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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Daniel Salazar
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5918e3f4e2 | fix: kv max number value (#3629) | ||
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Nariman Jelveh
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2c9e818e5f |
Docs/remove discord reddit links (#3628)
* docs: remove Discord and Reddit links Drops both links from the docs README (header row and Support list) and from the footer generated on every built docs page. * docs: remove Mastodon link |
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Nariman Jelveh
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8826a9fc51 |
Remove Discord and Reddit links from README (#3627)
Removed links to Discord and Reddit from the README. |
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Daniel Salazar
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8307e8c9f0 | chore: bump up deps (#3626) | ||
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Daniel Salazar
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732786a029 | fix: clean up email validation (#3622) | ||
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f0cd251626 |
🛠️ PUT-1521: Cleanup puter js permissions api + backend routes (#3607)
* refactor(puter-js): collapse puter.perms request* to resource + access
Fifteen request methods differed only by a folder name or an access level, so
every new resource meant another method. Replace them with requestFolder,
requestApps, requestSubdomains and requestAppRootDir, each taking the access
level as an argument.
The old names stay as @deprecated aliases: puter.js ships unpinned from
js.puter.com/v2, so removing them would break live apps. They remain in the
generated declarations because stripInternal has no effect on declarations
emitted from JavaScript, and hand-omitting them would break TypeScript callers
the runtime still serves.
Also drops the user-to-user and user-to-group grant wrappers (groups.js and the
grantUser/grantGroup half of grants.js) plus the req_ shim, none of which were
documented or called. The app, origin and dev-app grants stay: the dashboard
uses puter.perms.revokeApp() to clear grants on app uninstall.
* docs(perms): document the collapsed puter.perms surface
Replace the twelve one-method-per-task pages with requestFolder, requestApps
and requestSubdomains, and rewrite the Perms overview around the seven public
methods. The deprecated aliases keep working but are no longer documented.
Boy Scout: drops the long-dead commented-out grantUser/revokeOrigin sidebar
block for pages that were never published.
* refactor(perms): drop unused user-to-user and user-to-group permission routes
Filesystem access is shared through /share, which records the grant so the
owner can see and revoke it. The older direct-grant paths were left behind with
no caller anywhere - not the GUI, not a doc, not an app: grant-user-user
(already a 501 stub), revoke-user-user, grant/revoke-user-group, and the five
/group/* CRUD routes.
Removing them orphans PermissionService.grant/revokeUserGroupPermission and its
group-members cache bump, the three PermissionStore group writers, and six
GroupStore methods, so those go too.
What stays, and why:
- grant/revokeUserUserPermission - ACLService and ShareService power fs.share
through them.
- The group permission read path (#scanUserGroup, readUserGroupPerms) - a
migration seeds the admin group unrestricted driver access, so it is
load-bearing.
- GroupStore getByUid/addUsers/removeUsers - signup, save_account, OIDC and the
self-hosted default user assign group membership.
No schema change: user_to_user_permissions, user_to_group_permissions and their
audit tables are untouched. Group rows now come only from migrations, so tests
that need one seed it with SQL the way a migration does.
* refactor(perms): reduce GroupStore to membership writes
With the /group/* routes gone, `getByUid` had no production caller left — the
routes were the only thing that read a group back. Removing it takes the row
decoder and the GroupRow type with it, since they exist only to shape its
result.
What remains is `addUsers`/`removeUsers`: signup, save_account, OIDC and the
self-hosted admin bootstrap all assign group membership. Permissions attached to
a group are read through PermissionStore, which joins the junction table itself
and never needed the store.
Tests that wanted a group id now select it, which is all `getByUid` was doing
for them.
* chore(perms): drop the three by-hand groups no code reads
freeai, experimental and dangerous exist in prod but in no migration — they
were added by hand when hardcoded permissions were keyed by group name. That
map is now a flat per-user floor (`default_user_permissions`), so a group
nothing looks up grants nothing.
Guarded rather than unconditional, because both tables the delete can reach
cascade: dropping a group that still carries permissions or members would
silently revoke them from every member. Only a group with neither goes. One that
survives has dependents and needs a deliberate decision — query
user_to_group_permissions by group_id to see what it holds.
system, admin, user and temp are untouched: config names two of them and code
names the others.
Matches on `extra.name`, not `metadata.name` — `metadata` carries the display
title and colour, and `critical: true` is set on all of these including freeai,
so it does not discriminate.
* feat(puter-js): collapse puter.perms onto request(resource, details) + check()
One method per task meant a new method, doc page and sidebar entry for every
resource. `request` now takes the resource and a payload whose accepted fields
depend on it, and `check` answers the same question without prompting.
request('folder', { name: 'Documents', access: 'write' }) -> path
request('apps', { access: 'read' }) -> boolean
request('email') -> address
check('folder', { name: 'Documents', access: 'write' }) -> boolean
Returns stay per-resource: a folder gives its path, email the address, the rest
a boolean, and anything denied is falsy so one `if` covers both.
An array asks for several at once. Everything already held is settled first, so
the prompt covers only what is missing and does not appear when the whole set is
held - the user answers once for the lot. `check` answers per entry, in order,
so a caller can tell which parts are missing rather than only that some are.
Each resource declares four things in one registry entry: how to ask for it
alone, whether it is held, the strings a batch pools into a prompt, and the
value once held. The strings themselves are defined once in
lib/permissionStrings.js, so a request and its check cannot name them
differently. `check` is built on /auth/check-permissions, already live and
already used by UI.js, and it throws rather than answering false when the check
cannot run: a caller that cannot tell "denied" from "never ran" would prompt
someone who had already granted it.
Backward compatibility: all 22 older methods stay callable and typed, marked
@deprecated with the call that replaces them. A lone string still routes to the
raw-permission path - no resource name contains a `:` and every permission
string does, so the two forms cannot collide. The grant/revoke app methods are
untouched; the consent dialog and the dashboard's uninstall path use them.
Also drops three copies of the access-level assertion onto one shared
validator, and gives `appRootDir` a non-prompting server probe, since
`app-root-dir:` only resolves while a grant is being written and a permission
check on it always answers false.
* docs(perms): document request() and check() as the perms surface
Five per-method pages became one `request()` page carrying the resource table,
the batch form and the raw-string escape hatch, plus a `check()` page. The
overview is rewritten around the two methods.
requestAppData's page is re-homed as /Perms/appData rather than deleted - its
scope table, private-entry guidance and lifetime notes are not signature
documentation and have nowhere else to live. Inbound links from KV/set.md and
Objects/app.md follow it.
Playground examples move to the new call form. They are not wired into
examples.js, but an example demonstrating a deprecated method is worse than one
nobody loads.
* fix(perms): keep /auth/revoke-user-user as a deprecated route
Dropping this route with the rest of the unused user-to-user plumbing went too
far. The grant side is retired and stays retired - puter.fs.share() is the only
way in - but access those grants left behind has to remain withdrawable, and a
caller reaching the endpoint over HTTP directly had no replacement. Revoking can
only ever narrow what someone can reach, so keeping it carries no risk.
revokeUserUserPermission never left the permission service; it is load-bearing
for puter.fs.share(). This only re-wires the handler to it, with the gates it
always had.
Nothing in this repo calls the route, which makes it exactly what a later
cleanup reads as dead, so a test pins the registration and its gate alongside
the restored 400 and grant/revoke round-trip cases.
The 501 stub at grant-user-user and the never-called /group/* routes stay
deleted, as does puter.perms.revokeUser - puter.fs.unshare() replaces it and
falls back to live grants when no share row exists.
* fix(perms): let a write grant satisfy a read check on apps and subdomains
`apps-of-user:<uuid>:write` covers managing the user's apps, which includes
reading them, but nothing said so to the permission system. Prefix implication
only widens the other way — an `apps-of-user:<uuid>` grant covers both modes —
so a scan for `:read` missed a `:write` grant, and `puter.perms.check('apps')`
reported an app holding write as holding nothing. A batched request would then
prompt again for access already granted.
Adds the read-from-write exploder for both namespaces, mirroring
`fs-access-levels`. The widening runs one way only, and does not cross into
another user's namespace; both are covered by tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(perms): answer the app-root-dir check without provisioning it
`/auth/request-app-root-dir` conflates two questions: may the caller claim its
root directory, and where is it. The second provisions `AppData/<uid>` on first
ask, so a caller that only wanted the first — `puter.perms.check('appRootDir')`
— created a directory by asking about it.
Adds `check: true`, which runs the same actor guard and stops at the answer.
A caller that may not claim it still gets the 403, so the flag can't widen
anything. Existing callers are unaffected: without it the route behaves exactly
as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(perms): put request() and check() on one path
`request` dispatched to the old per-task methods while `check` asked the
permission tables, so the two answered different questions about the same
access. Concretely, before this: `request('folder', { access: 'write' })`,
`'apps'`, `'subdomains'`, `'appData'` and `'permission'` prompted every time,
whether or not the access was held — which the docs said they wouldn't;
`check('folder')` reported false for a folder the app could read through an ACL
grant that no `fs:` string names, so a batch prompted for it needlessly; a
batch entry for `'appRootDir'` skipped the post-grant retry the single call
does, resolving `undefined` after a grant that had in fact succeeded; and an
N-entry batch made N permission reads plus 2N `whoami` calls.
Both now run the same pipeline — resolve the permission strings, read what is
held once, prompt for the remainder, resolve each entry — with per-resource
hooks for the parts only that resource can answer. So a batch costs one
permission read and one `whoami`, a check reports exactly what a request would
skip the prompt for, and `'folder'` uses the same stat-or-permission reading in
both.
Also:
- A resource is looked up as an own property, so `request('constructor')` is
the permission string it always was rather than a TypeError.
- A permission read that fails no longer decides anything: `request` falls
through to the prompt it would have raised anyway, `check` throws. Before,
`check('appRootDir')` folded a failed check into "not granted", which is what
the documentation says must not happen.
- Drops `requestFolder`, `requestApps`, `requestSubdomains` and
`requestAppRootDir`. They were added in this branch and immediately deprecated
— never shipped, and `request()` no longer needs to route through them. The 22
methods that did ship keep their exact behaviour, prompting without consulting
what is held, which the suite now asserts alongside the new behaviour.
- Documents `'appRootDir'`, which was a supported resource in every overload and
in `PermsResource` but named in none of the docs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(perms): act on review of the three preceding commits
- `src/puter-js/test/perms.test.js` still called `requestApps`,
`requestFolder`, `requestSubdomains` and `requestAppRootDir`, which the
previous commit removed. Four cases in the interactive browser harness threw.
Pointed at `request(...)` instead.
- `request('appRootDir', …)` made two round trips where the shipped method
makes one: a read-only probe, then the call that names the directory. A
request is going to claim it either way, so the claim is now the check, and
the entry it returns carries through to the result. `check` keeps the
read-only mode, which is the reason that mode exists. Matters because the
route sits on the FS_SIGN bucket, shared with signed-URL minting.
- `requestPermission` is one of the shipped methods, and the previous commit's
message was wrong to say all 22 keep their exact behaviour: it forwards to
`request`, so it now settles a permission the caller already holds instead of
prompting for it. The value can differ, not just the prompt count — a user who
would have clicked Deny on a re-prompt used to get `false`. It is the more
honest answer (the app does hold the access, and denying a re-prompt never
took it away), but it is a change, and the suite assertion had been switched
to an unheld permission, which hid it. Asserted both ways instead, in the unit
tests and the API suite.
- An entry that names no permission no longer rides a grant given for the other
entries in the same call. Unreachable today — every resource either names one
or reports itself held — but nothing pinned it.
- Reverted three type-union reformats in `LegacyFSController.ts` that a
formatter had folded into the app-root-dir commit. That file was not
prettier-clean to begin with; reformatting it is somebody else's change.
- Docs and types: `Perms.md`'s `appRootDir` row now matches `request.md`'s,
`check.md` says that a `true` is per entry and a batch still prompts if any
one entry is missing, and `types.js` no longer names `requestFolder` /
`requestAppData` in prose that ships in the generated declarations.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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ZHOU7821
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943adae622 | docs: use absolute link to router page in workers create docs (#3615) | ||
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Daniel Salazar
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65572dcf23 | fix: nicer sms card fallback (#3621) | ||
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ZHOU7821andZHOU7821
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b3923f86da |
docs: fix typo in workers description (#3614)
Co-authored-by: ZHOU7821 <318904296+ZHOU7821@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Nariman Jelveh
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729114bd09 |
Prioritize app-center in recommendations
Reordered the recommended app list so app-center appears earlier and dev-center is kept at the end. This keeps the default app suggestions aligned with the expected homepage/app-center placement without changing behavior beyond ordering. |
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Nariman Jelveh
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da1c85d3c5 |
Add Meetings to recommended app defaults
Include `meetings` in `RECOMMENDED_APP_NAMES` so it appears in the default recommended apps set alongside other core productivity tools. |
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Nariman Jelveh
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66410d7f1f |
Revert "Let a browser send the device fingerprint header it is offered"
This reverts commit
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Nariman Jelveh
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76bd05f228 |
Dashboard: let the trial be a detail line, not an alarm
The Usage card gives each of its three columns a meter and two lines. The plan column had a boxed, tinted, bordered paragraph instead — and at the ~230px a third of that card comes to, thirty words of it wrapped into a five-line ribbon standing twice as tall as the storage and resources meters beside it. The box is the shape we use for the dunning banner. A trial is a date you should know about, not a fault, and it was reading as the loudest thing on the card. So it takes the slot its neighbours use for "n% of 100 GB": a quiet hint- coloured line under the badge. All three columns now measure the same. The copy stopped repeating itself while it was there. The badge said "ends Sep 20" and the sentence beneath it said "ends on September 20, 2026" — two elements, one fact, and neither of them answering the question someone actually has, which is how much room is left to decide. The badge now carries "31 days left" and the line under it carries the consequence: "First charge Sep 20 unless you cancel." Billing keeps the full sentence and the opt-out, and Manage is directly below. |
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Nariman Jelveh
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fef1337b2b |
Let a browser send the device fingerprint header it is offered
`fingerprint.ts` reads the device fingerprint from a request body or, for authenticated requests with no body to carry it, from `x-puter-device-fingerprint`. That header is documented there as "the header the GUI may send the device fingerprint on for non-signup requests", and the middleware has always honoured it. A browser could never actually send it. The CORS allowlist in `#installCors` does not include it, so the preflight comes back without it in `Access-Control-Allow-Headers`, the browser abandons the request, and `fetch` rejects before anything reaches the server. Nothing in tree sends the header today, which is why this went unnoticed: the first client to try it sees every call fail with a network error rather than a readable status. Adds the header to the allowlist, and a preflight test asserting the browser is allowed to ask for it. |
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404oops
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58794f4f76 |
feat: add MetaProvider for Muse Spark models and integrate with ChatCompletionDriver (#3616)
- Implemented MetaProvider to interface with Meta's Muse Spark models. - Integrated MetaProvider into ChatCompletionDriver, allowing for dynamic model selection. - Added unit and integration tests for MetaProvider to ensure functionality and reliability. - Updated documentation to include Meta as a supported vendor for AI models. |
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Nariman Jelveh
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9809e428b5 |
Update shared label in email template
Adjust the share-notification email copy to reference the current "Shared" files section instead of "Shared with me," in both HTML and plain-text variants. This keeps onboarding messaging aligned with the UI. |
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Nariman Jelveh
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eaddd1d44e |
redesign: share notification emails (#3612)
* redesign: share notification emails The share digests were an unstyled fragment: a 520px div with a couple of paragraphs, no preview line, no small-screen or dark-mode handling, and an html-only body that left every text-only client reading a machine down-conversion of the markup. Both digests (`file_shared_with_you` and `file_shared_invite`) now render through one layout: a 600px table column that goes full width under 600px, every color written inline so a client that drops `<style>` still gets the design, with the stylesheet carrying only what inline CSS can't express — the small-screen and dark-mode overrides. The shares are a tinted panel of hairline-separated rows rather than loose text, the call to action is a cell-padded button Outlook can draw, and the reason for receiving plus the unsubscribe sit below the card where they belong. No images at all, so nothing depends on an asset a client may refuse. Templates may now carry a `text` part, and both digests do: it goes out beside the HTML as multipart/alternative, which is what plain-text clients, screen readers and spam scoring prefer. Copy: a preview line that adds to the subject instead of repeating it, a heading before the list, and an honest unsubscribe label — the link silences notification mail account-wide, not just shares. The invite now says what to do with the address and that an existing account can claim the shares by confirming it. Also drops `share_by_username` and `share_by_email`, unreferenced since the digests replaced them. * fix: widen the template map to the interface before compiling `Object.entries` over the literal map yields a union with a distinct type per template, and only the share digests carry a `text` part — reading it off the union is an error the build tsconfig hides (`noCheck: true`) and `npm run typecheck` catches. |
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Reynaldi Chernando
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53b792c52c | connect to worker's kv with cli (#3613) | ||
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Daniel Salazar
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2dd7073034 | fix: vscode webdav (#3610) | ||
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Daniel Salazar
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a552ce0b87 |
fix: better metrics for cache hit rates (#3609)
* fix: better metrics for cache hit rates * chore: type + docs |
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Neal Shah
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c04827fd3f | add dynamic worker create event (#3608) | ||
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Daniel Salazar
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9debdffc5d | fix: email send frequency + ai ordering (#3604) | ||
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Nariman JelvehandJuan Castro
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57b4cbab66 |
feat(dashboard): rewrite Files-tab sharing as a from-scratch modal (#3598)
* feat(dashboard): rewrite Files-tab sharing as a from-scratch modal
The Files tab's Share… action opened UIWindowShare, a desktop UIWindow,
which doesn't fit the dashboard. Replace it with UIShareModal, built on
the same overlay pattern as UIItemPropertiesModal: a centered card on
desktop, a bottom sheet on mobile, styled with the dashboard's design
tokens (dark mode included).
Wiring follows the onShowProperties precedent: generate_file_context_menu
gains an optional onShare hook that TabFiles supplies; every other caller
falls back to the desktop share window unchanged.
Feature parity with UIWindowShare — grant by email/username with an
access level, list who has access (owner, direct, and inherited-from-
ancestor grants), change a grant's mode, revoke — plus:
- revoke confirmation inlined into the row instead of a stacked UIAlert
- real form semantics: Enter submits, button disabled until input,
spinner while in flight, API errors keep the typed name for correction
- dialog a11y: focus moves in on open and back on close, Tab is trapped,
Escape closes (first Escape cancels an open revoke confirmation),
status messages announce via aria-live
- backdrop close keyed on where the press started, so a text-selection
drag out of the input can't dismiss the dialog
- name-derived avatar colors and a loading state for the first fetch
Also fixes a double-encoding bug (shared by UIWindowShare) where mode
labels ran through html_encode twice, rendering "Can edit & share".
* fix(dashboard): keep keyboard focus inside the share modal across re-renders
Changing a grant's mode, revoking, or Escape-canceling the inline
confirmation re-renders the access list (or disables the focused
control), which dropped focus onto <body> - outside the dialog's Tab
trap and invisible to screen readers. Focus is now restored explicitly
after each of those actions: to the same holder's control when it
survives, else to the dialog itself (tabindex=-1), and the Tab trap
steps back into the cycle when focus rests on the dialog container.
A failed grant likewise returns focus to the recipient input.
* fix(dashboard): give share modal controls 44px touch targets
On touch devices the close (32x32) and revoke (30x30) buttons and the
26px-tall per-row mode select were below the 44px minimum. On coarse
pointers the icon buttons now hit-test at 44x44 through a centered
pseudo-element (visuals unchanged, and the row spacing absorbs the
overhang without overlapping neighbors), and the row select gets
taller padding. Fine-pointer rendering is untouched.
* fix(dashboard): clear the iOS home indicator in the share bottom sheet
The app opts into viewport-fit=cover, so on notched phones the
bottom-docked sheet extends to the physical screen edge and its last
row sat under the home indicator. The sheet body's bottom padding now
adds env(safe-area-inset-bottom), matching how the codebase pads other
bottom-docked surfaces.
* fix(share): say 'Updated access' when changing a grant's mode
Changing someone's access level reported 'Shared with X', the same
message as a fresh grant, which reads as if a new share happened.
Both share dialogs now confirm mode changes with a dedicated
'Updated access for X' message. The UIWindowShare call also drops the
html_encode() around the recipient - i18n() already encodes
interpolations, so the wrapper double-encoded.
* fix(dashboard): align the share dialog's accessible name with the properties modal
The dialog's aria-label read 'name - Share' with an em dash while the
sibling properties modal uses plain 'name Properties'; screen readers
announce the dash as noise. Use the same name-then-noun pattern.
* fix(dashboard): ellipsize the share input's placeholder when it overflows
At phone widths the 'Add people by email or username' placeholder was
clipped mid-letter; text-overflow: ellipsis truncates it cleanly.
* fix(dashboard): raise the share selects' chevron contrast in light mode
The hardcoded slate-400 stroke measured ~2.6:1 against light surfaces,
below the 3:1 minimum for non-text indicators. Light mode now uses
slate-500 (~4.7:1); dark mode keeps slate-400, which already clears
5:1 there.
* fix(dashboard): stop Files-tab shortcuts from firing behind the share modal
The document-level keydown.tabfiles handler kept running while the
share (or item-properties) modal was open. With focus on any of the
modal's buttons or selects, Enter and Space were preventDefault-ed
before they could activate the control, arrows could not drive the
mode selects, and letter typeahead was hijacked into row typesearch —
while Enter opened the selected row behind the overlay, Delete moved
it to Trash, and Cmd+A/C/X/V acted on the hidden list. Yield the
keyboard to the modal for as long as one is up; its own handlers
already cover Escape and Tab.
* fix(dashboard): keep the on-screen keyboard down when the share sheet opens
Autofocusing the recipient input popped the keyboard over the bottom
sheet the moment it opened, hiding the access list before the user had
chosen what to do — the same reason the revoke flow already focuses
the dialog instead of the input. On touch-primary devices give the
dialog container initial focus (which also anchors the Tab trap);
desktop keeps the input autofocus.
* fix(dashboard): give the share sheet's confirm and submit buttons 44px touch height
The inline revoke confirmation's Cancel/Remove pair rendered ~29px
tall on touch — small targets 6px apart where one of the two is
destructive — and the submit button was fixed at 38px. Grow both to
44px under pointer: coarse, matching the standard the modal's icon
buttons already meet. The touch block moves below the confirm-button
base rules it now overrides, since a media query adds no specificity
and source order decides.
* fix(dashboard): name the person in the share rows' accessible labels
Every grant row's mode select announced as bare 'Access level' and
every revoke button as 'Remove access', so a screen reader user
tabbing the list could not tell whose grant a control changes. Carry
the holder in the aria-label ('Access level for alice' / 'Remove
access for alice'); the visible UI and the revoke tooltip stay as
they were. i18n() encodes the interpolated string as a whole, quotes
included, so the labels stay attribute-safe for any holder name.
* fix(dashboard): keep the share status region in the accessibility tree
* fix(dashboard): give the share modal's add-row controls 44px touch height
* refactor(gui): extract the share dialogs' pure logic into tested modules
* feat(dashboard): adopt the shared mode helpers and handle pending invitations
---------
Co-authored-by: Juan Castro <jfcastro9208@gmail.com>
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Juan Fernando Castro
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5e1645d40e |
🔧 PUT-1524: Sanity check file sharing api (#3603)
* fix: sharing answers "who can reach this" from the grants, not the index Two ways a share listing could name access that was no longer there. A recipient's listing paired the flat permission read with the list of permissions it asked for by array index. That read drops misses and dedupes its keys, so the two are not positional: one entry's live grant vouched for another entry that had none, and listShared() kept publishing a withdrawn item's name, size and signed thumbnail URL to someone who could no longer open it. Read the permission off the value instead. getShares() had the same gap from the owner's side, with no liveness check at all — a grant withdrawn through /auth/revoke-user-user or an ACL mode change left the index row behind, and the owner was told someone could reach a file they could not. Checked against the grants now, one batched read per distinct holder. Pending invites are not subject to it: they have no grant yet, which is the point of them. Also covers the access-token actor, which reaches the same reach bound as an app through a different arm of the ACL check. No behavior change there — it was correct and untested. * test: pin that a revoke crosses regions A revoke reaches a peer region as a replicated SQL delete plus three invalidation events, one per cache the region owns: the u2u row cache, the flat view and the scan generation. The delete alone changes nothing there, and each cache has a different consequence if its event is lost — 20s for the generation, 5 minutes for the row cache, and forever for the flat view, whose grant-path entries carry no expiry. Nothing covered the whole path end to end. The store tests prove each event is emitted and applied; this proves the result, which is that the recipient stops being able to read. It asserts the read still succeeds after the SQL delete alone, so the test also records why replication is not sufficient on its own. * test: pin that a leaked uuid buys no access A masked share path hides which folder an item sits in; it was never the thing deciding who may open it. Nothing checked that at the route level, so the guarantee rested on unit tests of the resolver alone. Reads one shared file through its masked path, then tries the sibling four ways: the shared uuid with the sibling's name, the sibling's own uuid, a `..` back out of the root, and the owner's real path. Worth knowing about this one: it's mutation-checked. Removing the head !== root.name guard in sharePathMask.ts fails it with reachable: /testuser/55dd54c0…/share-http-1df8933e.txt. I verified that specifically because two tests I wrote earlier in this chunk passed with their guards broken — both were vacuous, and I deleted them rather than commit false assurance. * docs: say what listShared's total actually counts `total` counts the shares recorded for you; items are filtered after the page is read, so a withdrawn grant leaves the count higher than anything paging will yield. The page description already explained the short-page behaviour, but the field read as an exact count and the example printed it as one. The test pins the gap it describes: two shares, one withdrawn outside the index, one item listed and a total of two. * fix: keep an undelivered broadcast event instead of dropping it The outbound queue was cleared before the send, so a peer that timed out took its events with it. Most were survivable — a lost cache invalidation heals when the entry's TTL lapses. A revoke's flat-perm invalidation is not: grant-path entries carry no expiry, so a peer went on serving a withdrawn grant until something else wrote that key. Failed sends now go back on the queue, which the existing flush timer retries. Anything queued since wins over the retry, and the queue is bounded at 10,000 with the oldest dropped first, so a peer that stays down cannot grow it without limit. Each retry is signed at send time, so it is not rejected against the replay window. * fix: stop plus-addressing from deciding who a share reaches |
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b795b219a8 |
✨ PUT-1497: Share file link sharing and notifications (#3595)
* refactor(share): move share notifications into their own service
* feat(share): invite an address with no account, and email it
* feat(share): surface pending invites in the SDK and share dialog
* fix(share): unreachable revoke confirmation, and double-encoded labels
* feat(share): budget share announcements, group them, and let people block senders
Sharing had one defence against noise: a 15-minute quiet window per (sender,
recipient) pair, which dropped the second share rather than folding it in.
Twenty senders each under their own window could still bury someone, and there
was no way to make one of them stop.
Announcements are now budgeted on two axes through the existing sliding-window
limiter: 1 per 15 minutes and 20 per day from one sender, and 10 per hour /
50 per day to one recipient from anyone. Over budget the share still succeeds
and the recipient's notification is still brought up to date — only the
interruption is dropped. Invite email to an address with no account is budgeted
the same way, keyed on a hash of the canonical address.
Notifications now fold across senders: a new share rewrites the notification
the recipient hasn't dismissed, so "alice and bob shared 5 items with you"
replaces a stack of five. The record is written even when suppressed, so the
count is right whenever they next look.
Blocking is a new `user_block` table with enforcement in ShareService: a blocked
sender's share is refused with `recipient_not_accepting_shares`, spends no
quota, and writes no row, and their unclaimed invite is dropped when the address
is confirmed. Existing access is untouched — that is what revoke is for.
Managed from a Blocked people card in the dashboard's Security tab.
Also publishes the sharing limits, including the ones already on this branch
that were never documented.
* fix(share): name the item in share email, instead of 'an item'
* fix(share): make the invite lifecycle canonical, authorized, and race-safe
* refactor(email): drop EmailClient.isConfigured; callers read config.email
* feat(share): batch share email into a per-recipient digest, durably
* docs(share): document the share error codes; steady the disk migration tests
* fix(share): log why a digest wasn't sent, and recover orphaned ones
* feat(share): email recipients about shares by default, with a way to decline
Share email was off unless a deployment opted in, which meant an account
holder was told about a share in the app only. It is now on unless
`share_email_notifications` is set to false.
The reason it defaulted off was that nobody could decline. So this also
honors `user.unsubscribed` — the account-wide opt-out the /unsubscribe page
already writes and app feedback already respects, which share email ignored —
and the digest carries that link. Sharing and the in-app notification are
unaffected by it; only the mail stops.
The link is composed in the template around an interpolated uuid rather than
passed pre-built: Handlebars escapes interpolated values, so a whole URL came
out as `user_uuid=…`, which browsers decode but link scanners and older
mail clients need not.
* fix(share): count every shared file in the digest, not just the first
* feat(share): let a recipient refuse shares from everyone
Blocking answered "not from this person" but had no answer to "not from
anyone", so the only way to stop a stream of unwanted shares was to name
each sender after they had already reached you.
Stored as a key in the user row's existing `metadata` blob rather than a
column: the share path already holds the recipient's row by the time it
asks, so reading it costs nothing, and a one-bit preference doesn't earn
a migration per dialect. `updateMetadata` merges and refreshes the cached
row, so the switch bites on the very next share.
Refusing everyone reports the same code as refusing one person — which of
the two it is is the recipient's business, not the sender's. Enforced at
both moments the per-sender block is: when the share is issued, and when
a pending invite is claimed. The per-sender list is untouched while the
blanket switch is on, so turning it off restores what it hid.
`GET /share/blocks` now carries `all`; `POST`/`DELETE` take `{ all: true }`
beside the existing `{ username }`. Managed from the same Blocked people
card in the dashboard's Security tab.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(share): keep the digest sweep off a window that still has a timer
The sweep treated an entry as orphaned the moment its window closed, which
is also the moment the node that armed it fires. Claiming an entry is only
exclusive among flushers that can see each other's deletes, so the two
could each claim a share of the same digest and both send. It now waits
out a grace period first, which costs a genuinely stranded digest that
much delay and nothing else.
Both digest listings were capped at 200 with no word when they hit it — a
truncated flush sends a digest that undercounts and reads as complete.
The cap is named and logged.
Also: `#emailHolder` still described share email as off by default, which
it stopped being; the config doc said the batch window defaults to 60s
when it is 90; and the two tests that need several calls inside one window
were racing a 50ms window across four sequential round trips, so they
failed under full-suite load rather than on the behaviour they cover.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(share): stop double-encoding the recipient in two dialog messages
`i18n()` encodes what it returns, replacements included, so encoding the
recipient first showed the entities to anyone whose address or username
contains one. Same pattern already fixed two lines above.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(notification): widen the mysql shown/acknowledged columns
Both arrived from the v1 schema as `tinyint(1)`, where they were flags.
The backend rework changed the writes to a unix second; sqlite (`INTEGER`)
and postgres (`bigint`) took it and mysql did not, so on mysql every
`markShown` and `markAcknowledged` has failed with
ER_WARN_DATA_OUT_OF_RANGE and left the column NULL. Dismissing a
notification never stuck — the unacknowledged count never moved and one
already delivered came back on every reconnect.
No backfill: every reader tests `IS NULL` / `IS NOT NULL` only, so a
legacy `1` keeps meaning "yes" once widened. Guarded on the current type,
because changing a column type copies the table and this directory
replays on every boot.
Not reachable from the test suite — it runs against sqlite and postgres,
both of which already have the right type. Verified by hand against mysql:
`/notif/mark-read` and `/notif/mark-ack` now persist, and a dismissed
share notification is no longer the one a later share folds into.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Reynaldi Chernando
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401b6066b3 | Use gpt 5.6 luna as default for docs (#3602) | ||
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Daniel Salazar
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ec3c33fea6 | fix: misc hardening fixes (#3600) | ||
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Anany Singh
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95d797b047 | feat(workers): expose app_uid in puter.workers.get and puter.workers.list (#3596) | ||
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Daniel Salazar
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bd06e88185 | feat: bring back referrals PUT-1463 (#3599) | ||
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Nariman Jelveh
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cabedc30b0 |
Require login on app landing pages
Prevent first-time visitors from being treated as temporary users when they open an app landing page such as `/app/<name>` or `/desktop/app/<name>`. These routes now always go through the real login/signup flow. |
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Daniel Salazar
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f81b76c1d1 | fix: webdav connectivity fixes for macos (#3597) | ||
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404oops
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9604cc3f23 | feat(ai-chat): overhaul provider model catalogs to match current APIs (#3586) | ||
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2c852bf6b3 |
✨ PUT-1412 File sharing backend api (#3553)
* refactor(permissions): drop hardcoded group permission map for a flat default
* test(drivers): assert credential-gate intent instead of a 403 proxy
* fix(permissions): report whether a revoke removed anything and persist the linked grant row before the flat view
* feat(permissions): replicate permission invalidations across regions
* feat(share): extend the share table into an index of active shares
* feat(share): query and maintain active shares in ShareStore
* feat(users): add a batched lookup by email
* fix(cache): apply cache updates broadcast from peer regions
* fix(permissions): scope a revoke to the issuer that granted it
* feat(share): add ShareService with a per-day share limit
A share is two writes that belong together: the permission grant, which
authorizes access, and a share row, which makes it listable and ties it to an
fsentry so it dies with the file. Nothing else grants fs:* to a user.
Authorization reuses canManagePermission — an owner satisfies it through the
is-owner implicator, a delegate through an explicit manage:fs:<uid> grant. An
owner may clear any issuer's share of their node; anyone else only the ones
they issued, or their own access. Self-revoke skips the manage gate but still
requires `see`, so it cannot be used to probe for files.
The per-day limit counts shares created rather than live rows, so revoking and
re-sharing cannot recycle a slot, and changing an existing share's mode is not
new reach and does not spend budget. Tunable via share_daily_limit.
* feat(share): expose sharing over HTTP
POST /share, POST /share/revoke, GET /share/shared-with-me, GET /share/shares.
The controller was registered but entirely commented out.
Recipients × items fan out concurrently — every pair is a distinct
(holder, entry) key, so none of them contend — bounded by
runWithConcurrencyLimitSettled, which returns results index-aligned with the
input for the per-pair outcome list. Responses carry usernames only, never
internal ids, and the 404-not-403 rule is preserved so a failed call cannot
confirm a file the caller could not otherwise see. Notifications are fired off
the response path; a share must not fail over its own notification.
Per-request caps on recipients and items bound one call's fan-out; the daily
limit bounds the total.
* feat(share): keep recipients consistent when a shared item changes
* fix(fs): stop listing issuer homes at the filesystem root
* fix(acl): serialize concurrent mode changes on one node and pin app containment on shared paths
* fix(fs): expire signed URLs over entries the signer doesn't own
signFile defaults to a ~317k-year TTL and verifySignature checks only uid,
expires and signature — never the ACL. A recipient who ever signed a shared
file therefore held a permanent, revocation-proof URL to its bytes: revoking
the share did nothing to it.
signEntry now takes the acting user and drops to NON_OWNER_SIGNATURE_TTL_SECONDS
(1 hour) when the signer is not the entry's owner. Owners keep the permanent
default, so no existing client changes behavior.
The signature-authenticated directory listing bounds its children
unconditionally: that route has no session actor, and a signature proves
possession rather than ownership, so a recipient holding a short-lived
directory signature could otherwise mint permanent URLs for every child.
A bounded window is not revocation — the durable fix is a per-entry signature
epoch folded into the HMAC and bumped on any permission change.
* refactor(permissions): drop the unused permission-issuer lookup
listUserPermissionIssuers and its store method listUserPermissionIssuerIds
existed to synthesize the filesystem root from the home directories of everyone
who had granted the caller a permission. That listing is gone — it advertised
folders readdir then refused to open — and the share index answers "who shared
with me" directly, so nothing wants them back.
One removed test only asserted that the call returned an array; the other
covered readLinkedUserUserPerms round-tripping and is kept, rewritten without
the issuer lookup.
* fix(share): return the created share, not just an acknowledgement
* feat(puter.js): add file sharing to puter.fs
share(), unshare(), listShared() and getShares() on puter.fs, following the
existing FS operation shape: positional and options-object forms through
defineOperation, JSDoc overloads as the published signature, relative paths
resolved against the app's root directory.
A bare recipient string is read as an email when it contains @ and as a
username otherwise. Sharing an item with someone who already has it replaces
their access rather than stacking a second grant, so raising read to write is
one more call.
Adds a sharing suite to the API runner, which passes unchanged on node,
browser and workerd. Documents all four methods with runnable examples, and
corrects the FS overview callout that told readers one user cannot read
another's files — true before this, not after.
* feat(gui): add a Shared folder for items others shared with you
A sidebar entry listing everything other users have shared with you, backed by
puter.fs.listShared().
The path is the sentinel `puter://shared` rather than /<user>/Shared: this is a
query, not a directory, and a path-shaped value could collide with a folder
someone actually creates. refresh_item_container and update_window_path both
branch on it to skip the stat there is no fsentry for, and the listing swaps
readdir for listShared.
Entries render at their real paths under their owners' directories — the item
container already preferred an explicit fsentry.path over joining onto the
container, so nothing else had to change. Each carries who shared it and at
what level, which the context menu reads next.
* feat(gui): share items from the context menu
A sharing dialog shaped like its neighbours — options object, HTML-string
template, jQuery wiring, delegating to UIWindow() — with a recipient field, a
read/edit/share dropdown, and the current access list with revoke buttons.
Reached from a new "Share…" context menu entry, which is hidden on items shared
*with* you: re-sharing needs manage, so the dialog would only surface an error.
Those items get "Remove from Shared" in place of Delete. Delete moves an item
to *your* trash, which for someone else's file means moving their data out of
their tree — FSService refuses it, and the user saw a bare 403. Removing your
own access is what the action was reaching for, so that is what it now does.
* fix(share): withdraw what a removed recipient re-shared
* feat(share): report access inherited from a parent folder
* fix(gui): load the puter.js bundle the server configured
* refactor(gui): extract the action icon set into a helper
* feat(gui): surface Shared in the file browser
* feat(gui): manage access from the share dialog
* test(share): cover access inherited from a parent folder
* fix(share): keep downstream access from surviving a delegate who leaves
* fix(gui): name the real owner in the share dialog
* fix(gui): page through every shared item instead of the first 50
* feat(share): return item metadata with a share
* fix(share): invalidate a holder's cache when the entry is deleted
* fix(gui): treat items inside a shared folder as someone else's
* feat(permissions): let manage inherit down the filesystem tree
Access already reached descendants through the ancestor chain while authority did not, so someone trusted to manage a shared folder could re-share the folder but nothing inside it, and could not see who had access to a file within it.
A manage-inherits-from-ancestor implicator resolves it in the permission layer, beside is-owner, so every caller agrees rather than just ShareService. It consults only the immediate parent — resolving that re-enters one level up, making a chain of depth d cost d checks rather than d².
That makes two cascade gaps reachable, both fixed here. A revoke now walks the subtree, since a grant on a descendant can rest on authority held at the folder. And it stops at a delegate whose authority survives another issuer, because what they granted was never theirs to lose.
Also pins that manage is not transitive: granting it needs manage:manage:fs:<uid>, which only the owner holds, so delegation is one level deep by construction.
* fix(gui): offer sharing inside a folder you manage
The menus encoded "manage does not inherit" and would now hide an action that works. The Shared listing records each root's mode; the menus resolve a child's by longest matching ancestor, loading on demand so a deep link or restored window works too.
* fix(share): make the daily share limit hold under concurrency
* test(share): cover concurrency, measure cost, and name cases for what they verify
* fix(gui): import the ownership helpers the item menu calls
The single-item context menu handler calls is_owned_by_me and
shared_mode_for, but the imports were only ever added to
generate_file_context_menu.js — so every right-click on an item threw a
ReferenceError before the menu could build, and the non-owner Delete
gating never ran.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(share): authorize before resolving the recipient
share() looked up the recipient in parallel with the entry, before the
manage check — and the two failures carried different error codes. Any
verified user with a real entry uid could probe arbitrary emails and
usernames for account existence, at no quota cost. Resolve the entry,
authorize, and only then resolve the recipient: an unauthorized caller
now sees the identical safe 404 whether or not the recipient exists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(permissions): broadcast permission row-cache invalidations to peer regions
Every publishCacheKeys call for the u2u, u2a, and access-token row
caches omitted broadcast, so a revoke only cleared the mutating
region's Redis. A peer region applied the replicated generation bump,
re-scanned, read the deleted row from its own still-warm 5-minute row
cache, and re-warmed the flat view from it — revoked access outlived
the revoke by the row-cache TTL instead of the intended 60-second
bound. CacheReplicationService already consumes these events; the
emits were just never sent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(fs): refuse to rename an entry owned by another user
remove and move both refuse to act on an entry the caller does not
own, even when the ACL allows the write — rename had no such guard, so
a write-mode share recipient could rename the owner's file, or the
shared folder itself, rewriting the owner's whole subtree's paths.
rename now takes the acting user and applies the same policy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(permissions): decide a flat delete from the primary, not a lagging replica
revokeUserUserPermission deletes the SQL grant, then only drops the
flat KV entry once no issuer still grants the permission. That
remaining-check read through the row cache the delete had just
invalidated, straight to a replica — under any lag the deleted row
reappeared, the flat delete was skipped, and the stale rows were
re-cached for another five minutes. Grant-path flat entries carry no
TTL, so the holder kept working access with zero SQL rows behind it,
invisible to every listing. The check now reads the primary and
re-warms the cache with what it actually saw.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(permissions): keep a failed remote flat-invalidation from crashing the process
The outer.permission.flatInvalidated applier was fire-and-forget with
no catch, and it awaits a KV delete — one transient KV error while
applying a peer region's revoke became an unhandled rejection, which
is process-fatal under default Node. Its sibling appliers were already
guarded; this one now logs and moves on, leaving the entry to the next
invalidation or its TTL, same as a lost event.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(share): revoke every requested item and recipient, not just the first
revokeShare destructured only the first recipient and first item while
the parsers accept arrays up to the request caps — unshare({items:
[a, b, c]}) returned success having revoked only a, leaving access the
caller believes is gone. Revoke now fans out over every (recipient,
item) pair exactly like POST /share, reports per-pair outcomes, and
sums the revoked count; the response stays backward compatible.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(share): only a confirmed email designates a recipient
Recipient resolution by email accepted unconfirmed accounts, so
pre-registering someone else's address (unconfirmed) was enough to
receive shares meant for them once no confirmed account held it.
An email now only resolves to an account that has confirmed it;
username shares are unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(share): accept tilde-rooted paths like the FS routes do
The SDK resolves relative paths to ~/..., but the share routes never
expanded the tilde — a ~-prefixed string was read as a uid and every
relative-path call 404'd. Item parsing now treats ~ as path-shaped and
expands it to the actor's home with the same helper the legacy FS
routes use, on share, revoke, and the shares listing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(share): walk a directory revoke by parent linkage, not path prefix
listByFsentrySubtree matched descendants with fsentry_id = ? OR path
LIKE ?, which has two problems: fsentries.path is lazily backfilled
and NULL on old rows, so those descendants' shares silently survived a
directory revoke, and the OR'd predicates forced a scan of every
active share. A recursive CTE over parent_id — the same shape the
lineage resolver already uses — covers every descendant and runs on
idx_parentId_name.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(gui): give each item its own share dialog
single_instance keyed the dialog on the app id alone, so opening
Share… on a second file focused the first file's dialog — typing a
recipient there granted access to the wrong file, with only the title
hinting at it. The dialog is now instanced per path: same item
refocuses, different item opens fresh. Also stops pre-encoding the
title, which UIWindow encodes again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(permissions): let manage answer a write check
A manage grant let its holder re-share a folder but not work in it: the
ACL mode family stops at write, and the fs exploder had no rule for the
narrowest mode, so `manage:fs:<uid>` never satisfied `fs:<uid>:write`.
Fold manage into the candidate list for every non-manage mode, in both
the access-token branch and the scan branch, and give `write` an (empty)
exploder rule so the manage arm is emitted for it too.
* fix(fs): authorize restructuring by write on the parent
* fix(fs): let a share recipient work inside a shared folder
rename, remove and move refused outright when the entry belonged to
someone else, so a recipient with write could neither delete nor rename
anything inside a folder shared with them. The GUI compounded it by
hiding Delete for any item it did not own.
Authorize the three by ACL write on the entry's parent. For an owner
that is the same answer; for a recipient it grants the inside of a
shared folder and withholds the folder itself, whose parent is the
owner's private tree.
Deleting sends the item to its owner's trash rather than the deleter's,
so it leaves the recipient's view without leaving the owner's account
and without changing hands. A move may not otherwise carry someone
else's entry out of their tree.
* fix(fs): give a new entry to the owner of the folder it lands in
A file a share recipient added to a shared folder was recorded as
theirs while living in the owner's tree, so a subtree could hold rows
belonging to several people — and the storage it consumed was checked
against the writer while being counted against the owner.
Take the owner from the parent row at every insert, charge the
allowance to that owner, and hand a moved entry over to the tree it
moves into. An entry now always belongs to whoever owns the directory
holding it.
* feat(fs): address shared entries as ~/share/<uid>
A recipient could read the owner's whole path off any shared entry —
where they keep the file and what sits beside it, neither of which the
share is about.
Give shares their own namespace. `~/share/<entry-uid>/rel/path` resolves
to the real path on the way in, and outgoing paths are rewritten to it
on the way out. Entries the actor owns pass through untouched, so no
existing client contract moves.
* revert(fs): mask only the directory bar, not the addressing
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Ayush tiwari
|
fc861da89f | feat: add Gemini 3.7 Flash (#3587) | ||
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Parman Mohammadalizadeh
|
facb844747 |
fix: derive express subdomain offset from the configured root domain (#3575)
Express derives `req.subdomains` by dropping a fixed number of labels from the right of the hostname, defaulting to 2. A deployment whose `domain` has more than two labels therefore reads its own root domain as an active subdomain, so the user-site redirect sends the root origin to the static hosting domain, which sends it back. Self-hosting docs recommend exactly that shape (`puter.example.com`). Set the offset from the label count of `config.domain`. Two-label domains keep the express default, so existing deployments are unchanged. Fixes #3561 |
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Yashwarhade8010
|
3b791bb334 | docs: update web search examples to gpt-5.6-luna (#3589) | ||
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Daniel Salazar
|
a64a444a17 | feat: batch delete for flush + metering fixes (#3593) | ||
|
Daniel Salazar
|
d3c9828207 | fix: metering gui maths (#3592) | ||
|
Daniel Salazar
|
87180b1081 | fix: metering (#3591) | ||
|
Daniel Salazar
|
d22b656df8 | fix: metering issues with addons (#3588) | ||
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Nariman Jelveh
|
19cd5f4476 |
feat: add BytePlus ModelArk providers (chat, image, video) (#3498)
* feat: add BytePlus ModelArk chat provider Adds BytePlus ModelArk as a provider for the puter-chat-completion driver, following the MiniMax/ZAI providers as reference per doc/contributing-apis.md. - OpenAI-compatible endpoint at ark.ap-southeast.bytepluses.com/api/v3 (apiBaseUrl config selects the region) - Static catalog of 16 chat models (Seed 2.x/1.x incl. vision, GLM, DeepSeek, GPT-OSS) with limits and per-token pricing from the official docs - Passes Ark's thinking/response_format/stop params through custom; normalizes reasoning_content to reasoning - Bare deepseek-v4-* names stay with the first-party DeepSeek provider; BytePlus only claims prefixed aliases - Offline unit tests (mocked SDK against a real test server) plus an env-gated integration test * feat: add BytePlus image and video providers Extends the BytePlus ModelArk integration to the puter-image-generation and puter-video-generation drivers, reusing the same services.byteplus API key and regional apiBaseUrl as the chat provider. Image (Seedream/SeedEdit via OpenAI-compatible /images/generations): - dola-seedream-5-0-pro (pixel-tier pricing + billed input images from the 2nd on), seedream-5-0-lite, 4-5, 4-0, and seededit-3-0-i2i - quality tiers 1K/1.5K/2K; aspect ratios resolve to Ark's documented pixel sizes; explicit WxH passes through with Ark's bounds enforced Video (Seedance via Ark's async /contents/generations/tasks + polling): - Seedance 2.0 / 2.0 Fast / 2.0 Mini / 1.5 Pro / 1.0 Pro / 1.0 Pro Fast (2.5 is priced but its API isn't live yet, so it's excluded) - per-video-token billing from usage.completion_tokens, with per-second estimates feeding the credit cap; audio vs silent rates for 1.5 Pro - first/last frame and reference-image inputs; generate_audio param added to IGenerateVideoParams Pricing and capabilities hardcoded from the official docs (ModelArk pages 1544106, 1330310, 1520757, 1521309, 1541523). Offline unit tests mock the SDK / global fetch; integration tests are env-gated on PUTER_TEST_AI_BYTEPLUS_API_KEY. * fix: correct BytePlus catalogs and validation against the live API Verified the three BytePlus providers against ModelArk with a real key; these are the mismatches that surfaced. - Drop seededit-3-0-i2i-250628. Ark reports it as Shutdown and every request 404s. Its now-unreachable image-to-image branches in the provider go with it. - seedream-4-5 and the 5.0 series enforce a 3,686,400 pixel minimum, so they only accept the 2K tier. Mark them 2k-only and snap an unsupported tier up to the nearest allowed one, which also keeps the aspect-ratio table from mapping to a sub-minimum size. - glm-4-7 has a 204,800 token context, not 256K. - Guard the actor in the image provider like the video provider does. - Round a sub-minimum video duration up to the shortest supported clip instead of reporting it as insufficient funds. - Gate video resolution on the model's own dimensions; the dims table is shared across a family and accepts more than any one model does. * Tighten BytePlus AI provider handling Extract shared reasoning-content normalization for OpenAI-style chat providers, and harden BytePlus image/video behavior. This updates image tier and size validation, normalizes aspect ratios and input image refs, prevents mismatched BytePlus key/base URL fallback config, makes video resolution matching case-insensitive, and rejects excess reference images instead of silently truncating them. Tests were expanded to cover the new BytePlus request and validation paths. |
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404oops
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fc56075115 |
Merge pull request #3584 from rupesh0001-tech/rupesh
feat(ai-chat): add grok-4.6 model to xai provider |
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404oops
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e1998e39ab | Increase max_tokens limit to 500,000 | ||
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Daniel Salazar
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fb7968a1c7 | fix: metering hardening; handle burst of unfinished ai requests (#3585) | ||
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rupesh0001-tech
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c88eeb3868 |
feat(ai-chat): add grok-4.6 model to xai provider
- Add grok-4.6 model definition with pricing and context specs - Add aliases x-ai/grok-4.6 and grok-4.6-latest - Add unit tests for alias resolution and metering calculation Closes #3562 |
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Reynaldi ChernandoandCopilot Autofix powered by AI
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9e25ce1401 |
[PUT-1478] Add KV commands to CLI (#3579)
* Add KV commands to CLI * docs * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Daniel Salazar
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f15d835eeb | fix: restrict openai and anthropic compatible endpoints to be subscription (#3583) | ||
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Daniel SalazarandClaude Fable 5
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27c4506e02 |
feat: usage rendered as credits on a 50c base, free allowance doubled (#3569)
* feat: usage rendered as credits on a 50c base, free allowance doubled Usage is now displayed in credits: a configurable creditsPerDollar rate (default 2,000, making the free tier's 50c allowance an even 1,000-credit base) ships with the metering usage response, and the dashboard's usage cards and per-API table show raw credit numbers through one shared formatter. The dashboard budget math is also fixed — capacity is spend plus server-netted remainder, so held purchased credit can never render as negative usage. The registered-user free allowance doubles to 50c, tier display names move to Basic/Plus/Pro, and dead referral-promise strings leave the English dictionary. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: the credits display rate exists only in deployment config No default in code and no rate on any wire the plan surfaces read: a deployment that doesn't configure creditsPerDollar renders usage in dollars, exactly as before credits existed. The usage endpoint sends the rate only when configured, and nothing in code or comments states what any deployment's rate is. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: metering reports pre-scaled credits, never raw amounts The usage, per-app usage, and cost-catalogue endpoints multiply every monetary field by the config multiplier (renamed creditMultiplier) before responding, and flag the unit; the multiplier itself never ships. Counts, units, and byte figures pass through untouched. With no multiplier configured the endpoints report raw amounts and clients render dollars, as before credits existed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: absent addon fields stay absent when scaling to credits Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Neal Shah
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6a7c09f54e | blacklist dynamic workers (#3582) | ||
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Reynaldi Chernando
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6254714484 |
deprecate gemini 2 flash and lite (#3581)
* deprecate gemini 2 flash and lite * fix test |