* docs: add the easy perms recipe
Covers the supported surface: request() and check(). Adds the perms
recipe tag the build validates against.
* docs: add a playground example per operation in the perms recipe
One runnable example for each section: request a folder, request the
email address, request apps or subdomains, and check before prompting.
* docs: open the perms recipe with what it lets an app build
* docs: ground the perms examples in the UI that would ask
A photo editor exporting to Pictures, a checkout emailing a receipt, a
launcher listing apps, and a settings toggle that reads its own state
without raising a prompt.
* refine
---------
Co-authored-by: Reynaldi Chernando <reynaldichernando@gmail.com>
* docs: add the easy fs sharing recipe
share(), listShared(), getShares() and unshare() — the fs ground the
existing recipes do not already cover.
* docs: add a playground example per operation in the fs sharing recipe
One runnable example for each section of the recipe: share, mode,
listShared, getShares and unshare.
* docs: open the sharing recipe with what it lets an app build
* docs: ground the sharing examples in a document-editor flow
Each example now sits in the UI that would call it — a Share button, a
role picker, a shared-with-me inbox, an access list, ending a review.
* remove redundant examples and refine recipe
---------
Co-authored-by: Reynaldi Chernando <reynaldichernando@gmail.com>
The existing team-share suite resolves shares through listings and store
reads, neither of which enters the permission scan, so a scan that never
terminates leaves it green. These ask the question the product asks —
can this member open the file — via ACLService.check.
Add claude-sonnet-5-5 ($2/$10 per MTok, 1M context, 128K output) and move
the bare claude-sonnet / claude-sonnet-latest aliases to it. Sonnet 5.5
rejects non-default sampling params and disabled thinking, so it joins the
temperature-omit, effort, and adaptive-thinking gates.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
create() inserted on the primary then read the row back through the
replica, so a replica that had not caught up answered the same as a team
that was not there and the call threw. Nothing rolled the insert back,
and the owner membership was never written, leaving a team its owner
could not see but which still counted against their cap.
Read back through pread in create() and update(), seed the row cache
with the result, and delete the row if the read-back still finds
nothing. #cached no longer stores a null, which would otherwise hold a
lagging replica's answer for the full TTL.
The group path recursed without the anti-cycle state, so a grant issued
into a group the issuer belongs to resolved back into itself and the
scan did not terminate. Thread the scan state through the group scanner
and skip an issuer already on the path, matching the user-to-user path.
Readings produced under a non-empty path are pruned for that path only,
so they are no longer written to or served from the shared scan cache.
* fix: open shared links with the intended account
* refactor: validate shared account hints in the GUI
* fix: scope the shared-link account hint to plain top-level visits
The hint no longer switches accounts in popups, embeds or action flows, and
only counts next to a share path the GUI would open. It is dropped from the
URL before any switch or prompt, so a reload never asks again. An unsaved
recipient gets a dismissible choice (sign in, or continue as the current
account) instead of a picker with no way out.
---------
Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>
* feat: let the Contact Us form carry screenshots and recordings
The form doubles as our bug-report channel, and the bugs worth reporting
are often the ones that need a picture: a visual glitch, or something that
takes five steps to reach. Up to 5 images or videos may now ride along
with the message, delivered as attachments on the support email.
Nothing the client says about a file is believed. The endpoint takes bare
base64 and re-derives all three of the things that matter from the decoded
bytes:
- Type, sniffed from magic numbers and matched against an allow-list of
PNG/JPEG/GIF/WebP and MP4/QuickTime/WebM. A declared MIME is never read,
so it cannot smuggle anything past the list. SVG is excluded on purpose
(it carries script, and support tooling renders what it is sent), as are
the non-video brands that share MP4's `ftyp` box -- HEIC, M4A, JPEG 2000.
- The file name, reduced to a display label with the extension taken from
the sniffed type. PNG bytes named `payload.html` arrive as
`payload.png`; a name can never carry the CR/LF that would break out of
a Content-Disposition header, nor the bidi overrides that make
`report<RLO>gnp.exe` render as `report.exe.mp4`.
- Size: 10 MB per file, 15 MB per submission, counted on decoded bytes.
Encoded length is capped before decoding, so an oversized payload costs
a length check rather than a 10 MB allocation. The total stays well
under the 25 MB most providers enforce, since the outgoing mail base64s
these again.
Base64 is decoded strictly, reusing the round-tripping decoder that
already guards app icons -- `Buffer.from(s, 'base64')` silently drops
characters it does not recognise, and the round-trip is what rejects
bytes smuggled after the payload. That decoder and the image sniffer move
from appIcon.ts to a new mediaSniff.ts, which gains the video counterpart.
One request is now worth megabytes of parsing and outbound mail, so the
existing per-user rate limit gains a per-IP backstop (which the per-user
counter cannot see through freshly minted accounts), a concurrency cap,
and a Content-Length gate that refuses an impossible body before anything
decodes it.
Payloads are not stored. They ride the email; the new
`feedback.attachments` column records names, types and sizes only, so an
abusive submission stays attributable once the mail has been dealt with.
Also fixes the form posting an empty message when Send was pressed with
nothing typed, and surfaces submit failures instead of leaving the button
disabled with no explanation.
* fix: stream Contact Us attachments as multipart instead of base64 JSON
Base64 in a JSON body went through the global JSON parser before the route
ran: raw buffer, rawBody copy, decoded string, parsed strings, then decoded
Buffers plus a re-encode for the strict check. A max-size submission peaked
around 110-135 MB of heap for 15 MB of files, and the route's Content-Length
check ran after all of it.
Attachments now arrive as multipart/form-data, which the global parser skips.
Auth, rate limit, concurrency and the Content-Length 413 all run before the
body is read, and busboy enforces the count, per-file and total caps while
streaming, so only the decoded file bytes are held (~16 MB peak). On a broken
limit the reader stops and the response closes the connection.
JSON stays supported for message-only posts; a JSON `attachments` field is
rejected.
* fix: deliver Contact Us 413s instead of resetting the upload
Closing the socket on a mid-stream limit sent the 413 and then reset the
connection with the client still uploading, so the client could see a
reset instead of the error. After a limit trips, the rest of the body is
now read and discarded, bounded by the body budget; past the budget the
request is destroyed.
Adds an HTTP-level test through the full middleware stack (FormData
upload, unauthenticated refusal, 413 on declared length before the body
is sent, 413 on a chunked upload over the per-file cap), trims comments
to the AGENTS.md length rule, and drops a box-drawing test divider.
---------
Co-authored-by: Daniel Salazar <daniel.salazar@puter.com>
Browser uploads (Dev Center deploy, puter.fs.upload) PUT file bytes
directly to presigned URLs on the public S3 endpoint. That cross-origin
PUT is preflighted, and the bucket had no CORS rules, so RustFS answered
without Access-Control-Allow-Origin and the browser blocked the upload.
s3-init now runs put-bucket-cors on every boot after ensuring the bucket
exists (idempotent). Origins are open because the presigned URL is the
credential and the SDK sends no cookies. Document how to re-run and
verify in doc/self-hosting.md.
The Security tab only rendered the 2FA card for accounts with a confirmed
email, so a seat — provisioned without one by design — had no way to
enrol from the UI at all. It was the GUI twin of the enable-route check
fixed earlier: the rule could be required of accounts that could not
satisfy it. The card now shows for a seat too, giving it the ordinary
authenticator flow: QR, manual secret, six-digit code, recovery codes.
Disabling is refused while the seat's team requires 2FA. Without that a
member could switch off the factor their team mandates and lock
themselves out of everything until they enrolled again.
No method pages: requiring 2FA and resetting a member's factor are team
administration, which the docs deliberately do not publish — only
`list`, `listMembers` and `listDirectory` are app-callable.
But an app acting for a gated seat does meet `two_factor_required`, and
an undocumented 403 leaves it nothing to go on. It goes beside
`password_change_required` in rate-limits-and-quotas, which already
explains what a team's administration does to a member's requests.
Adds the Mistral and document-annotation img2txt examples to the
playground, states that Textract takes no options, and drops the
normalize mentions from the img2txt docs and types.
The SDK now checks Mistral inline sources against the size a base64
upload can reach inside the 50 MB JSON body (36 MB) instead of the
10 MB Textract limit; 50 MB let 38-50 MB inputs through to a body-parser
413. Retired-model messages no longer cite vendor dates.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Model sync against Mistral's listing, docs and a live call per id:
mistral-ocr-latest now serves OCR 4.1, so the catalog pins it (with
mistral-ocr-4 and the retired-but-redirected 2503) to mistral-ocr-4-1,
adds mistral-ocr-4-0 and OCR 3 (mistral-ocr-2512 / -3 / -3-0), and
rejects the retired mistral-ocr-2505 before any upstream call. Mistral
usage is metered per model at vendor rates: $4/1000 pages for OCR 4.x
with $5 annotations, $2 and $3 for OCR 3, replacing the flat $1 and $3.
Textract now calls DetectDocumentText instead of AnalyzeDocument with
LAYOUT. The layout feature cost $4/1000 pages while we billed the
$1.50 detect rate, and it only added text-less LAYOUT_* blocks that put
blank lines into img2txt output. Multi-page PDFs and unsupported
formats become a 400 that names Mistral as the alternative.
Request shape: a model name alone now selects its provider, so calls
differ only by model; an explicit provider still picks its default and
must agree with the model. Mistral options gain tableFormat,
extractHeader, extractFooter and documentAnnotationPrompt; annotation
formats accept the REST (json_schema.schema) or SDK
(jsonSchema.schemaDefinition) spelling and are validated before
billing. Non-image documents such as DOCX go as document_url.
Response shape: both providers return model, text and blocks with a
0-based page; Mistral also returns document_annotation, which was
billed but dropped. img2txt resolves to that annotation when
documentAnnotationFormat is set and to the text otherwise; the return
is a string for every model, so normalize has no effect on it.
Input size: OCR input is capped at the provider limit (10 MB Textract,
50 MB Mistral), and web inputs in loadFileInput are streamed under the
cap instead of buffered whole, which also bounds speech2txt URLs.
Docs: img2txt models, options, input limits, return value and errors;
OCR limits in the quotas page.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Found by driving the flow against a live instance: a provisioned seat
could reach `configure-2fa/setup` but never `enable`, which demands a
confirmed email. Seats are provisioned without one on purpose (PUT-1792,
the team being the trust anchor), so requiring 2FA of a team would have
locked out precisely the accounts the rule is for — permanently, since a
seat cannot enrol and the rule never lifts.
The check now passes for an account a team provisioned; every other
account still needs its address confirmed, with tests either way.
The card's note was also a line too long and rendered clipped, so it says
the same thing in the space the layout gives it.
An owner toggle beside the directory one, confirmed on the way on since
it locks out every account without 2FA until they enrol, and unconfirmed
on the way off since that only lifts a requirement.
A per-member Reset 2FA action, shown only while the rule is on — with it
off a member can clear their own factor and needs nobody's help. The
confirmation says what it does and what it leaves alone: signed out
everywhere, told about it, password unchanged.
`require2fa` rides the Team shape and `update()`, and `resetTwoFactor()`
joins the module beside `resetPassword()`, whose docblock already says
2FA is left alone — the two now read as the pair they are.
Forcing 2FA makes lockout materially likelier, and nothing could clear a
factor except the account holding it — `resetMemberPassword` leaves 2FA
alone on purpose, and admin only displays it. A seat that lost both its
authenticator and its recovery codes had no way back.
Its own route and its own audit action rather than folded into the
password reset, so that method keeps the property its comment claims: a
password reset alone is not takeover. The two together are, and for an
account the team created and pays for that is the team's to do — but it
has to be chosen and recorded, not arrived at sideways.
Bounded to `org_owned = 1`: a joined member's own login is not a team's
to reach into. The member is told, and signed out everywhere.
`group.require_2fa`, toggled by the owner through `PUT /teams/:uid` and
recorded in the audit log like `directory_enabled` — it changes what
every seat must hold to sign in, so it is not something a team should be
able to alter silently.
Enforced by deriving, not by stamping a flag on the user: a stamp left
behind by a member leaving, or by the rule being turned off, would lock
someone out of their own account with no team left to clear it. The seat
row already joins `group` and is already read per request, so it carries
the flag and the gate costs nothing extra. Toggling busts those rows, or
turning the rule off would leave members locked out until the TTL lapsed.
The gate rides the same `allowUnconfirmed` opt-out as the other pending-
requirement gates, so the routes a gated member must still reach stay
reachable — `configure-2fa` among them, which would otherwise be walled
off behind the very requirement it clears.
Scoped to `org_owned = 1`: the owner is not a seat of their own team, and
a joined member is an ordinary self-paying account whose personal login
is not a team's to dictate. The owner is held to the rule at the point it
matters — they cannot turn it on without 2FA of their own.
OpenAI's o3-pro, Mistral's mistral-large-2512 and zai-glm-5-2, and
DeepSeek's deepseek-v4-flash / deepseek-v4-flash-vision-exp are no
longer served by their upstream APIs, so drop them from the hardcoded
provider model lists (closesHeyPuter/puter#3945).
DeepSeek's legacy chat/reasoner aliases and default model previously
pointed at deepseek-v4-flash; they now resolve to deepseek-v4-pro, the
remaining model in that catalog, so existing callers keep working.
Signed-off-by: Anuj Shrivastava <anujshrivastava10e@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Anuj Shrivastava <anuj.shrivastava@btr.group>
* fix(kv): keep disableSharing entries out of other apps' events (PUT-1876)
Private kv keys and values are no longer delivered to cross-app subscriptions, including forwarded and durable deliveries.
* fix(fs): refuse usernames whose home path still holds another account's rows (PUT-1877)
Username claims (signup, save_account, change-username, OIDC, team provisioning) now also check for leftover rows under /<name>/, and the root listing only returns the actor's own home.
* fix(puter-js): reconnect the events channel after a server-side disconnect (PUT-1881)
A server hang-up is retried with a bounded backoff; persistent handlers survive it and get an optional onError when the connection can't be restored.
* fix(backend): let the graceful shutdown finish before telemetry exits (PUT-1948)
The telemetry preload no longer exits on signals; the entry point drains, tears down top-down, flushes telemetry last, then exits. DB pools stay open until teardown.
* fix(fs): reserve quota for signed uploads in progress (PUT-1880)
startWrite/startBatchWrite hold each upload's declared size in a per-owner cache reservation until it completes, aborts or expires, so a burst of starts can't all read the same committed usage. Caps in-flight uploads at 10,000 per account.
* fix(fs): refuse to complete a signed upload whose object never arrived (PUT-1951)
Completion now 400s when the object store reports the key missing (transient errors stay lenient), abort no longer deletes an object a live entry still uses, and a ghost entry is only removed after a second miss at its recorded location.
* fix(metering): move usage to v2 keys with a small totals item, per-model detail shards and a 3-month TTL (PUT-1949)
The billed item holds only totals; per-model detail lives in 100 hash-sharded items read in one batch and cached for 60s, and more than 5,000 distinct usage types in a month fold into other. Global and per-app aggregates store totals only, appTotals comes from a prefix listing, a refused path only skips the key that refused it, exact reads near the allowance are throttled per key, and every metering record expires after 3 months. September usage restarts at deploy; the monthly-charge claim stays on the v1 key through September so recurring charges don't fire twice.
* test(events): let the worker backoff test tolerate a loaded run
* feat(events): scale KV event fan-out with the key owner's plan
A KV change delivers to up to 512 matching subscriptions (2,048 filter evaluations) for a paid key owner and 128 (512) otherwise, inline values are dropped once more than 128 match, and paid accounts may hold up to 512 share handles per app. The owner's plan is only looked up when a change has more candidates than any cap.
* test(metering): seed the 150-app listing test directly so it fits under coverage
dependabot[bot]