Commit Graph
6314 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
2c852bf6b3 PUT-1412 File sharing backend api (#3553)
* refactor(permissions): drop hardcoded group permission map for a flat default

* test(drivers): assert credential-gate intent instead of a 403 proxy

* fix(permissions): report whether a revoke removed anything and persist the linked grant row before the flat view

* feat(permissions): replicate permission invalidations across regions

* feat(share): extend the share table into an index of active shares

* feat(share): query and maintain active shares in ShareStore

* feat(users): add a batched lookup by email

* fix(cache): apply cache updates broadcast from peer regions

* fix(permissions): scope a revoke to the issuer that granted it

* feat(share): add ShareService with a per-day share limit

A share is two writes that belong together: the permission grant, which
authorizes access, and a share row, which makes it listable and ties it to an
fsentry so it dies with the file. Nothing else grants fs:* to a user.

Authorization reuses canManagePermission — an owner satisfies it through the
is-owner implicator, a delegate through an explicit manage:fs:<uid> grant. An
owner may clear any issuer's share of their node; anyone else only the ones
they issued, or their own access. Self-revoke skips the manage gate but still
requires `see`, so it cannot be used to probe for files.

The per-day limit counts shares created rather than live rows, so revoking and
re-sharing cannot recycle a slot, and changing an existing share's mode is not
new reach and does not spend budget. Tunable via share_daily_limit.

* feat(share): expose sharing over HTTP

POST /share, POST /share/revoke, GET /share/shared-with-me, GET /share/shares.
The controller was registered but entirely commented out.

Recipients × items fan out concurrently — every pair is a distinct
(holder, entry) key, so none of them contend — bounded by
runWithConcurrencyLimitSettled, which returns results index-aligned with the
input for the per-pair outcome list. Responses carry usernames only, never
internal ids, and the 404-not-403 rule is preserved so a failed call cannot
confirm a file the caller could not otherwise see. Notifications are fired off
the response path; a share must not fail over its own notification.

Per-request caps on recipients and items bound one call's fan-out; the daily
limit bounds the total.

* feat(share): keep recipients consistent when a shared item changes

* fix(fs): stop listing issuer homes at the filesystem root

* fix(acl): serialize concurrent mode changes on one node and pin app containment on shared paths

* fix(fs): expire signed URLs over entries the signer doesn't own

signFile defaults to a ~317k-year TTL and verifySignature checks only uid,
expires and signature — never the ACL. A recipient who ever signed a shared
file therefore held a permanent, revocation-proof URL to its bytes: revoking
the share did nothing to it.

signEntry now takes the acting user and drops to NON_OWNER_SIGNATURE_TTL_SECONDS
(1 hour) when the signer is not the entry's owner. Owners keep the permanent
default, so no existing client changes behavior.

The signature-authenticated directory listing bounds its children
unconditionally: that route has no session actor, and a signature proves
possession rather than ownership, so a recipient holding a short-lived
directory signature could otherwise mint permanent URLs for every child.

A bounded window is not revocation — the durable fix is a per-entry signature
epoch folded into the HMAC and bumped on any permission change.

* refactor(permissions): drop the unused permission-issuer lookup

listUserPermissionIssuers and its store method listUserPermissionIssuerIds
existed to synthesize the filesystem root from the home directories of everyone
who had granted the caller a permission. That listing is gone — it advertised
folders readdir then refused to open — and the share index answers "who shared
with me" directly, so nothing wants them back.

One removed test only asserted that the call returned an array; the other
covered readLinkedUserUserPerms round-tripping and is kept, rewritten without
the issuer lookup.

* fix(share): return the created share, not just an acknowledgement

* feat(puter.js): add file sharing to puter.fs

share(), unshare(), listShared() and getShares() on puter.fs, following the
existing FS operation shape: positional and options-object forms through
defineOperation, JSDoc overloads as the published signature, relative paths
resolved against the app's root directory.

A bare recipient string is read as an email when it contains @ and as a
username otherwise. Sharing an item with someone who already has it replaces
their access rather than stacking a second grant, so raising read to write is
one more call.

Adds a sharing suite to the API runner, which passes unchanged on node,
browser and workerd. Documents all four methods with runnable examples, and
corrects the FS overview callout that told readers one user cannot read
another's files — true before this, not after.

* feat(gui): add a Shared folder for items others shared with you

A sidebar entry listing everything other users have shared with you, backed by
puter.fs.listShared().

The path is the sentinel `puter://shared` rather than /<user>/Shared: this is a
query, not a directory, and a path-shaped value could collide with a folder
someone actually creates. refresh_item_container and update_window_path both
branch on it to skip the stat there is no fsentry for, and the listing swaps
readdir for listShared.

Entries render at their real paths under their owners' directories — the item
container already preferred an explicit fsentry.path over joining onto the
container, so nothing else had to change. Each carries who shared it and at
what level, which the context menu reads next.

* feat(gui): share items from the context menu

A sharing dialog shaped like its neighbours — options object, HTML-string
template, jQuery wiring, delegating to UIWindow() — with a recipient field, a
read/edit/share dropdown, and the current access list with revoke buttons.

Reached from a new "Share…" context menu entry, which is hidden on items shared
*with* you: re-sharing needs manage, so the dialog would only surface an error.

Those items get "Remove from Shared" in place of Delete. Delete moves an item
to *your* trash, which for someone else's file means moving their data out of
their tree — FSService refuses it, and the user saw a bare 403. Removing your
own access is what the action was reaching for, so that is what it now does.

* fix(share): withdraw what a removed recipient re-shared

* feat(share): report access inherited from a parent folder

* fix(gui): load the puter.js bundle the server configured

* refactor(gui): extract the action icon set into a helper

* feat(gui): surface Shared in the file browser

* feat(gui): manage access from the share dialog

* test(share): cover access inherited from a parent folder

* fix(share): keep downstream access from surviving a delegate who leaves

* fix(gui): name the real owner in the share dialog

* fix(gui): page through every shared item instead of the first 50

* feat(share): return item metadata with a share

* fix(share): invalidate a holder's cache when the entry is deleted

* fix(gui): treat items inside a shared folder as someone else's

* feat(permissions): let manage inherit down the filesystem tree

Access already reached descendants through the ancestor chain while authority did not, so someone trusted to manage a shared folder could re-share the folder but nothing inside it, and could not see who had access to a file within it.

A manage-inherits-from-ancestor implicator resolves it in the permission layer, beside is-owner, so every caller agrees rather than just ShareService. It consults only the immediate parent — resolving that re-enters one level up, making a chain of depth d cost d checks rather than d².

That makes two cascade gaps reachable, both fixed here. A revoke now walks the subtree, since a grant on a descendant can rest on authority held at the folder. And it stops at a delegate whose authority survives another issuer, because what they granted was never theirs to lose.

Also pins that manage is not transitive: granting it needs manage:manage:fs:<uid>, which only the owner holds, so delegation is one level deep by construction.

* fix(gui): offer sharing inside a folder you manage

The menus encoded "manage does not inherit" and would now hide an action that works. The Shared listing records each root's mode; the menus resolve a child's by longest matching ancestor, loading on demand so a deep link or restored window works too.

* fix(share): make the daily share limit hold under concurrency

* test(share): cover concurrency, measure cost, and name cases for what they verify

* fix(gui): import the ownership helpers the item menu calls

The single-item context menu handler calls is_owned_by_me and
shared_mode_for, but the imports were only ever added to
generate_file_context_menu.js — so every right-click on an item threw a
ReferenceError before the menu could build, and the non-owner Delete
gating never ran.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(share): authorize before resolving the recipient

share() looked up the recipient in parallel with the entry, before the
manage check — and the two failures carried different error codes. Any
verified user with a real entry uid could probe arbitrary emails and
usernames for account existence, at no quota cost. Resolve the entry,
authorize, and only then resolve the recipient: an unauthorized caller
now sees the identical safe 404 whether or not the recipient exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(permissions): broadcast permission row-cache invalidations to peer regions

Every publishCacheKeys call for the u2u, u2a, and access-token row
caches omitted broadcast, so a revoke only cleared the mutating
region's Redis. A peer region applied the replicated generation bump,
re-scanned, read the deleted row from its own still-warm 5-minute row
cache, and re-warmed the flat view from it — revoked access outlived
the revoke by the row-cache TTL instead of the intended 60-second
bound. CacheReplicationService already consumes these events; the
emits were just never sent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(fs): refuse to rename an entry owned by another user

remove and move both refuse to act on an entry the caller does not
own, even when the ACL allows the write — rename had no such guard, so
a write-mode share recipient could rename the owner's file, or the
shared folder itself, rewriting the owner's whole subtree's paths.
rename now takes the acting user and applies the same policy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(permissions): decide a flat delete from the primary, not a lagging replica

revokeUserUserPermission deletes the SQL grant, then only drops the
flat KV entry once no issuer still grants the permission. That
remaining-check read through the row cache the delete had just
invalidated, straight to a replica — under any lag the deleted row
reappeared, the flat delete was skipped, and the stale rows were
re-cached for another five minutes. Grant-path flat entries carry no
TTL, so the holder kept working access with zero SQL rows behind it,
invisible to every listing. The check now reads the primary and
re-warms the cache with what it actually saw.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(permissions): keep a failed remote flat-invalidation from crashing the process

The outer.permission.flatInvalidated applier was fire-and-forget with
no catch, and it awaits a KV delete — one transient KV error while
applying a peer region's revoke became an unhandled rejection, which
is process-fatal under default Node. Its sibling appliers were already
guarded; this one now logs and moves on, leaving the entry to the next
invalidation or its TTL, same as a lost event.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(share): revoke every requested item and recipient, not just the first

revokeShare destructured only the first recipient and first item while
the parsers accept arrays up to the request caps — unshare({items:
[a, b, c]}) returned success having revoked only a, leaving access the
caller believes is gone. Revoke now fans out over every (recipient,
item) pair exactly like POST /share, reports per-pair outcomes, and
sums the revoked count; the response stays backward compatible.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(share): only a confirmed email designates a recipient

Recipient resolution by email accepted unconfirmed accounts, so
pre-registering someone else's address (unconfirmed) was enough to
receive shares meant for them once no confirmed account held it.
An email now only resolves to an account that has confirmed it;
username shares are unaffected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(share): accept tilde-rooted paths like the FS routes do

The SDK resolves relative paths to ~/..., but the share routes never
expanded the tilde — a ~-prefixed string was read as a uid and every
relative-path call 404'd. Item parsing now treats ~ as path-shaped and
expands it to the actor's home with the same helper the legacy FS
routes use, on share, revoke, and the shares listing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(share): walk a directory revoke by parent linkage, not path prefix

listByFsentrySubtree matched descendants with fsentry_id = ? OR path
LIKE ?, which has two problems: fsentries.path is lazily backfilled
and NULL on old rows, so those descendants' shares silently survived a
directory revoke, and the OR'd predicates forced a scan of every
active share. A recursive CTE over parent_id — the same shape the
lineage resolver already uses — covers every descendant and runs on
idx_parentId_name.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(gui): give each item its own share dialog

single_instance keyed the dialog on the app id alone, so opening
Share… on a second file focused the first file's dialog — typing a
recipient there granted access to the wrong file, with only the title
hinting at it. The dialog is now instanced per path: same item
refocuses, different item opens fresh. Also stops pre-encoding the
title, which UIWindow encodes again.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(permissions): let manage answer a write check

A manage grant let its holder re-share a folder but not work in it: the
ACL mode family stops at write, and the fs exploder had no rule for the
narrowest mode, so `manage:fs:<uid>` never satisfied `fs:<uid>:write`.

Fold manage into the candidate list for every non-manage mode, in both
the access-token branch and the scan branch, and give `write` an (empty)
exploder rule so the manage arm is emitted for it too.

* fix(fs): authorize restructuring by write on the parent

* fix(fs): let a share recipient work inside a shared folder

rename, remove and move refused outright when the entry belonged to
someone else, so a recipient with write could neither delete nor rename
anything inside a folder shared with them. The GUI compounded it by
hiding Delete for any item it did not own.

Authorize the three by ACL write on the entry's parent. For an owner
that is the same answer; for a recipient it grants the inside of a
shared folder and withholds the folder itself, whose parent is the
owner's private tree.

Deleting sends the item to its owner's trash rather than the deleter's,
so it leaves the recipient's view without leaving the owner's account
and without changing hands. A move may not otherwise carry someone
else's entry out of their tree.

* fix(fs): give a new entry to the owner of the folder it lands in

A file a share recipient added to a shared folder was recorded as
theirs while living in the owner's tree, so a subtree could hold rows
belonging to several people — and the storage it consumed was checked
against the writer while being counted against the owner.

Take the owner from the parent row at every insert, charge the
allowance to that owner, and hand a moved entry over to the tree it
moves into. An entry now always belongs to whoever owns the directory
holding it.

* feat(fs): address shared entries as ~/share/<uid>

A recipient could read the owner's whole path off any shared entry —
where they keep the file and what sits beside it, neither of which the
share is about.

Give shares their own namespace. `~/share/<entry-uid>/rel/path` resolves
to the real path on the way in, and outgoing paths are rewritten to it
on the way out. Entries the actor owns pass through untouched, so no
existing client contract moves.

* revert(fs): mask only the directory bar, not the addressing

fe535d598 made `~/share/<uid>` the actual address for every shared
entry. That reached far past the intent: item names became uuids, the
Shared views rendered uuids instead of filenames, and navigation
addressed entries through a namespace nothing else understood.

Put real paths back everywhere — responses, the share listing, and
request handling — and do the masking where it was wanted, in the
window's directory bar. A recipient sees `Shared › Contents › sub`
while every crumb keeps the real path it navigates to.

The share listing now carries the entry's name, content type, owner and
a signed thumbnail. A share row has no fsentry behind it for a client
to stat, and the stored thumbnail is an `s3://bucket/key` URI that no
client can render and none should see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: path obfuscation, webdav + small ui stuff

* test(share): assert the masked share path by its exact shape

The substring check tripped on the scratch files' own names, which start
with `sharing-`; the exact-equality assertion on `/<owner>/<uid>/<name>`
already proves nothing above the share leaks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(share): rename policy, shared-view guards, webdav share parent, quota/bucket invariants

- Rename: a directly-shared FILE renames with write on it; a shared
  folder root stays fixed (its name is the owner's tree structure).
  GUI can_rename mirrors the backend, guards all editor entry points.
- Up from a share root goes to the Shared view on both surfaces; the
  Shared view gets a single crumb, a disabled Up button, and refuses
  drops, New/Paste, uploads and ctrl+V everywhere (it is a query, not
  a directory).
- WebDAV: PROPFIND on /owner/uuid answers as a virtual collection
  holding the share root (ACL-gated; 404 for strangers).
- Storage allowance override no longer crosses user boundaries: a
  recipient's plan cannot raise the owner's cap.
- Overwrites stay in the bucket the entry already lives in instead of
  repointing to the handling server's bucket and stranding the old
  object.
- manage mode documented as implying write (matches enforcement);
  share dialog label now "Can edit & share". Documented that fs socket
  events are owner-only.
- Sidebar: saved orders gain the Shared entry once the user has shares.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(share): close review findings, and retire /auth/grant-user-user

Security
- Recipient writes no longer echo the owner's real path back. The pending-write
  event and the upload-progress meta both go to the *acting* user, so a write
  into a shared folder handed out the layout above the share root.
- `maskerFor` failed open: the first caller fixed the actor, and one that ran
  before the request knew who was acting pinned `undefined` — after which every
  path published unmasked. It now adopts the first real actor and rebuilds for
  a different one.
- `/auth/grant-user-user` returns 501. It wrote user-to-user grants straight to
  the permission tables with no share row, so nothing could list or cascade a
  revoke over them — and the new `manage` mode meant a delegate could reach it
  for the owner's files. Filesystem access goes through `/share`; nothing else
  is meant to pass between two users. Undocumented (its docs page was never
  written) and no callers. Revoking is untouched, so grants made before this
  can still be withdrawn.
- `#assertCanManage` asks about the permission actually being granted rather
  than a fixed `read`, so sharing at `manage` is refused at the share layer
  instead of by `grantUserUserPermission` two levels down.
- `listSharedWithMe` checks the grants, not just the index: withdrawing access
  any other way left the row publishing name, size and a signed thumbnail URL.
- Moving an item into another tree now retires its shares. Grants are keyed on
  uuid, so they followed it and left the new owner with recipients they never
  agreed to.

Correctness
- `acl.check` gets the real path again, not the masked one. ACL matches on the
  path string, and a mask hides the `AppData/<appUid>` shape it needs.
- "Leave this share" works for a grant that predates the index; the fallback
  scoped the delete to the caller as issuer, which can never match.
- `move`/`copy` reject a name with a slash or a `.`/`..` segment, as `rename`
  already did. It matters more here: a move into the owner's Trash skips the
  destination write check.
- Descendant walks scope by path, not by owner, so rows predating the
  one-owner-per-subtree invariant aren't orphaned by their parent's deletion.

Performance
- Index `user_to_user_permissions(permission)`. Retiring a node's grants is a
  prefix match, but the primary key is (issuer, holder, permission), so it was
  a full scan.
- Retirement is coalesced and chunked. `remove()` emits one event per
  descendant, so deleting a directory fired one unindexed lookup per file, all
  at once and unawaited.
- `listReaching` is a plain `fsentry_id IN (...)` on `idx_share_fsentry`. It
  runs behind every file write, and the join-plus-OR it replaced was
  unindexable.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>
2026-08-17 09:08:23 -04:00
Ayush tiwari fc861da89f feat: add Gemini 3.7 Flash (#3587)
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2026-08-16 23:51:37 -07:00
Parman Mohammadalizadeh facb844747 fix: derive express subdomain offset from the configured root domain (#3575)
Express derives `req.subdomains` by dropping a fixed number of labels
from the right of the hostname, defaulting to 2. A deployment whose
`domain` has more than two labels therefore reads its own root domain as
an active subdomain, so the user-site redirect sends the root origin to
the static hosting domain, which sends it back. Self-hosting docs
recommend exactly that shape (`puter.example.com`).

Set the offset from the label count of `config.domain`. Two-label
domains keep the express default, so existing deployments are unchanged.

Fixes #3561
2026-08-16 23:48:20 -07:00
Yashwarhade8010 3b791bb334 docs: update web search examples to gpt-5.6-luna (#3589) 2026-08-16 23:45:02 -07:00
Daniel Salazar a64a444a17 feat: batch delete for flush + metering fixes (#3593)
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2026-08-16 15:26:33 -07:00
Daniel Salazar d3c9828207 fix: metering gui maths (#3592) 2026-08-16 14:57:29 -07:00
Daniel Salazar 87180b1081 fix: metering (#3591) 2026-08-16 14:19:05 -07:00
Daniel Salazar d22b656df8 fix: metering issues with addons (#3588)
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2026-08-15 22:06:51 -07:00
Nariman Jelveh 19cd5f4476 feat: add BytePlus ModelArk providers (chat, image, video) (#3498)
* feat: add BytePlus ModelArk chat provider

Adds BytePlus ModelArk as a provider for the puter-chat-completion
driver, following the MiniMax/ZAI providers as reference per
doc/contributing-apis.md.

- OpenAI-compatible endpoint at ark.ap-southeast.bytepluses.com/api/v3
  (apiBaseUrl config selects the region)
- Static catalog of 16 chat models (Seed 2.x/1.x incl. vision, GLM,
  DeepSeek, GPT-OSS) with limits and per-token pricing from the
  official docs
- Passes Ark's thinking/response_format/stop params through custom;
  normalizes reasoning_content to reasoning
- Bare deepseek-v4-* names stay with the first-party DeepSeek
  provider; BytePlus only claims prefixed aliases
- Offline unit tests (mocked SDK against a real test server) plus an
  env-gated integration test

* feat: add BytePlus image and video providers

Extends the BytePlus ModelArk integration to the puter-image-generation
and puter-video-generation drivers, reusing the same services.byteplus
API key and regional apiBaseUrl as the chat provider.

Image (Seedream/SeedEdit via OpenAI-compatible /images/generations):
- dola-seedream-5-0-pro (pixel-tier pricing + billed input images from
  the 2nd on), seedream-5-0-lite, 4-5, 4-0, and seededit-3-0-i2i
- quality tiers 1K/1.5K/2K; aspect ratios resolve to Ark's documented
  pixel sizes; explicit WxH passes through with Ark's bounds enforced

Video (Seedance via Ark's async /contents/generations/tasks + polling):
- Seedance 2.0 / 2.0 Fast / 2.0 Mini / 1.5 Pro / 1.0 Pro / 1.0 Pro Fast
  (2.5 is priced but its API isn't live yet, so it's excluded)
- per-video-token billing from usage.completion_tokens, with per-second
  estimates feeding the credit cap; audio vs silent rates for 1.5 Pro
- first/last frame and reference-image inputs; generate_audio param
  added to IGenerateVideoParams

Pricing and capabilities hardcoded from the official docs (ModelArk
pages 1544106, 1330310, 1520757, 1521309, 1541523). Offline unit tests
mock the SDK / global fetch; integration tests are env-gated on
PUTER_TEST_AI_BYTEPLUS_API_KEY.

* fix: correct BytePlus catalogs and validation against the live API

Verified the three BytePlus providers against ModelArk with a real key;
these are the mismatches that surfaced.

- Drop seededit-3-0-i2i-250628. Ark reports it as Shutdown and every
  request 404s. Its now-unreachable image-to-image branches in the
  provider go with it.
- seedream-4-5 and the 5.0 series enforce a 3,686,400 pixel minimum, so
  they only accept the 2K tier. Mark them 2k-only and snap an
  unsupported tier up to the nearest allowed one, which also keeps the
  aspect-ratio table from mapping to a sub-minimum size.
- glm-4-7 has a 204,800 token context, not 256K.
- Guard the actor in the image provider like the video provider does.
- Round a sub-minimum video duration up to the shortest supported clip
  instead of reporting it as insufficient funds.
- Gate video resolution on the model's own dimensions; the dims table is
  shared across a family and accepts more than any one model does.

* Tighten BytePlus AI provider handling

Extract shared reasoning-content normalization for OpenAI-style chat providers, and harden BytePlus image/video behavior. This updates image tier and size validation, normalizes aspect ratios and input image refs, prevents mismatched BytePlus key/base URL fallback config, makes video resolution matching case-insensitive, and rejects excess reference images instead of silently truncating them. Tests were expanded to cover the new BytePlus request and validation paths.
2026-08-15 21:08:17 -07:00
404oops fc56075115 Merge pull request #3584 from rupesh0001-tech/rupesh
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feat(ai-chat): add grok-4.6 model to xai provider
2026-08-15 21:22:01 +02:00
404oops e1998e39ab Increase max_tokens limit to 500,000 2026-08-15 21:20:45 +02:00
Daniel Salazar fb7968a1c7 fix: metering hardening; handle burst of unfinished ai requests (#3585)
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2026-08-15 10:52:29 -07:00
rupesh0001-tech c88eeb3868 feat(ai-chat): add grok-4.6 model to xai provider
- Add grok-4.6 model definition with pricing and context specs
- Add aliases x-ai/grok-4.6 and grok-4.6-latest
- Add unit tests for alias resolution and metering calculation

Closes #3562
2026-08-15 20:32:22 +05:30
Reynaldi ChernandoandCopilot Autofix powered by AI 9e25ce1401 [PUT-1478] Add KV commands to CLI (#3579)
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* Add KV commands to CLI

* docs

* Potential fix for pull request finding

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-15 11:43:30 +07:00
Daniel Salazar f15d835eeb fix: restrict openai and anthropic compatible endpoints to be subscription (#3583)
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2026-08-14 18:55:15 -07:00
Daniel SalazarandClaude Fable 5 27c4506e02 feat: usage rendered as credits on a 50c base, free allowance doubled (#3569)
* feat: usage rendered as credits on a 50c base, free allowance doubled

Usage is now displayed in credits: a configurable creditsPerDollar rate
(default 2,000, making the free tier's 50c allowance an even
1,000-credit base) ships with the metering usage response, and the
dashboard's usage cards and per-API table show raw credit numbers
through one shared formatter. The dashboard budget math is also fixed —
capacity is spend plus server-netted remainder, so held purchased
credit can never render as negative usage. The registered-user free
allowance doubles to 50c, tier display names move to Basic/Plus/Pro,
and dead referral-promise strings leave the English dictionary.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: the credits display rate exists only in deployment config

No default in code and no rate on any wire the plan surfaces read: a
deployment that doesn't configure creditsPerDollar renders usage in
dollars, exactly as before credits existed. The usage endpoint sends
the rate only when configured, and nothing in code or comments states
what any deployment's rate is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: metering reports pre-scaled credits, never raw amounts

The usage, per-app usage, and cost-catalogue endpoints multiply every
monetary field by the config multiplier (renamed creditMultiplier)
before responding, and flag the unit; the multiplier itself never
ships. Counts, units, and byte figures pass through untouched. With no
multiplier configured the endpoints report raw amounts and clients
render dollars, as before credits existed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: absent addon fields stay absent when scaling to credits

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 16:29:01 -07:00
Neal Shah 6a7c09f54e blacklist dynamic workers (#3582) 2026-08-14 18:35:34 -04:00
Reynaldi Chernando 6254714484 deprecate gemini 2 flash and lite (#3581)
* deprecate gemini 2 flash and lite

* fix test
2026-08-14 17:27:48 -04:00
Neal Shah efa2cb4441 add more extensibility to workers driver (#3565) 2026-08-14 17:24:36 -04:00
Nariman Jelveh 4bc969b99e Update RecommendedAppsService.ts 2026-08-14 14:05:44 -07:00
Reynaldi Chernando 65f6d38432 update gpt 5.6 luna and terra pricing (#3580) 2026-08-14 16:38:13 -04:00
Daniel SalazarandClaude Fable 5 d641f6f7a1 tests: count only this test's dynamo reads in the block-window assertion (#3576)
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The spy sits on the test server's shared dynamo client, so a raw call
count also picks up background work and the async tail of earlier tests
in the file — which made the block-window test flakily report a third
read. Each test runs in its own random namespace, so filtering the
spy's calls to that namespace removes the cross-talk without loosening
the assertion.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 11:05:25 -07:00
Daniel SalazarandClaude Fable 5 00828b9998 fix: concurrency limiter heals legacy INCR keys instead of failing open (#3574)
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The zset rework of the redis concurrent backend (#3529) kept the same
key names the old INCR counter used. Against a leftover string key every
zset command in the acquire MULTI fails WRONGTYPE while the trailing
EXPIRE still succeeds — so steady traffic refreshes the stale key
forever, and the failed zcard result turned into NaN, which admitted
every caller unbounded. Release then errored WRONGTYPE on each request
(the '[concurrent] release failed' log storm).

Surface per-command MULTI errors instead of coercing them to NaN, and on
WRONGTYPE delete the legacy key and re-acquire against a clean zset.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 01:40:05 -07:00
Daniel SalazarandClaude Fable 5 126ec09556 docs: publish rate limits and quotas, and make limit changes move the docs (#3568)
Developer-facing reference for every rate limit, concurrency cap,
quota, and error shape — an advanced page, since puter.js already turns
the common failures into prompts. AGENTS.md and CONTRIBUTING.md now
carry the rule that a PR moving any of these numbers updates the page
in the same PR: an undisclosed limit is one developers discover as a
service failure.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 00:41:01 -07:00
jelveh 25a5799088 Update RecommendedAppsService.ts 2026-08-14 00:38:05 -07:00
Daniel SalazarandClaude Fable 5 ea2f9967a6 fix: over-quota batch uploads surface the storage prompt instead of failing quietly (#3566)
* fix: over-quota batch uploads surface the storage prompt instead of failing quietly

Partial batch failures now carry each item's code/status, and when every
failed item failed the same way the shared code/status is hoisted onto
the rejection itself — so an upload that exceeds the storage quota
rejects with storage_limit_reached/413 and the SDK's upload handler
shows the free-up-space prompt. A partial failure is also no longer
misread as the signed-batch endpoint being unavailable.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: out-of-storage copies prompt to upgrade the same way uploads do

Any fs operation the server refuses with 413 storage_limit_reached now
surfaces the upgrade prompt — the check that lived inline in upload's
error handler moves to a shared helper wired into the operation
scaffold's reject path, so copy/move/mkdir/rename get it too. The
desktop's copy/paste suppresses its generic alert for that code, since
the SDK dialog already explains the refusal and carries the fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 00:26:07 -07:00
Daniel Salazar ba9b885a5a Revert "feat: dashboard app search continues into the App Center (#3567)" (#3572)
This reverts commit 6cc241ac31.
2026-08-13 21:00:02 -07:00
Daniel SalazarandClaude Fable 5 6cc241ac31 feat: dashboard app search continues into the App Center (#3567)
A search that matches none of the user's own apps now puts the same
query to the App Center catalogue and renders the hits under the empty
state — debounced, filtered to apps the user doesn't already have, and
launchable in place.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 20:48:03 -07:00
Nariman Jelveh 7f8e24f06d fix: keep "Add an app" in the grid while searching
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Typing in the Apps tab's search dropped the tail tile — deliberately, on the
grounds that a query asks which apps you HAVE and a tile matching nothing has
no business in the answer. That reads the search too narrowly: looking for an
app you don't have is the same gesture as looking for one you do, and the
moment the search comes up short is exactly when the way to GET an app is
worth having on screen.

So the tile is pushed unconditionally now, and a query that matches nothing no
longer replaces the grid with a bare "No apps match your search" — the line
moves above a grid holding just that tile. Keeping it a real grid, rather than
parking a tile inside the empty state, is also what keeps it reachable: arrows
and Enter only walk tiles inside .myapps-page, and the tail tile carries
tabindex -1 for the pager's roving focus.

The no-apps-at-all state is untouched: with nothing installed and nothing
typed, the empty state still stands in for the whole grid.
2026-08-13 18:53:59 -07:00
Nariman Jelveh 9b6627b1ea fix: an app's background helper must stay private to it
`launchApp(name, args, { background: true })` hid the child's window and
nothing else, so the instance was hidden but not private: it kept its
taskbar item, lit the running dot on its dashboard tile, and — because
the dashboard enforces one instance per app — WAS what clicking that tile
opened. Minimize the parent, click the child's tile, and Puter handed the
user the window the parent was mid-conversation with; the app, which only
ever meant that instance for its caller, said so on screen. Showing it
also dropped the never-shown marker, so from then on the helper outlived
its launcher and owned the tile.

Hidden now means unreachable. `user_facing_windows` is the one rule: of
an app's windows, the ones that are the user's. Everything the user
drives filters through it — the tile's reopen and its running dot and
Quit item, the taskbar item's click, window list and show/hide/close-all,
the file row's switcher and open-file dot, and the dashboard's
Back/Forward — so a helper is never focused, restored, listed, or counted
as running. With none of the user's own left, the tile simply launches a
fresh instance and the helper keeps serving whoever launched it. Paths
that act on the APP rather than on a window it happens to have open —
uninstall, and a launcher's close taking its helpers down with it —
deliberately keep the unfiltered list.

The taskbar item is now what a hidden launch EARNS by becoming visible,
rather than something it advertises from the start; makeWindowVisible
adds it (and fires the dots event) before showing, since focusWindow
marks an item active and needs it to exist. Windows stamp data-in_taskbar
when they take their place in data-open-windows, so the close path only
decrements a count it actually joined — otherwise a helper closing beside
the user's own window would zero the count and strip the item off a
window still open. For the same reason a helper's close no longer pops
the dashboard URL: it never claimed an entry (the push only happens for a
window created visible), and consuming one would minimize the user's
window of the same app.

is_unseen_background_window gains the other half of its own definition:
launched hidden AND launched BY another app. An app that is always
windowless (`background` on the app record) starts hidden too, but when
the user opens it there is nobody it is serving — it is the instance
their tile has to find, or every click would start another one they
cannot see.
2026-08-13 18:38:13 -07:00
Nariman Jelveh 7576e0b03a fix: route dashboard file menus by input modality, not touch capability
A mouse right-click on a file row in the dashboard Files tab opened the
mobile context-menu sheet (centered over the row, nowhere near the
cursor) on any touch-capable laptop or desktop, because phone/tablet
detection used navigator.maxTouchPoints > 0. The same check applied the
.touch-device class, degrading mouse selection and drag on those
machines.

Route by how the menu was invoked (the row's tracked pointer type) plus
isTouchPrimaryDevice() — coarse pointer and no hover — which is false on
touch-capable laptops but true on iPads whose UA claims macOS. Also let
sidebar-folder and background menus accept taphold on such iPads, where
they were previously unreachable (taphold dismissed, and iOS never fires
native contextmenu).
2026-08-13 17:46:58 -07:00
Nariman Jelveh d980a9f590 fix: don't invert full-color icons in the dashboard context menu 2026-08-13 17:33:14 -07:00
Nariman Jelveh d18ea1adb5 fix: a background app must not outlive the app that launched it
An app launched with `background: true` gets a real window from the moment it
starts, just hidden. Nothing ever took it down: when the app that launched it
closed, the child kept running with no way to reach it and no reason to be
there. On the dashboard the only sign was a running dot on a tile the user had
never lit up, and clicking that tile did nothing at all.

Three things were wrong, and all three had to go:

A window nobody has seen now dies with its launcher. UIWindow's close path
closes hidden children the closing app launched, keyed on a marker stamped at
creation. makeWindowVisible drops that marker the first time the window becomes
visible — showing itself with `puter.ui.showWindow()`, or the user showing it —
because from then on the window is the user's, and keeps running.

The dashboard tile is a real handle again. focusExistingAppWindow only routed
MINIMIZED windows through showWindow(); a hidden one fell through to
focusWindow(), which leaves it invisible while handing it the keyboard. With no
taskbar in dashboard mode the tile is the only handle on a background app, so
that click had nowhere else to go. It now asks whether the window is on screen
at all. The Files tab's row-click had the same one-line defect.

And a background instance can't take a tile from the user's own session: an
on-screen window wins, then a window the user has seen, then a hidden one.

Removing the child then hit a crash of its own: ExecService's `remove` handler
dereferenced the launcher's iframe to say goodbye, and the launcher was already
gone. Throwing there aborts jQuery's remove() itself, so the window stayed in
the DOM — running dot and all. That one also hit anyone closing a background app
from the taskbar after its launcher had closed.

The predicates behind all of this live in one helper, window_visibility.js, with
showWindow() reading the same `hidden, not minimized` rule it spelled out inline
before.
2026-08-13 14:36:08 -07:00
Nariman Jelveh 08f075d774 Update RecommendedAppsService.ts 2026-08-13 11:45:28 -07:00
Nariman Jelveh 664de0016b fix: a hidden window must not hold the keyboard
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Launching an app to serve another one took focus away from the app the user
was working in, and they had to click it to get it back. Typing a guest name
into Calendar's event editor — which launches Contacts to read the address
book — dropped the user out of the field mid-word.

Four things conspired, all of them variations on "a window nobody can see is
treated as the window in front":

`window-active` was hardcoded into every window's markup, including windows
created hidden. focusWindow() — the thing that normally grants that class,
and strips it from everyone else — is already skipped for a hidden window, so
two windows ended up claiming it. It now follows the same rule as the
window_stack push a few lines above: visible windows only.

Both "focus the window once its IPC attaches" sites read that class to decide,
so a hidden child window pulled focus a beat after launching. Neither focuses
a window with data-is_visible="0" any more.

makeWindowInvisible left `window-active` on the window it had just hidden.
Since focusWindow() disables pointer events on every other app's iframe, an
app calling puter.ui.hideWindow() on itself left whoever launched it both
unfocused AND unclickable until the next click. It now hands activation back
to the top of the window stack, the way closing a window does, and drops
itself out of the activation order until it is shown again.

showWindow only ever un-minimized: for a window hidden by hideWindow() (which
keeps its geometry and writes no data-orig-*) every branch left it hidden and
stamped NaN geometry on it from the missing attributes. It now routes such a
window to makeWindowVisible. That is what makes the taskbar item a real
handle on a background app — clicking the item calls showWindow on the group.
2026-08-13 09:59:37 -07:00
Nariman Jelveh e273431f14 feat: let an app launch another app in the background
`puter.ui.launchApp(name, args)` had no way to say "I need this app's API,
not its window". That matters because we create and show an app's window
before the app's own code runs, so an app launched purely to serve another
one cannot avoid appearing on screen: the best it can do is call
`puter.ui.hideWindow()` once it boots, which reads as a window flashing
open and shut. In dashboard mode it was worse than a flash — the child
maximized into the tab and minimized its parent behind it, so asking a
service app a question took the user's app away from them.

So `launchApp` now accepts `background: true`, and the window starts
hidden. The app is otherwise entirely normal: it keeps its taskbar item,
so a user can see that it is running, show it, or close it, and it can
show itself with `puter.ui.showWindow()` whenever it has something to say.
Only a literal `true` counts, since the flag arrives over IPC from another
app.

The decision now lives in one predicate, `starts_hidden(app_info, options)`,
which folds this together with the existing app-level `background` flag and
is used everywhere the old flag was read — including the dashboard's
minimize-the-parent branch. `show_in_taskbar` deliberately still keys on the
app-level flag alone: an app that is always windowless has nothing to put in
the taskbar, while a background *launch* should stay visible there.

Existing callers are unaffected: with `background` unset, both paths
evaluate exactly as they did.
2026-08-13 09:47:35 -07:00
Daniel Salazar 8ed8feed4b fix: don't let an aborted upload take down the process (#3557)
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2026-08-13 01:02:17 -07:00
Daniel Salazar 22f5bf5429 fix: duplicate emails (#3556) 2026-08-12 22:00:48 -07:00
Nariman Jelveh 198184f986 fix: drop the feedback dialog's rate limit entirely
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Reopening still failed intermittently: any call the backoff refused looks
exactly like the user closing the dialog, so an app's "Send feedback"
button just did nothing, with nothing to see anywhere.

Rate limiting this dialog is not worth that. The other modals an app can
open with no user gesture — requestPermission, alert, prompt — have no
rate limit either, so one dialog at a time is the only rule left, and a
refusal now says so in the console.
2026-08-12 17:46:05 -07:00
Nariman Jelveh 026ae46530 fix: let an app reopen the feedback dialog after the user closes it
The abuse guard counted every dismissal that sent nothing as a strike
against the app, so closing the dialog blocked the app's next
showFeedbackDialog() for 10s, then 60s, then for the rest of the page's
life. The key is the app uuid, so relaunching the app did not clear it,
and a blocked call replies sent:false — the app just sees nothing happen.

Key the guard off how fast the app comes back instead. A reopen within a
second of the app's last dialog activity is machine-paced and gets the
same escalating backoff; attempts made while backed off count as activity
too, so a loop cannot wait out a tier and start from zero strikes. Any
human-paced reopen clears the app's record, so the tiers are only reached
by an app that reopens at machine speed several times running.

One dialog at a time, and a successful send clearing the record, are
unchanged.
2026-08-12 17:35:54 -07:00
Nariman Jelveh 0615c3aa3c feat: add "Show hidden" to the dashboard's folder context menu
The dashboard's files tab filtered out dot-files unconditionally, so
there was no way to reach them the way the desktop Explorer allows.
Add the same "Show hidden" toggle next to Refresh, driven by the
shared show_hidden_files preference so the two stay in sync, and dim
revealed rows with item-revealed like the Explorer does.

The socket-driven item.added path applies the same rule, so a hidden
file created elsewhere can't appear in a view that filtered its
siblings out.
2026-08-12 17:26:04 -07:00
Nariman Jelveh 748461aabb fix: show the new folder's row in the dashboard before mkdir answers (#3555)
* fix: show the new folder's row in the dashboard before mkdir answers

Both New Folder paths in the dashboard Files tab awaited mkdir before
drawing anything, so on a slow connection the button appeared to do
nothing for seconds. The toolbar path then did a full renderDirectory on
top of that -- a second round-trip, and with the default eventual
consistency the new folder could miss the listing entirely, leaving the
rename editor unopened.

Both now go through one createFolderInstant(), which renders the row
first: a locally predicted name (mirroring the backend's " (N)" dedupe
convention), a temporary uid, and the name editor already open. mkdir is
still asked for the plain "New Folder" path with rename: true, so the
server keeps owning deduplication; the prediction is only what we draw in
the meantime, and the row corrects itself if the two disagree. On failure
the row is withdrawn and the error is shown rather than swallowed.

Renaming is the next thing the user does and it needs the real uid, so
rename() awaits the create promise parked on the row. Everything else
that acts on the item -- open, menus, drag -- sits out while the row is
pending. mkdir's item.added comes back to the originating client (the
event carries no original_client_socket_id) and cannot match a temporary
uid, so _creatingItem still suppresses it, now as a counter: as a flag,
one create finishing uncovered another still in flight.

Two things found on the way:

- directory_depth_limit_exceeded had no translation key, so that alert
  (including the pre-existing desktop create_folder path) rendered the
  raw slug.
- The empty-directory notice is now restorable without refetching, since
  a withdrawn create has to put it back. It carries its own class because
  the loading overlay shares the same container.

Verified end to end against a dev backend with mkdir slowed to 3s:
toolbar and context-menu paths, rename and Escape before the response,
two overlapping creates, and a rejected mkdir.

* fix: don't draw the instant new-folder row while a listing is rebuilding

renderDirectory() clears .files before its readdir resolves, so a row
drawn during a load survives the clear and is left behind in whatever
directory the load lands on. Clicking the new-folder button while a
folder is still opening produced a row for `<old dir>/New Folder` sitting
in the new directory's listing, with the rename editor open on it —
clicking it navigated elsewhere and renaming it renamed a folder the user
wasn't looking at.

Drop the click while a rebuild is in flight, the same way renderDirectory
already drops navigation clicks that arrive while it renders.

* fix: stop drops onto a not-yet-created folder row from mangling files

A row drawn ahead of its mkdir carries a predicted path, but it was still
registered as a live drop target. Dropping a file on it called
move_items() with a destination that does not exist yet, and move treats
a non-existent destination as a rename target — so the dragged file was
silently renamed to "New Folder" instead of moving into the folder.
Reproduced against a slow mkdir: victim.txt became a 5-byte file named
"New Folder".

Sit the row out of the jQuery UI droppable (drop and the spring-load
hover) until the real fsentry lands, matching the guards already on
opening it, its menus and dragging it. The native-file dragster drop gets
the same guard: it uploads into the same predicted path.
2026-08-12 17:16:44 -07:00
Daniel Salazar 78cfe0c0f6 metrics: add metering buffer store coutns (#3554) 2026-08-12 15:55:03 -07:00
Nariman Jelveh 81f9f00fc0 fix: stop app feedback dialog clicks from focusing the iframe beneath
Clicking inside the feedback overlay (e.g. the textarea) reached
initgui's global mousedown -> focusWindow path: mouseover_window is
computed geometrically and is blind to the overlay, so focusWindow
focused the app window's iframe underneath — stealing keyboard focus
from the textarea and forwarding the click into the app.

Suppress it the established way (same fix as the dashboard app-group
panel): set window.mouseover_window = undefined in the overlay's own
mousedown handler, which runs before the document-level one; undefined
is the only value initgui's guard skips.
2026-08-12 15:00:32 -07:00
Nariman Jelveh 556380cf16 fix: keep app feedback send button blue on hover
The generic .app-feedback-btn:hover:not(:disabled) rule out-ranked the
.app-feedback-btn-primary:hover override (the :disabled argument inside
:not() counts toward specificity), so hovering Send repainted it with
the light --afb-hover background under white text. Strengthen the
primary hover selector so the blue gradient wins.
2026-08-12 13:42:11 -07:00
Daniel Salazar 908ec23eda fix: sanitize user data (#3552) 26.08.1 2026-08-12 12:08:54 -07:00
Juan Fernando Castro d5ae5a0049 🔧 PUR-1072: Flatten driver permissions to hardcoded values (#3545)
* refactor(permissions): drop hardcoded group permission map for a flat default

* test(drivers): assert credential-gate intent instead of a 403 proxy
2026-08-12 12:08:38 -07:00
Daniel Salazar 419d0aaa89 doc: update bounty doc 2 (#3551)
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2026-08-12 09:56:34 -07:00
Daniel Salazar c3a0c28705 docs: update bug bountu (#3550) 2026-08-12 09:55:13 -07:00
Nariman Jelveh 7ceb2090b7 feat: app user feedback system (#3546)
* feat: app user feedback system

Add puter.ui.showFeedbackDialog(), letting users send feedback to an
app's developer. In the app environment the Puter desktop renders the
dialog; on a third-party website a puter.com popup hosts it. The message
is stored in a new app_feedback table and emailed to the app owner's
confirmed email — it never passes through the app's own code.

Feedback is strictly opt-in per app via a new apps.feedback_enabled
column (a real column, not an app-metadata key, so Dev Center's
whole-blob metadata saves can't silently erase it), settable through the
existing puter.apps.update path (feedbackEnabled).

Backend follows the layered stack: AppFeedbackStore (durable count
queries) -> AppFeedbackService (opt-in check, message normalization,
abuse caps, best-effort owner email) -> AppFeedbackController
(POST /app-feedback, GET /app-feedback/target). New app-user-feedback
email template uses the escaping-safe nl2br triple-stash.

Defensive by design:
- requireUserActor blocks app tokens, so feedback can't be submitted
  programmatically; guiOriginOnly keeps cross-origin pages out.
- App identity comes only from the validated IPC sender (desktop) or the
  browser-attested opener origin (popup), never from message contents.
- The send-feedback popup action is in NON_AUTH_POPUP_ACTIONS, so it
  never delivers a token to the opener.
- Layered limits: route rate limits, plus DB-count caps that fail closed
  when the limiter backend is down, plus a per-app daily owner-email cap.
- Owner email is fully best-effort: an unconfigured transport,
  unconfirmed/unsubscribed/suspended owner, or send failure never fails
  the request or blocks storage.
- The dialog and SDK method are resolve-only and always settle, so a
  caller is never left hanging.

Migrations for sqlite/mysql/postgres, puter.js types, docs, backend
tests (sqlite + postgres), and a Playwright e2e spec are included.

* feat: add feedback control to the dashboard app-drawer

Surface the feedback dialog directly from the app window's chrome in
dashboard mode: apps that opt in (apps.feedbackEnabled) get a "Send
Feedback" button in the dashboard app-drawer, next to minimize/close.
It opens the same UIWindowAppFeedback dialog, targeting this app by uid.

The control is only rendered when the app opted in — feedback_enabled is
threaded from the launched app's metadata into the window options — and
the dialog still re-checks opt-in server-side, so a stale flag can't send
anywhere. Reuses the existing .dashboard-app-drawer-btn styling and the
app_feedback_title i18n string, so no new CSS or strings.

Adds e2e coverage: the control appears and opens the dialog for an
opted-in app, and is absent for an app that hasn't opted in.

* feat: enable app feedback by default in Dev Center

New apps created in Dev Center now have feedbackEnabled set on creation,
so users can send the developer feedback without any extra setup. A "User
Feedback" toggle in the app's settings lets developers turn it off (and
back on); it's wired into the save payload, the dirty-state tracking, and
the reset-to-original path like the neighboring toggles.

The Save update omits feedbackEnabled unless the toggle is present, and
the backend leaves an omitted field untouched, so the default survives
the create-then-save flow Dev Center runs. Add an SDK apps-suite guard
covering that round-trip (create-on -> unrelated update keeps it -> can
be turned off).

* fix: feedback modal polish + share sender email

Address four issues with the app feedback UI:

- Dashboard app-drawer: the extra "feedback" control pushed the close
  button past the drawer's derived width and clipped it. A `has-feedback`
  modifier widens the surface by one button + gap so all three controls
  fit. The control's glyph is now a message bubble with text lines, which
  reads more clearly at 14px than the previous bare speech bubble.

- The feedback dialog is no longer a UIWindow. It's a from-scratch
  overlay modal in the spirit of the dashboard modals (uninstall,
  add-app): a fixed scrim + centered card with self-contained,
  theme-aware color tokens (light default + dark override), a bottom-sheet
  layout on narrow screens, backdrop/Escape close, and an entrance
  transition. This renders consistently across the three contexts it's
  opened from (desktop app-IPC, dashboard drawer, standalone popup), so
  the callers no longer pass UIWindow-specific window_options.

- Feedback now shares the sender's email (not just their username) with
  the developer so they can respond: the owner email sets Reply-To to the
  sender and shows the address in the body — but only when the sender's
  email is verified (an unverified address could be anyone's, so it's
  never used as a reply target). EmailClient.send gains an optional
  replyTo. The dialog note now says the email will be shared.

Tests: e2e updated for the new modal (7 pass); backend feedback suite
covers the verified/unverified sender-email split (sqlite + postgres);
EmailClient + GUI unit suites pass; type-check clean.

* fix: resolve 'app-'-prefixed app names in feedback target lookup

APP_NAME_REGEX allows names beginning with "app-" (e.g. the seeded
app-center), but resolveTargetApp's startsWith('app-') heuristic sent
those to a uid-only lookup with no name fallback, so feedback for such
apps 403'd even when enabled. Use AppStore.resolveApp (uid, then name)
like the rest of the codebase.

* fix: make feedback daily caps fail closed under concurrent submissions

The per-user and per-user-per-app caps were check-then-insert and the
per-app email cap was count-then-send, so parallel requests (or multiple
nodes, or the route limiter failing open) could all read a stale
under-cap count and push past every limit — the exact scenario the
DB-backed caps exist to stop.

Now the user caps recount after the insert (own row included) and roll
the row back with 429 if a burst breached them, and the email cap claims
its slot (email_sent=1) before sending, recounts, and releases the slot
if over cap or if the send fails.

* docs: disclose the Dev Center's feedback-on-by-default in SDK docs/types

The Dev Center deliberately creates apps with feedbackEnabled (see
32c950de5), but the SDK docs, apps.d.ts, and AppFeedbackService's class
doc all described feedback as strictly opt-in / default-false with no
qualification — so a Dev Center developer reading them would wrongly
conclude feedback is off for their app. State the Dev Center behavior
alongside the API default, and correct the update-path docs: an omitted
feedbackEnabled leaves the current value unchanged rather than
defaulting to false.

* fix: don't mint a user-app token as a side effect of the feedback popup

Every embedded_in_popup boot ran the user-app token exchange, and the
exchange is a write: /auth/get-user-app-token bootstraps an app row for
the opener origin, grants flag:app-is-authenticated (what makes the
site count as connected to the account), and creates its AppData dir.
So merely opening — or immediately cancelling — a send-feedback popup
recorded a user<->site relationship the read-only feedback flow never
needs: the server resolves the feedback target from the attested origin
without any of it.

Gate the exchange behind runsUserAppTokenExchange(action) in all three
popup paths that mint (main postAuthActions exchange, temp-user signup
success, manual signup fallback). request-permission keeps the exchange
since grants are written against the app row it bootstraps.

* fix: refuse feedback when the deployment cannot deliver it

With no email transport configured (the common self-hosted default),
submissions were stored in app_feedback — a table with no read path
beyond the abuse-cap COUNTs — the owner email was silently skipped, and
the sender was still shown 'Feedback sent. Thank you!'. The developer
never learns the feedback exists while the user believes it was
delivered.

Gate acceptsFeedback on clients.email.isConfigured so the pre-flight
reports enabled:false (the dialog shows its 'not accepting feedback'
pane) and submit returns 403 instead of swallowing messages. Owner-level
store-without-email cases (unconfirmed owner email, per-app email cap
overflow) keep their existing deliberate semantics.

* fix: settle showFeedbackDialog instead of hanging on older host GUIs

In the app environment showFeedbackDialog awaited an IPC reply with no
capability check. A host GUI that predates this feature (self-hosted
Puter running the live js.puter.com SDK) has no handler for the message
and never replies, so the promise documented as 'never rejects' also
never resolved.

The GUI now advertises the IPC dialogs it can answer via a
puter.gui_features param on the app iframe URL, and the SDK resolves
false when 'feedback-dialog' isn't listed. A reply timeout could not
substitute: legitimate replies only arrive when the user closes the
dialog, so any timeout would false-negative while the user is typing.
Older SDKs ignore the extra param.

* fix: guard app-triggered feedback dialog against desktop-lockout loops

The showFeedbackDialog IPC handler had no re-entry or abuse guard, and
the dialog it opens is a full-viewport overlay above the taskbar and
every window — so 'while (true) await puter.ui.showFeedbackDialog()'
kept the desktop permanently covered (for signed-out users, the same
loop spams the full-page signup window instead). Every dismissal just
settled the promise and let the app immediately reopen it.

Allow one dialog at a time, and back off reopens per app after each
dismissal that sent nothing: 10s, then 60s, then blocked until page
reload. A successful send resets the backoff, and user-initiated paths
(dashboard drawer) are unaffected since they don't go through IPC.

* fix: carry feedback_enabled in suggested/recommended app summaries

launch_app uses options.app_obj verbatim when provided, and the
suggested-apps launch paths (open_item.js, UIWindowSearch.js,
UIDesktop.js) pass summaries from toAppSummary — which omitted
feedback_enabled. So an opted-in editor launched by opening a .txt file
showed no Send Feedback control in the dashboard drawer, while the same
app launched from the Apps tab (full puter.apps.get object) did.

* fix: gate feedback dialog Cancel/X on an in-flight submit

Escape and backdrop clicks were already ignored while the POST was
pending, but the X, Close, and Cancel buttons weren't — clicking one
mid-send settled the promise false and tore down the overlay while the
submission still landed server-side: the developer got the email, the
app was told sent=false, and a user who resubmitted 'the failed one'
sent a duplicate and burned a daily-cap slot.

Apply the same !sending gate to the buttons and disable them visually
while the send is in flight.

* fix: reject feedback origins longer than the source_origin column

readTargetParam accepted values up to 3000 chars but the raw origin is
stored verbatim into source_origin VARCHAR(2048) (MySQL/Postgres), so a
2049-3000 char origin passed every validation and then blew up the
INSERT with an HTTP 500 on Postgres/strict MySQL — or was silently
truncated on non-strict MySQL, corrupting the abuse-forensics value the
column exists for. Cap the param at the column size.

* fix: make the feedback dialog's privacy note match what is shared

The note unconditionally said 'Your email address will be shared with
the developer so they can respond', but AppFeedbackService shares the
username always and the email only when it exists and is verified — an
unverified or temp-user sender was promised a reply path that never
materializes, and nobody was told about the username.

Show 'username and email' when the signed-in user's email is verified,
and 'username' otherwise.

* fix: stop HTML-escaping email subject lines

Subjects were compiled with default Handlebars escaping, so the
app-user-feedback subject rendered a title like "Bob's App & Games" as
"Bob&#x27;s App &amp; Games" — literal entities in the recipient's mail
client. Subjects are plain-text headers, not HTML; compile them with
noEscape. Header safety is unaffected: the transport encodes newlines
and free-form values collapse whitespace upstream.

* docs: state exactly what showFeedbackDialog shares with the developer

The doc claimed the dialog 'tells the user their username will be
shared', while the dialog's note talked only about the email address and
the implementation shares the username always plus the email (as
Reply-To) only when verified. Describe the actual disclosure: username
always, email when verified.

* docs: document the COOP false-resolve limitation of showFeedbackDialog

Under COOP the popup's opener link is severed, so the SDK deliberately
resolves false while the popup stays open and the user can still submit
(a feedback submission has no server read-back the way a permission
grant does). The documented contract ('resolves to true if the user
submitted feedback') was silently wrong on cross-origin-isolated pages —
state the limitation in the doc and the SDK jsdoc: false means 'not
confirmed', not 'not sent'.

* feat: point the feedback email footer at the Dev Center

The footer told developers to turn feedback off via a puter.apps.update
one-liner, but the toggle lives in the Dev Center app settings — and
Dev Center is where apps get feedback enabled by default in the first
place. Reword it to 'manage it in the Dev Center' with a link built
from config.origin (like app_link) so it holds on self-hosted
deployments.

* test: cover the feedback service and store layers directly

The service owns every feedback business rule — target resolution,
eligibility, message normalization, the durable caps, and the owner-email
preconditions — but was only reachable through the controller's tests. Give
it and the store their own suites so a regression names the layer it broke.

Service coverage adds the branches the route tests could not reach: a
blocked origin resolving to null rather than surfacing a 403, owners who are
suspended or unsubscribed, length measured after normalization, the 24h cap
window boundary, subject-header injection via the app title, and the email
links being rooted at config.origin.

The two describes already labelled `AppFeedbackService ...` move out of the
controller test, which keeps only the caller-facing promise that a failed
send still returns success.

* refactor: prep the feedback cap error once instead of via a factory

Both throw sites are in one call and only one can ever run, so a plain
const reads the same and drops a function that existed only to defer a
constructor.

* Require verified users for app feedback API

Add `requireVerified: true` to both app feedback routes (`GET /target` and `POST /`) in `AppFeedbackController`. This tightens access control so only verified user accounts can fetch feedback targets or submit app feedback.
2026-08-12 09:49:24 -07:00