* fix: open shared links with the intended account
* refactor: validate shared account hints in the GUI
* fix: scope the shared-link account hint to plain top-level visits
The hint no longer switches accounts in popups, embeds or action flows, and
only counts next to a share path the GUI would open. It is dropped from the
URL before any switch or prompt, so a reload never asks again. An unsaved
recipient gets a dismissible choice (sign in, or continue as the current
account) instead of a picker with no way out.
---------
Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>
* feat: let the Contact Us form carry screenshots and recordings
The form doubles as our bug-report channel, and the bugs worth reporting
are often the ones that need a picture: a visual glitch, or something that
takes five steps to reach. Up to 5 images or videos may now ride along
with the message, delivered as attachments on the support email.
Nothing the client says about a file is believed. The endpoint takes bare
base64 and re-derives all three of the things that matter from the decoded
bytes:
- Type, sniffed from magic numbers and matched against an allow-list of
PNG/JPEG/GIF/WebP and MP4/QuickTime/WebM. A declared MIME is never read,
so it cannot smuggle anything past the list. SVG is excluded on purpose
(it carries script, and support tooling renders what it is sent), as are
the non-video brands that share MP4's `ftyp` box -- HEIC, M4A, JPEG 2000.
- The file name, reduced to a display label with the extension taken from
the sniffed type. PNG bytes named `payload.html` arrive as
`payload.png`; a name can never carry the CR/LF that would break out of
a Content-Disposition header, nor the bidi overrides that make
`report<RLO>gnp.exe` render as `report.exe.mp4`.
- Size: 10 MB per file, 15 MB per submission, counted on decoded bytes.
Encoded length is capped before decoding, so an oversized payload costs
a length check rather than a 10 MB allocation. The total stays well
under the 25 MB most providers enforce, since the outgoing mail base64s
these again.
Base64 is decoded strictly, reusing the round-tripping decoder that
already guards app icons -- `Buffer.from(s, 'base64')` silently drops
characters it does not recognise, and the round-trip is what rejects
bytes smuggled after the payload. That decoder and the image sniffer move
from appIcon.ts to a new mediaSniff.ts, which gains the video counterpart.
One request is now worth megabytes of parsing and outbound mail, so the
existing per-user rate limit gains a per-IP backstop (which the per-user
counter cannot see through freshly minted accounts), a concurrency cap,
and a Content-Length gate that refuses an impossible body before anything
decodes it.
Payloads are not stored. They ride the email; the new
`feedback.attachments` column records names, types and sizes only, so an
abusive submission stays attributable once the mail has been dealt with.
Also fixes the form posting an empty message when Send was pressed with
nothing typed, and surfaces submit failures instead of leaving the button
disabled with no explanation.
* fix: stream Contact Us attachments as multipart instead of base64 JSON
Base64 in a JSON body went through the global JSON parser before the route
ran: raw buffer, rawBody copy, decoded string, parsed strings, then decoded
Buffers plus a re-encode for the strict check. A max-size submission peaked
around 110-135 MB of heap for 15 MB of files, and the route's Content-Length
check ran after all of it.
Attachments now arrive as multipart/form-data, which the global parser skips.
Auth, rate limit, concurrency and the Content-Length 413 all run before the
body is read, and busboy enforces the count, per-file and total caps while
streaming, so only the decoded file bytes are held (~16 MB peak). On a broken
limit the reader stops and the response closes the connection.
JSON stays supported for message-only posts; a JSON `attachments` field is
rejected.
* fix: deliver Contact Us 413s instead of resetting the upload
Closing the socket on a mid-stream limit sent the 413 and then reset the
connection with the client still uploading, so the client could see a
reset instead of the error. After a limit trips, the rest of the body is
now read and discarded, bounded by the body budget; past the budget the
request is destroyed.
Adds an HTTP-level test through the full middleware stack (FormData
upload, unauthenticated refusal, 413 on declared length before the body
is sent, 413 on a chunked upload over the per-file cap), trims comments
to the AGENTS.md length rule, and drops a box-drawing test divider.
---------
Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>
Browser uploads (Dev Center deploy, puter.fs.upload) PUT file bytes
directly to presigned URLs on the public S3 endpoint. That cross-origin
PUT is preflighted, and the bucket had no CORS rules, so RustFS answered
without Access-Control-Allow-Origin and the browser blocked the upload.
s3-init now runs put-bucket-cors on every boot after ensuring the bucket
exists (idempotent). Origins are open because the presigned URL is the
credential and the SDK sends no cookies. Document how to re-run and
verify in doc/self-hosting.md.
Adds the Mistral and document-annotation img2txt examples to the
playground, states that Textract takes no options, and drops the
normalize mentions from the img2txt docs and types.
The SDK now checks Mistral inline sources against the size a base64
upload can reach inside the 50 MB JSON body (36 MB) instead of the
10 MB Textract limit; 50 MB let 38-50 MB inputs through to a body-parser
413. Retired-model messages no longer cite vendor dates.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Model sync against Mistral's listing, docs and a live call per id:
mistral-ocr-latest now serves OCR 4.1, so the catalog pins it (with
mistral-ocr-4 and the retired-but-redirected 2503) to mistral-ocr-4-1,
adds mistral-ocr-4-0 and OCR 3 (mistral-ocr-2512 / -3 / -3-0), and
rejects the retired mistral-ocr-2505 before any upstream call. Mistral
usage is metered per model at vendor rates: $4/1000 pages for OCR 4.x
with $5 annotations, $2 and $3 for OCR 3, replacing the flat $1 and $3.
Textract now calls DetectDocumentText instead of AnalyzeDocument with
LAYOUT. The layout feature cost $4/1000 pages while we billed the
$1.50 detect rate, and it only added text-less LAYOUT_* blocks that put
blank lines into img2txt output. Multi-page PDFs and unsupported
formats become a 400 that names Mistral as the alternative.
Request shape: a model name alone now selects its provider, so calls
differ only by model; an explicit provider still picks its default and
must agree with the model. Mistral options gain tableFormat,
extractHeader, extractFooter and documentAnnotationPrompt; annotation
formats accept the REST (json_schema.schema) or SDK
(jsonSchema.schemaDefinition) spelling and are validated before
billing. Non-image documents such as DOCX go as document_url.
Response shape: both providers return model, text and blocks with a
0-based page; Mistral also returns document_annotation, which was
billed but dropped. img2txt resolves to that annotation when
documentAnnotationFormat is set and to the text otherwise; the return
is a string for every model, so normalize has no effect on it.
Input size: OCR input is capped at the provider limit (10 MB Textract,
50 MB Mistral), and web inputs in loadFileInput are streamed under the
cap instead of buffered whole, which also bounds speech2txt URLs.
Docs: img2txt models, options, input limits, return value and errors;
OCR limits in the quotas page.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
OpenAI's o3-pro, Mistral's mistral-large-2512 and zai-glm-5-2, and
DeepSeek's deepseek-v4-flash / deepseek-v4-flash-vision-exp are no
longer served by their upstream APIs, so drop them from the hardcoded
provider model lists (closesHeyPuter/puter#3945).
DeepSeek's legacy chat/reasoner aliases and default model previously
pointed at deepseek-v4-flash; they now resolve to deepseek-v4-pro, the
remaining model in that catalog, so existing callers keep working.
Signed-off-by: Anuj Shrivastava <anujshrivastava10e@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Anuj Shrivastava <anuj.shrivastava@btr.group>
* fix(kv): keep disableSharing entries out of other apps' events (PUT-1876)
Private kv keys and values are no longer delivered to cross-app subscriptions, including forwarded and durable deliveries.
* fix(fs): refuse usernames whose home path still holds another account's rows (PUT-1877)
Username claims (signup, save_account, change-username, OIDC, team provisioning) now also check for leftover rows under /<name>/, and the root listing only returns the actor's own home.
* fix(puter-js): reconnect the events channel after a server-side disconnect (PUT-1881)
A server hang-up is retried with a bounded backoff; persistent handlers survive it and get an optional onError when the connection can't be restored.
* fix(backend): let the graceful shutdown finish before telemetry exits (PUT-1948)
The telemetry preload no longer exits on signals; the entry point drains, tears down top-down, flushes telemetry last, then exits. DB pools stay open until teardown.
* fix(fs): reserve quota for signed uploads in progress (PUT-1880)
startWrite/startBatchWrite hold each upload's declared size in a per-owner cache reservation until it completes, aborts or expires, so a burst of starts can't all read the same committed usage. Caps in-flight uploads at 10,000 per account.
* fix(fs): refuse to complete a signed upload whose object never arrived (PUT-1951)
Completion now 400s when the object store reports the key missing (transient errors stay lenient), abort no longer deletes an object a live entry still uses, and a ghost entry is only removed after a second miss at its recorded location.
* fix(metering): move usage to v2 keys with a small totals item, per-model detail shards and a 3-month TTL (PUT-1949)
The billed item holds only totals; per-model detail lives in 100 hash-sharded items read in one batch and cached for 60s, and more than 5,000 distinct usage types in a month fold into other. Global and per-app aggregates store totals only, appTotals comes from a prefix listing, a refused path only skips the key that refused it, exact reads near the allowance are throttled per key, and every metering record expires after 3 months. September usage restarts at deploy; the monthly-charge claim stays on the v1 key through September so recurring charges don't fire twice.
* test(events): let the worker backoff test tolerate a loaded run
* feat(events): scale KV event fan-out with the key owner's plan
A KV change delivers to up to 512 matching subscriptions (2,048 filter evaluations) for a paid key owner and 128 (512) otherwise, inline values are dropped once more than 128 match, and paid accounts may hold up to 512 share handles per app. The owner's plan is only looked up when a change has more candidates than any cap.
* test(metering): seed the 150-app listing test directly so it fits under coverage
Closing an account that owns a team left `owner_user_id` NULL while
`deleted_at` stayed NULL, so the team remained live while every team
route resolves by membership — which the deletion cascades away. The team
could then not be administered by anyone, and the accounts it provisioned
could not be closed. Declined now in both directions: live teams via
`countOwned`, and soft-deleted ones still holding accounts via a new
store read, since a deleted team's accounts are suspended rather than
removed.
The cap lock gave up after 200ms and proceeded unserialized, so
overlapping provisioning could each read the seat count before any insert
committed. It declines instead; a single create never contends. An
unreachable lock backend is a 503 rather than a silent pass.
An account a team provisioned can no longer create a team of its own
(PUT-1890) — that is not the intended lifecycle, since such accounts do
not go through the normal sign-up path. Keyed on `org_owned = 1`, so the
owner and joined members are unaffected, and not via `teamsAvailableTo`,
which is permissive by design.
The directory declines scoped access tokens, as `listMembers` already
bounds non-account callers.
* fix(tools): spawn npm.cmd through a shell on Windows
* fix(tools): join the npm command line on Windows to avoid DEP0190
Passing args alongside shell: true warns on Node 24. Test the spawn
tuple as data and run a real npm spawn instead of mocking child_process.
---------
Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>
* feat: allow browser extension origins in auth requests
Add chrome-extension://, moz-extension://, safari-extension://, safari-web-extension://, and extension:// to the protocol allow-list so browser extensions can obtain app tokens via /auth/get-user-app-token.
Extract WEB_AND_EXTENSION_PROTOCOLS constant in validation.js so the allow-list is defined once and shared by AuthService, AppStore, and AppDriver.
* fix: harden the extension-origin allow-list
Review follow-ups on the extension-origin change:
- Require a host in `validateUrl`. Only "special" schemes need an
authority, so `chrome-extension:` parsed with an empty hostname and
slipped past the reserved-system-host guard in AppDriver.
- Lowercase the host in `AuthService#normalizedOrigin`. `new URL()`
lowercases http(s) hosts but leaves opaque ones alone, so one
extension in two spellings resolved to two app uids — two AppData
trees, two permission sets — and missed the origin blocklist.
- Drop `extension:`. No browser emits it, and it accepted
`extension://evil.com` as an app origin.
- Freeze the allow-list and derive `validateUrl`'s http(s) default from
`WEB_PROTOCOLS` so the two spellings can't drift apart.
- Pin the tests to the real uid derivation, use unique extension ids so
a row left by another test can't mask the bootstrap path, and cover
the host-less and near-miss schemes.
- Fix the prettier/eslint failure in AppStore.js.
---------
Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>
Signup links can carry a bonusCode. Core checks its shape and previews it through `puter.signup-bonus.check`, refuses a dead code before the abuse hook records the attempt, then hands a live one to `puter.signup-bonus.validate` after `puter.signup.validate`, which may raise the phone/card gates; the accepted code rides on `puter.signup.success`, and OIDC carries it in the signed state. `user.card-verified` is now awaited like `user.phone-verified`. The signup form shows the offer and sends the code.
Tokens under the `oidc-state` scope share one signing key, so the payload is
what says which job a token belongs to. The popup-return proof now carries a
`purpose` claim, and each verifier accepts exactly one kind of token.
The return leg also sets a single-use companion cookie, mirroring the nonce
`/start` already uses, and stamps the action its redirect lands on. Redeeming
a proof requires the matching cookie — consumed on success only, so a rejected
call can't invalidate an in-flight return — and the popup honors only a proof
minted for its own action.
The cookie is host-only, so `/auth/oidc/verify-popup-return` is also served on
the GUI origin and the popup redeems it same-origin. The return leg always
lands the popup on `config.origin`, where both the cookie and the route live.
* fix: new cache costs for claude
* fix: refuse app-issued scoped tokens on events handler and worker routes
An access token an app mints (e.g. a getReadURL() token) resolves
effectiveApp to the issuing app, so #handlerApp and listEventsWorkers
treated it as the app: it could publish, remove and list handlers, and
list or destroy the app's worker, regardless of its permission manifest.
Refuse any scoped token there, as the kv-handle routes already do.
* test: freeze the clock before the first backoff read in workerInvoker
The first hold was read on real time, so a slow run measured the 2s
backoff as 1s.
A public origin-bootstrap app row planted on an alternate hosting domain
could resolve ahead of the owner's private app and skip the private
access gate (PUT-1883).
- get-user-app-token canonicalizes hosted-subdomain origins before uid
derivation and bootstrap, so every hosting variant shares one app row
- the app create/update conflict check crosses hosting-domain variants,
so an existing alt-host stub is absorbed by the owner's create
- resolveOwnedAppForHostedSite and the canonical-uid lookup order
matches private-first with a deterministic id tiebreak
- GET /teams and /teams/:uid/members admit apps for teams whose owner opened
the directory; apps get active members' usernames only
- events.workers.list() from an app returns only its own worker
- hide account-session-only SDK methods from the public types
- unpublish the updateProfile docs page (redirects to getProfile)
- revokeReadURL() works through a new /auth/revoke-own-access-token route
* feat(ai): sync GPT-6 Sol, GPT-6 Luna, and Claude Opus 5.5
* chore: remove documentation changes from model sync
* fix(ai): bill OpenAI cache writes and long-context pricing
GPT-5.6 and later bill prompt-cache writes at 1.25x input and report them
in `cache_write_tokens`, inside the input total. Both OpenAI calculators now
split them out of the prompt count and meter them under their own key, and
the six GPT-5.6+ models carry the rate.
GPT-6, GPT-5.6, GPT-5.5 and GPT-5.4 (incl. Pro) bill a request with more
than 272K input tokens at 2x input (cached reads and cache writes included)
and 1.5x output for the whole request. Models declare this as
`long_context_pricing`, and the ledger overrides, the reported `usd_cents`
and the credit gate all apply the multipliers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ai): bill GPT-5.6 Sol at OpenAI's promotional pricing
The catalog carried GPT-5.5's $5/$0.50/$30, but OpenAI bills GPT-5.6 Sol
at $4/$0.40/$20 per million input/cached/output tokens, promotional
through at least 2026-11-21. PUT-1943 tracks re-checking before then.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`ExecService.launchApp`, reachable from `puter.ui.launchApp`, launched any
named app with no check on the target. Gate it: a godmode target may only
be launched by a godmode caller. Desktop launches (tile, double-click,
URL) call `launch_app` directly and are unaffected; `connectToInstance`
already had its own allowlist.
A root was free to be renamed or moved, so it could be parked on a
username no account held yet. The next account to take that name
provisioned a second root at the same path, and from then on either row
could answer a lookup of it — new entries inherit their owner from
whichever row resolved as the parent, so one account's files were
created owned by the other, and renaming the parked root dragged the
other account's subtree along with it.
Rename and move now refuse a root, every username claim checks the home
path before the user row is written, and renameUserHome refuses to heal
onto a path another account holds.
Filip Kujundžić