon/:app_uid', () => {
 
     it('decodes a data URL icon and serves the declared MIME', async () => {
         const owner = await makeUser();
-        const png = Buffer.from('mock-png-bytes');
+        // Real PNG bytes: the write path sniffs the decoded payload and
+        // rejects anything that isn't the image type it claims to be.
+        const png = Buffer.from(MINIMAL_PNG_BASE64, 'base64');
         const dataUrl = `data:image/png;base64,${png.toString('base64')}`;
         const app = await createApp(owner.actor, { icon: dataUrl });
 
@@ -740,7 +747,7 @@ describe('AppController GET /app-icon/:app_uid', () => {
     // than the redirect path that serves the same resource.
     it('caches an inline data-URL icon as long as the redirect path', async () => {
         const owner = await makeUser();
-        const dataUrl = `data:image/png;base64,${Buffer.from('x').toString('base64')}`;
+        const dataUrl = `data:image/png;base64,${MINIMAL_PNG_BASE64}`;
         const app = await createApp(owner.actor, { icon: dataUrl });
 
         const { res, captured } = makeRes();

src/backend/drivers/apps/AppDriver.js

@@ -25,10 +25,10 @@ import {
     DEFAULT_TEMP_SUBSCRIPTION,
 } from '../../services/metering/consts.js';
 import {
-    ICON_DATA_URL_MIME_ALLOWLIST,
     isAppIconEndpointUrl,
     isRawBase64ImageString,
     normalizeRawBase64ImageString,
+    validateIconDataUrl,
 } from '../../util/appIcon.js';
 import {
     buildHostedBackingDenial,
@@ -582,8 +582,10 @@ export class AppDriver extends PuterDriver {
             // Accepted shapes (mirrors v1's `image-base64` proptype so
             // puter-js callers keep working):
             //   1. Empty string — unset
-            //   2. Raw base64 (no prefix) — normalized to a PNG data URL
-            //   3. `data:image/<mime>;…` with an allow-listed MIME
+            //   2. Raw base64 (no prefix) of a real image — normalized to a
+            //      data URL carrying the sniffed MIME
+            //   3. `data:image/<mime>;base64,<image>` with an allow-listed
+            //      MIME that matches the decoded payload
             //   4. `/app-icon/<uid>` endpoint URL (relative, or absolute
             //      on a host we control)
             // Anything else (including arbitrary http(s) URLs) is rejected:
@@ -594,24 +596,20 @@ export class AppDriver extends PuterDriver {
                 // Raw base64 → wrap as data URL (v1 parity)
                 if (isRawBase64ImageString(iconStr)) {
                     iconStr = normalizeRawBase64ImageString(iconStr);
-                } else if (iconStr.startsWith('data:')) {
-                    const semi = iconStr.indexOf(';');
-                    const comma = iconStr.indexOf(',');
-                    const mimeEnd =
-                        semi !== -1 && (comma === -1 || semi < comma)
-                            ? semi
-                            : comma;
-                    const mime =
-                        mimeEnd !== -1
-                            ? iconStr.slice(5, mimeEnd).toLowerCase()
-                            : '';
-                    if (!ICON_DATA_URL_MIME_ALLOWLIST.includes(mime)) {
-                        throw new HttpError(
-                            400,
-                            '`icon` data URL must use an image MIME type',
-                            { legacyCode: 'bad_request' },
-                        );
+                }
+                if (iconStr.startsWith('data:')) {
+                    // Validates the whole URL, payload included — a MIME
+                    // prefix check alone let arbitrary text (quotes, tags)
+                    // through, which a Dev Center template then interpolated
+                    // into markup.
+                    const verdict = validateIconDataUrl(iconStr);
+                    if (!verdict.ok) {
+                        throw new HttpError(400, `\`icon\` ${verdict.reason}`, {
+                            legacyCode: 'bad_request',
+                        });
                     }
+                    // Store the canonical form, not the caller's spelling.
+                    iconStr = verdict.normalized;
                 } else if (!isAppIconEndpointUrl(iconStr, this.config)) {
                     throw new HttpError(
                         400,

src/backend/drivers/apps/AppDriver.test.ts

@@ -607,6 +607,148 @@ describe('AppDriver.create additional branches', () => {
         expect(created.icon).toBe(png);
     });
 
+    // The write path once validated only the MIME prefix, so an
+    // allow-listed prefix plus arbitrary text was stored verbatim and later
+    // interpolated into a Dev Center template — stored XSS in a godmode app
+    // that carries the user's session token. Reachable with an app-under-user
+    // token, the lowest-privilege credential we issue.
+    describe('icon data URL payload validation', () => {
+        const ATTACK_PAYLOAD =
+            '" a5x="1"><img src=x onerror=window.__A5APP=1>';
+
+        const createWithIcon = async (icon: string, label: string) => {
+            const { actor } = await makeUser();
+            return withActor(actor, () =>
+                driver.create({
+                    object: {
+                        name: uniqueName(label),
+                        title: 't',
+                        index_url: uniqueIndexUrl(),
+                        icon,
+                    },
+                }),
+            );
+        };
+
+        it('rejects the reported breakout payload', async () => {
+            await expect(
+                createWithIcon(ATTACK_PAYLOAD, 'xss-icon'),
+            ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
+        });
+
+        it('rejects the breakout payload on update, not just create', async () => {
+            const { actor } = await makeUser();
+            const created = await withActor(actor, () =>
+                driver.create({
+                    object: {
+                        name: uniqueName('xss-upd'),
+                        title: 't',
+                        index_url: uniqueIndexUrl(),
+                    },
+                }),
+            );
+            await expect(
+                withActor(actor, () =>
+                    driver.update({
+                        uid: created.uid,
+                        object: { icon: ATTACK_PAYLOAD },
+                    }),
+                ),
+            ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
+        });
+
+        it('rejects an allow-listed MIME whose payload is not an image', async () => {
+            // Valid base64, decodes cleanly — just isn't a PNG.
+            const notAnImage = `data:image/png;base64,${Buffer.from(
+                'not an image at all',
+            ).toString('base64')}`;
+            await expect(
+                createWithIcon(notAnImage, 'notimg-icon'),
+            ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
+        });
+
+        it('rejects a payload whose bytes contradict the declared MIME', async () => {
+            const pngBytes =
+                'iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNkYAAAAAYAAjCB0C8AAAAASUVORK5CYII=';
+            await expect(
+                createWithIcon(
+                    `data:image/gif;base64,${pngBytes}`,
+                    'mismatch-icon',
+                ),
+            ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
+        });
+
+        it('rejects a percent-encoded (non-base64) data URL', async () => {
+            // The only shape that can carry literal `<` and `"`.
+            await expect(
+                createWithIcon(
+                    'data:image/svg+xml,%3Csvg%20xmlns%3D%22http%3A//www.w3.org/2000/svg%22%3E%3C/svg%3E',
+                    'pct-icon',
+                ),
+            ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
+        });
+
+        it('rejects base64 with smuggled non-base64 characters', async () => {
+            // `Buffer.from(…,'base64')` silently drops these; the
+            // round-trip check is what catches them.
+            await expect(
+                createWithIcon(
+                    '<script>alert(1)</script>',
+                    'smuggle-icon',
+                ),
+            ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
+        });
+
+        it('accepts a base64 SVG icon and stores it canonically', async () => {
+            const svg = Buffer.from(
+                '<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="1" height="1"></svg>',
+            ).toString('base64');
+            const created = await createWithIcon(
+                `data:image/svg+xml;base64,${svg}`,
+                'svg-icon',
+            );
+            expect(created.icon).toBe(`data:image/svg+xml;base64,${svg}`);
+        });
+
+        it('accepts image/jpg as an alias of image/jpeg', async () => {
+            // Minimal JPEG SOI + APP0 header — enough to sniff.
+            const jpeg = Buffer.concat([
+                Buffer.from([0xff, 0xd8, 0xff, 0xe0]),
+                Buffer.from('0000JFIF'),
+            ]).toString('base64');
+            const created = await createWithIcon(
+                `data:image/jpg;base64,${jpeg}`,
+                'jpg-icon',
+            );
+            expect(String(created.icon).startsWith('data:image/jpg;base64,')).toBe(
+                true,
+            );
+        });
+
+        it('strips line wrapping from an otherwise valid payload', async () => {
+            const png =
+                'iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNkYAAAAAYAAjCB0C8AAAAASUVORK5CYII=';
+            const wrapped = `${png.slice(0, 40)}\n${png.slice(40)}`;
+            const created = await createWithIcon(
+                `data:image/png;base64,${wrapped}`,
+                'wrapped-icon',
+            );
+            expect(created.icon).toBe(`data:image/png;base64,${png}`);
+        });
+
+        it('rejects raw base64 that does not decode to an image', async () => {
+            // v1 wrapped any base64 as image/png regardless of content.
+            await expect(
+                createWithIcon(
+                    Buffer.from('definitely not an image payload').toString(
+                        'base64',
+                    ),
+                    'rawtext-icon',
+                ),
+            ).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 400 });
+        });
+    });
+
     it('normalizes a raw-base64 icon into a data: URL', async () => {
         const { actor } = await makeUser();
         // Raw base64 of a 1x1 PNG (no data: prefix)

src/backend/util/appIcon.ts

@@ -3,18 +3,19 @@
  *
  * This file is part of Puter.
  *
- * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published
- * by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
- * (at your option) any later version.
+ * Puter is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the
+ * terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by the Free
+ * Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any
+ * later version.
  *
- * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
- * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
- * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
+ * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS
+ * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU Affero General Public License for more
+ * details.
  *
  * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
- * along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ * along with this program. If not, see
+ * [https://www.gnu.org/licenses/](https://www.gnu.org/licenses/).
  */
 
 // Always routes through the backend `/app-icon/<uid>/<size>` endpoint rather
@@ -56,6 +57,179 @@ interface TrustedIconHostConfig {
 }
 
 const RAW_BASE64_REGEX = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/]+={0,2}$/;
+const BASE64_CHARS_REGEX = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/]*={0,2}$/;
+// `data:<type>/<subtype>[;param[=value]]…,<payload>`. The parameter list is
+// matched as a group of its own so it can be checked exhaustively — the
+// previous prefix-scan only looked at the bytes before the first `;` or `,`
+// and never inspected the payload at all.
+const DATA_URL_REGEX =
+    /^data:([a-z0-9][a-z0-9!#$&^_.+-]*\/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9!#$&^_.+-]*)((?:;[a-z0-9!#$&^_.+-]+(?:=[^;,]*)?)*),([\s\S]*)$/i;
+// Cap on how far into a payload we look for the `<svg` root element. SVG is
+// the one allow-listed type without a fixed-offset magic number; a file that
+// buries its root past this much leading comment/PI text is not something we
+// need to accept.
+const SVG_SNIFF_WINDOW = 8 * 1024;
+
+/**
+ * Decode strict base64 — no whitespace, correct padding, and byte-for-byte
+ * round-trip. `Buffer.from(s, 'base64')` silently skips characters it doesn't
+ * recognise, so `iVBORw0KGgo=" onerror=alert(1)` decodes without complaint; the
+ * round-trip is what rejects it.
+ */
+function decodeStrictBase64(value: string): Buffer | null {
+    if (!BASE64_CHARS_REGEX.test(value)) return null;
+    if (value.length === 0 || value.length % 4 !== 0) return null;
+    try {
+        const decoded = Buffer.from(value, 'base64');
+        if (decoded.length === 0) return null;
+        const stripped = value.replace(/=+$/, '');
+        const reencoded = decoded.toString('base64').replace(/=+$/, '');
+        return stripped === reencoded ? decoded : null;
+    } catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+
+/** `image/jpg` is a common misspelling of `image/jpeg`; treat them as one. */
+function canonicalImageMime(mime: string): string {
+    return mime === 'image/jpg' ? 'image/jpeg' : mime;
+}
+
+function looksLikeSvg(bytes: Buffer): boolean {
+    let head = bytes.subarray(0, SVG_SNIFF_WINDOW).toString('utf8');
+    if (head.charCodeAt(0) === 0xfeff) head = head.slice(1);
+    // Must open as markup (rules out arbitrary text that merely mentions
+    // `<svg` somewhere), and must actually contain an `<svg` root.
+    if (!head.trimStart().startsWith('<')) return false;
+    return /<svg[\s/>]/i.test(head);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Identify image bytes by content, returning a canonical allow-listed MIME type
+ * or null. Signature-based: the declared MIME on a data URL is caller input and
+ * cannot be trusted to describe the payload.
+ */
+export function sniffImageMime(bytes: Buffer): string | null {
+    if (
+        bytes.length >= 8 &&
+        bytes[0] === 0x89 &&
+        bytes[1] === 0x50 &&
+        bytes[2] === 0x4e &&
+        bytes[3] === 0x47 &&
+        bytes[4] === 0x0d &&
+        bytes[5] === 0x0a &&
+        bytes[6] === 0x1a &&
+        bytes[7] === 0x0a
+    ) {
+        return 'image/png';
+    }
+    if (
+        bytes.length >= 3 &&
+        bytes[0] === 0xff &&
+        bytes[1] === 0xd8 &&
+        bytes[2] === 0xff
+    ) {
+        return 'image/jpeg';
+    }
+    if (bytes.length >= 6) {
+        const head = bytes.subarray(0, 6).toString('latin1');
+        if (head === 'GIF87a' || head === 'GIF89a') return 'image/gif';
+    }
+    if (
+        bytes.length >= 12 &&
+        bytes.subarray(0, 4).toString('latin1') === 'RIFF' &&
+        bytes.subarray(8, 12).toString('latin1') === 'WEBP'
+    ) {
+        return 'image/webp';
+    }
+    if (looksLikeSvg(bytes)) return 'image/svg+xml';
+    return null;
+}
+
+export interface IconDataUrlVerdict {
+    ok: boolean;
+    /** Human-readable failure clause, suffixed onto "`icon` …". */
+    reason?: string;
+    /** Canonical MIME sniffed from the payload (on success). */
+    mime?: string;
+    /** Canonical, whitespace-stripped data URL to store (on success). */
+    normalized?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate an `icon` data URL end to end — MIME, encoding, _and_ payload.
+ *
+ * The write path used to check only the MIME prefix, so everything after the
+ * comma was stored verbatim. `data:image/png;base64,` is a valid prefix, which
+ * meant up to 5 MB of arbitrary text — including `"` and `<` — could be parked
+ * in the icon column and later interpolated into a Dev Center template — stored
+ * XSS in a first-party app that holds the user's session token.
+ *
+ * Requirements, in order:
+ *
+ * - Well-formed `data:` URL with an allow-listed image MIME type
+ * - `;base64` and nothing else for the parameter list. Every Puter client
+ *   produces base64 (`FileReader.readAsDataURL` always does); requiring it is
+ *   what makes the payload checkable at all. Percent-encoded payloads — the
+ *   only shape that can carry raw `<`/`"` — are rejected; callers with literal
+ *   SVG markup must base64 it.
+ * - Strictly valid base64 (round-tripped, so smuggled non-base64 bytes fail)
+ * - Decoded bytes that sniff as an image whose type matches the declaration
+ */
+export function validateIconDataUrl(value: unknown): IconDataUrlVerdict {
+    if (typeof value !== 'string') {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'must be a string' };
+    }
+    const match = DATA_URL_REGEX.exec(value.trim());
+    if (!match) {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'is not a well-formed data: URL' };
+    }
+    const declaredMime = match[1].toLowerCase();
+    const params = match[2].toLowerCase();
+    const payload = match[3];
+
+    if (
+        !(ICON_DATA_URL_MIME_ALLOWLIST as readonly string[]).includes(
+            declaredMime,
+        )
+    ) {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'data URL must use an image MIME type' };
+    }
+    if (params !== ';base64') {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            reason: 'data URL must be base64-encoded (`;base64`) with no other parameters',
+        };
+    }
+
+    // Line-wrapped base64 is tolerated, but only whitespace may be stripped —
+    // any other character outside the base64 alphabet fails below.
+    const compact = payload.replace(/[\s]+/g, '');
+    const bytes = decodeStrictBase64(compact);
+    if (!bytes) {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'data URL payload is not valid base64' };
+    }
+
+    const sniffed = sniffImageMime(bytes);
+    if (!sniffed) {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            reason: 'data URL payload is not a recognized image',
+        };
+    }
+    if (sniffed !== canonicalImageMime(declaredMime)) {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            reason: `data URL declares ${declaredMime} but the payload is ${sniffed}`,
+        };
+    }
+
+    return {
+        ok: true,
+        mime: sniffed,
+        normalized: `data:${declaredMime};base64,${compact}`,
+    };
+}
 const APP_ICON_ENDPOINT_PATH_REGEX = /^\/app-icon\/[^/?#]+(?:\/\d+)?\/?$/;
 // Direct subdomain file shape written by AppIconService:
 //   /app-<uid>.png            (original)
@@ -64,51 +238,62 @@ const APP_ICON_ENDPOINT_PATH_REGEX = /^\/app-icon\/[^/?#]+(?:\/\d+)?\/?$/;
 const APP_ICON_SUBDOMAIN_PATH_REGEX = /^\/app-[A-Za-z0-9_-]+(?:-\d+)?\.png$/;
 
 /**
- * v1-compatible raw-base64 detector. Legacy puter-js callers pass the
- * base64 payload without a `data:` prefix; v1 accepted it and normalized
- * to `data:image/png;base64,<raw>` before storage. We mirror that here
- * so clients that worked on v1 keep working.
- *
- * Rejects anything shorter than 16 chars, not aligned to base64 length,
- * or that doesn't round-trip through Buffer — catches random strings
- * that happen to match the charset.
+ * Decode a bare base64 string and sniff it, or null if it isn't base64 at all
+ * or doesn't decode to a recognized image.
  */
-export function isRawBase64ImageString(value: unknown): value is string {
-    if (typeof value !== 'string') return false;
+function sniffRawBase64Image(
+    value: unknown,
+): { bytes: Buffer; mime: string; compact: string } | null {
+    if (typeof value !== 'string') return null;
     const trimmed = value.trim();
-    if (trimmed.length < 16) return false;
-    if (!RAW_BASE64_REGEX.test(trimmed)) return false;
-    if (trimmed.length % 4 !== 0) return false;
-    try {
-        const decoded = Buffer.from(trimmed, 'base64');
-        if (decoded.length === 0) return false;
-        const stripped = trimmed.replace(/=+$/, '');
-        const reencoded = decoded.toString('base64').replace(/=+$/, '');
-        return stripped === reencoded;
-    } catch {
-        return false;
-    }
+    if (trimmed.length < 16) return null;
+    if (!RAW_BASE64_REGEX.test(trimmed)) return null;
+    const bytes = decodeStrictBase64(trimmed);
+    if (!bytes) return null;
+    const mime = sniffImageMime(bytes);
+    if (!mime) return null;
+    return { bytes, mime, compact: trimmed };
 }
 
-/** Wrap raw base64 in a `data:image/png;base64,…` URL; pass other values through. */
+/**
+ * V1-compatible raw-base64 detector. Legacy puter-js callers pass the base64
+ * payload without a `data:` prefix; v1 accepted it and normalized to
+ * `data:image/png;base64,<raw>` before storage. We mirror that here so clients
+ * that worked on v1 keep working.
+ *
+ * Rejects anything shorter than 16 chars, not aligned to base64 length, or that
+ * doesn't round-trip through Buffer — catches random strings that happen to
+ * match the charset. Also rejects base64 that decodes to something other than a
+ * recognized image: v1 wrapped any base64 as `image/png` regardless of content,
+ * which let non-image bytes into the icon column under an image MIME type.
+ */
+export function isRawBase64ImageString(value: unknown): value is string {
+    return sniffRawBase64Image(value) !== null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Wrap raw base64 in a `data:<sniffed-mime>;base64,…` URL; pass other values
+ * through unchanged (the caller then rejects them — a bare string that isn't a
+ * valid image is not one of the accepted `icon` shapes).
+ */
 export function normalizeRawBase64ImageString(value: string): string {
-    const trimmed = value.trim();
-    if (!isRawBase64ImageString(trimmed)) return value;
-    return `data:image/png;base64,${trimmed}`;
+    const sniffed = sniffRawBase64Image(value);
+    if (!sniffed) return value;
+    return `data:${sniffed.mime};base64,${sniffed.compact}`;
 }
 
 /**
  * Whether `value` is a reference we own — accepts two shapes:
- *   - `/app-icon/<uid>(/<size>)?`       : the AppController endpoint
- *   - `/app-<uid>(-<size>)?.png`        : the file written by
- *                                         AppIconService onto the
- *                                         `puter-app-icons` subdomain
  *
- * Relative paths must use the endpoint shape (the subdomain-file shape
- * is only meaningful when paired with a trusted host). Absolute URLs
- * accept either shape but only on a trusted host — without the host
- * check an authenticated user could set `icon` to an attacker URL and
- * turn `/app-icon/:uid` into a Puter-branded open redirector.
+ * - `/app-icon/<uid>(/<size>)?` : the AppController endpoint
+ * - `/app-<uid>(-<size>)?.png` : the file written by AppIconService onto the
+ *   `puter-app-icons` subdomain
+ *
+ * Relative paths must use the endpoint shape (the subdomain-file shape is only
+ * meaningful when paired with a trusted host). Absolute URLs accept either
+ * shape but only on a trusted host — without the host check an authenticated
+ * user could set `icon` to an attacker URL and turn `/app-icon/:uid` into a
+ * Puter-branded open redirector.
  */
 export function isAppIconEndpointUrl(
     value: string,
@@ -137,17 +322,18 @@ export function isAppIconEndpointUrl(
 /**
  * Whether `url` points at a host we control for app-icon hosting.
  *
- * Used to gate both the legacy redirect fallback in `/app-icon/:uid` and
- * the write-path validator in AppDriver — without this check an
- * authenticated user can set `icon` to an arbitrary attacker URL and
- * turn the unauthenticated `/app-icon/:uid` route into a Puter-branded
- * open redirector (cached publicly for 15 minutes).
+ * Used to gate both the legacy redirect fallback in `/app-icon/:uid` and the
+ * write-path validator in AppDriver — without this check an authenticated user
+ * can set `icon` to an arbitrary attacker URL and turn the unauthenticated
+ * `/app-icon/:uid` route into a Puter-branded open redirector (cached publicly
+ * for 15 minutes).
  *
  * Accepts:
- *   - `puter-app-icons.<static_hosting_domain>` (and …_alt)
- *   - The configured `api_base_url` host (AppIconService rewrites icon
- *     columns to `${api_base_url}/app-icon/<uid>`, so it must be trusted
- *     or round-tripped writes would fail validation).
+ *
+ * - `puter-app-icons.<static_hosting_domain>` (and …_alt)
+ * - The configured `api_base_url` host (AppIconService rewrites icon columns to
+ *   `${api_base_url}/app-icon/<uid>`, so it must be trusted or round-tripped
+ *   writes would fail validation).
  */
 export function isTrustedIconHost(
     url: string,

src/dev-center/js/apps.js

@@ -1378,7 +1378,7 @@ $(document).on('click', '.delete-app-settings', async function (e) {
     const app_data = await puter.apps.get(app_name, { icon_size: 16 });
 
     if ( app_data.metadata?.locked ) {
-        puter.ui.alert(`<strong>${app_data.title}</strong> is locked and cannot be deleted.`, [
+        puter.ui.alert(`<strong>${html_encode(app_data.title)}</strong> is locked and cannot be deleted.`, [
             {
                 label: 'Ok',
             },
@@ -1568,7 +1568,7 @@ function generate_app_card (app) {
       background-position: center;
       background-repeat: no-repeat;
       background-size: 92%;
-      background-image: url(${app.icon === null ? './img/app.svg' : app.icon});
+      background-image: url(${html_encode(app.icon === null ? './img/app.svg' : app.icon)});
       width: 60px;
       height: 60px;
       margin-right: 10px;
@@ -2457,7 +2457,7 @@ $(document).on('click', '.delete-apps-btn', async function (e) {
 
             if ( app_data.metadata?.locked ) {
                 if ( apps.length === 1 ) {
-                    puter.ui.alert(`<strong>${app_data.title}</strong> is locked and cannot be deleted.`, [
+                    puter.ui.alert(`<strong>${html_encode(app_data.title)}</strong> is locked and cannot be deleted.`, [
                         {
                             label: 'Ok',
                         },
@@ -2468,7 +2468,7 @@ $(document).on('click', '.delete-apps-btn', async function (e) {
                     break;
                 }
 
-                let resp = await puter.ui.alert(`<strong>${app_data.title}</strong> is locked and cannot be deleted.`, [
+                let resp = await puter.ui.alert(`<strong>${html_encode(app_data.title)}</strong> is locked and cannot be deleted.`, [
                     {
                         label: 'Skip and Continue',
                         value: 'Continue',
@@ -3142,7 +3142,7 @@ function app_context_menu (app_name, app_title, app_uid) {
                                         overwrite: false,
                                         appUID: app_uid,
                                     }).then(async (uploaded) => {
-                        puter.ui.alert(`<strong>${app_title}</strong> shortcut has been added to your desktop.`, [
+                        puter.ui.alert(`<strong>${html_encode(app_title)}</strong> shortcut has been added to your desktop.`, [
                             {
                                 label: 'Ok',
                                 type: 'primary',
@@ -3182,7 +3182,7 @@ async function attempt_delete_app (app_name, app_title, app_uid) {
     const app_data = await puter.apps.get(app_name, { icon_size: 16 });
 
     if ( app_data.metadata?.locked ) {
-        puter.ui.alert(`<strong>${app_data.title}</strong> is locked and cannot be deleted.`, [
+        puter.ui.alert(`<strong>${html_encode(app_data.title)}</strong> is locked and cannot be deleted.`, [
             {
                 label: 'Ok',
             },