* fix: keep launch tokens out of URLs and storage (PUT-2040)
- Strip the consumed launch token param from the app URL after load
- Never persist user session (godmode) tokens to localStorage; purge any stored one at boot
- Worker log socket sends the token as its first message instead of in the URL path
* fix: strip the private-app sign-in token from top-level URLs, keep godmode tokens across reloads (PUT-2040)
- Private-app gate: a top-level GET carrying ?puter.auth.token= that passes the gate gets the sticky cookie and a 302 to the same URL without the token. Framed launches are untouched.
- Godmode session tokens go to sessionStorage (never localStorage), so a frame reload stays signed in; cleared on sign-out or when an app token replaces it.
A personal access token scoped below the account (e.g. the one in an
account-minted getReadURL() URL) has effectiveApp === null, which the durable
list/unsubscribe/ack scope check and notif fetch read as account context. Gate
those on isAccountContext, as workers/handlers/kv-handles already do, and refuse
such tokens on durable subscribe.
* fix(fs): keep a vacated username off-limits to other accounts for an hour
Renaming a home rewrites descendant paths in the database, but their
cached entries keep the old path until they expire. ACL grants a home by
path prefix, so whoever takes the old name next must not be able to
before those entries are gone. renameUserHome now records the vacated
name, and the claim check every username-claim site already runs treats
it as taken for anyone but the account that left it.
* test: seed recommended apps that are still in the default list
The default list no longer includes editor or camera, so the ordering
test found neither.
The chat gate read `model.costs` directly to decide affordability, cap
`max_tokens` and size the credit hold, while usage is recorded at cost
times the AI cost factor, so all three ran low by the factor on every
request. The gate now resolves the factor and applies it to both rates.
The factor is looked up by the key the provider records usage under.
Providers expose that key through `meteringModelKey` and use it when
recording, so the gate and the charge can't drift apart; the
unreported-stream backstop records under the same key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
MeteringService knew about AI: it built the cost-factor facade, resolved
the `ai.cost.factor.*` hook and, since the previous commit, offered
`reserveAiCredits`. Metering stays agnostic to what it meters, so all of
that now lives with the AI drivers in `drivers/util/aiCostFactor.ts`.
`withAiCostFactor(metering, events, driver)` returns an
`AiMeteringService`: the service with recording scaled by the factor,
plus `costFactor` and `reserveAiCredits` for gates. The speech providers
take that type. MeteringService itself has no AI methods left.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A data URL's filename came from its MIME subtype, so `audio/mpeg`
became `input.mpeg` and `audio/x-wav` became `input.x-wav`. OpenAI's
transcription API picks the decoder from the extension and rejected
both. Map the MIME types whose subtype isn't the extension.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A streamed write sends the caller's declared size to the object store as
the body length. A body that ends short of it was rejected as
IncompleteBody and surfaced as a 500.
Text-to-speech, speech-to-text and voice-changer providers checked
affordability against the unscaled provider cost and never reserved it,
so the gate ran low by the AI cost factor and concurrent requests could
each spend the whole balance. They now go through
`reserveAiCredits`, which scales the amount by the model's cost factor,
checks it, and holds it until the request finishes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Remove models providers have deprecated or retired, add newly released
ones, and move provider defaults off retired models. Gemini video (Veo
via the Gemini API) is removed; Infron and OpenRouter skip models their
listings mark deprecated. xAI bills cached prompt tokens only at the
cached rate. Claude Sonnet 4.6 max output raised to 128K.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Update recipes for storing a small list and store per id
* Potential fix for pull request finding 'Clarify that IDs must be path-safe or properly escaped'
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
The account tab only offered changing the avatar. Add a "Remove photo"
action, shown while a picture is set, that clears it via
update_profile({ picture: null }) and resets every avatar to the default.
On failure the hint line says so and the picture stays.
The tab can render before the profile loads, so the profile loader also
reveals the button once a picture arrives. Also move the avatar hint
into i18n.
Three permission routes sized their work by the request body rather than by
the route, so one call could cost far more than its rate-limit slot implies.
- `extra` and `meta` were only type-checked. They ride every row a grant
writes (up to 16) and are re-serialised into the per-(user, app) cache on
each miss, so they are now capped at 4 KiB.
- `/auth/create-access-token` took a `permissions` array of any length: one
permission check and one sequential INSERT each. It now uses the same
16-per-request cap the grant routes already had, and runs every entry
through the validator those routes use.
- Withdrawing an app's cross-app data grants looks them up by permission
text, and no index on `user_to_app_permissions` led with `permission`.
Indexed per engine, mirroring what mysql_mig_22 / postgres_mig_11 /
sqlite 0067 did for `user_to_user_permissions`.
`grant-dev-app` validated none of its input — not even the type of `extra` —
so it now runs the same validator as its user-app sibling.
Two paths could also carry a permission wider than the `varchar(255)` column
it lands in. `grantUserAppPermission` already rejected that after rewriting;
`grantDevAppPermission` now does the same, and `createAccessToken` checks it
before the session row a failing INSERT would otherwise orphan.
Caps are published in rate-limits-and-quotas.md. Every in-tree caller sends
one permission and a small `extra`, so none of them change behaviour.
A page the browser gives no origin to — one opened straight from disk, or an
iframe sandboxed without `allow-same-origin` — serialises its origin as
`"null"`. `appUidFromOrigin` logged that at error level on every attempt and
the GUI sent it on three endpoints, so each refusal cost a 400 and an
error-level line while the user got nothing useful.
An opaque origin cannot name an app to mint a token for, and is not a valid
`postMessage` target to deliver one to, so these clients are refused rather
than supported. Make the refusal quiet, early and legible instead:
- AuthService: drop the `console.error` and say what the caller should do.
The accept/reject set is unchanged; a 400 is already counted per route.
- puter.js: `signIn()` rejects with `unsupported_origin` before opening
anything, which covers implicit auth too since it routes through `signIn`.
The load-time warning now covers sandboxed iframes, console-only — a modal
belongs in nobody else's embed.
- GUI: a popup whose opener has no attested origin says so and closes,
instead of rendering a blank window and wedging on a failed exchange.
Also fixes two faults this made reachable: `PuterDialog.open()` prefers the
popup branch, which reaches the `puter` global before the constructor that
assigns it has returned (`puter is not defined`, no SDK at all); and
`showModal()` throws where modals are blocked. `openNotice()` does neither.
Ordinary http(s) sign-in is unaffected.
One conflict, in workerInvoker.integration.test.ts: #3997 fixed the same
gap-marker flake this branch did, with a different barrier. Took theirs
— waiting on the `ev:qf` counter, which `#handlerFailed` writes strictly
after `discard`, so the marker is in and the lease cleared by the time it
reads 1. Their ordering also asserts the counter before flipping `answer`
back to 200, which closes the redelivery-clears-failures hole this
branch's version had removed the line to avoid.
Converted the two `vi.waitFor` calls #3997 added to `waitUntil`, the
helper this branch introduced for the rest of the file. Neither is wrong
today, since the new block fakes no timers, but a `jump()` added near
them later would hit exactly the drained-backoff trap the helper exists
for.
It describes our local two-server MySQL replication setup, which is
internal tooling rather than anything a self-hoster or contributor
needs. It now lives in the heyputer repo alongside the other internal
docs.
The suite it documented stays: the header comment now states the
env-var gate directly instead of pointing at a file this repo no
longer carries.
* fix: misc events and kv issues found during recipes
* test: cover handler depth on narrowed actors and created notifications
* test: fix stale legacy batch directory upload test and seat user-agent flake
* test: wait for the refusal to be recorded before claiming its gap marker
The refused-delivery test waited for `depth(subId)` to reach 1 before
claiming the marker, but `discard` removes the entry and appends the
marker in its place, so the depth is 1 before, during and after. The
wait returned at once, and the claim came back `inflight` — the refused
delivery still held the lease it was invoked on — leaving the assertion
reading `undefined`. It only passed on the slack in `invoked`'s poll
interval, which a loaded runner takes away.
Waiting on the claim itself is the barrier the depth was standing in
for. Dropping `answer = 200` with it: `beforeEach` already resets it,
and a redelivery settling before the last assertion would clear the
failure count it reads.
Daniel Salazar